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 2     ABSTRACT  This work is intended to ascertain whether Putnam’s internal realism is actually a realist doctrine. Putnam has opposed internal realism, which maintains that truth is an epistemic notion (specifically, idealised rational acceptability), to metaphysical realism, which holds that truth is a non-epistemic notion (in particular, a correspondence relationship between sentences and extra-linguistic facts). Putnam has argued that, even if metaphysical realism is untenable, realism is still defensible, for internal realism is a form of realism.  In my work, I leave aside the question of the correctness of Putnam’s arguments against metaphysical realism and I directly focus upon internal realism. I first present this position and I set out its realist characteristics: Putnam’s position can be characterised as one that originated in an attempt to develop Dummett’s anti-realist notion of truth in a realist direction. I show that this effort is in part successful.  Next, I raise objections against internal realism and I show that, despite its merits, Putnam’s position is not a form of realism. This is so mainly because internal realism may collapse into relativism, which – I argue – is not realism, and because the internal realist cannot explain how the world, which is causally independent of our minds, makes statements true or false.  Since Putnam’s probably constitutes the best possible attempt to produce an epistemic view of truth compatible with realism, I conclude that truth conceived as an epistemic notion is incompatible with realism. I finally suggest that realism can be restored if Putnam’s arguments against metaphysical realism can be shown to be incorrect, so that a non-epistemic notion of truth can be rehabilitated. 
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 7 Introduction      I. The central question: is internal realism a form of realism?   This thesis is meant to ascertain whether Putnam’s internal realism is indeed a form of realism, as Putnam contends it is. Internal realism is the position according to which, roughly, truth is an epistemic notion – specifically, idealised justification. Putnam has contrasted internal realism with both metaphysical realism and Dummett’s anti-realism. The central claim of metaphysical realism is that truth is a non-epistemic notion – in particular, a correspondence relationship between sentences and extra-linguistic facts. Dummett’s anti-realism affirms, on the other hand, that truth is an epistemic notion reducible to some kind of current justification. Internal realism contrasts with metaphysical realism in that it claims that truth is an epistemic notion; yet, internal realism does not coincide with anti-realism because it identifies truth not with current but with idealised justification.  Putnam has argued that the non-epistemic conception of truth of metaphysical realism, though it apparently matches the intuitive realist notion of truth, proves irremediably flawed, as the idea of a correspondence relationship between sentences and extra-linguistic facts is conceptually incoherent. Putnam has also urged that Dummett’s identification of truth with current justification, though free from conceptual incoherence, is unacceptable, as it does not comply with many realist requirements. Putnam hopes to remedy the deficiencies of both positions with the internal realist thesis that truth is idealised justification; that is, an epistemic notion that appears able to retain many of the realist features proper to the non-epistemic conception of truth of metaphysical realism.  Putnam’s contention is that internal realism is a form of realism; indeed one that widely matches the intuitive idea of realism once metaphysical realism has proved incoherent. In this work, I aim to show that Putnam’s contention is on the whole incorrect, as the internal realist notion of truth does not fulfil an essential realist requirement. Thus, internal realism is not a form of realism.  
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II. Internal realism as an attempted synthesis of metaphysical realism and anti-realism   We can distinguish at least two general standpoints from which a realist position may be held; that is, an ontological and a semantic perspective. In addition, philosophers of science typically hold that realism can also be asserted from an epistemological perspective.1 Roughly, the ontological realist is committed to affirming, in general, that there is a reality independent of our minds. The semantic realist claims that our descriptive statements are either true or false of that reality. Finally, the epistemological realist affirms that independent reality is knowable, at least in principle, to some extent.2  There is, however, the general tendency to associate realism more with semantic and ontological issues rather than with epistemological issues.3 On my view, the reason is that it is intuitive that even a sceptic can be a realist in the full sense. One can in fact be considered a realist in a strong sense – i.e. a metaphysical realist – if one maintains that:  (A) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds.4 (B) The world is independent of language. (C) Truth is some sort of correspondence relationship between language and the world independent of language.  (A) and (B) are ontological theses specifying two different senses in which the world is said to be independent of our minds and (C) is an alethic thesis. Notice that, if (A)-(C) are claimed to qualify realism in general, even a radical sceptic could be a realist. For he could well endorse all of them, as they say nothing at all about our ability to achieve true representations of the world. On the other hand, the old-fashioned idealist denying (A) – but not necessarily (B) and (C)5 – cannot be considered as a realist.   Dummett and other new-fashioned idealists – or anti-realists – do not question (A) but reject (C). In fact, as Putnam has emphasised, “Dummett identifies truth with                                                 1See for instance the Introduction of Papineau (1999). 2For example, Boyd has emphasised that “Scientific realists holds that the characteristic product of successful scientific research is knowledge of largely theory-independent phenomena, and that such knowledge is possible (indeed actual) even in those cases in which the relevant phenomena are not, in any non-question-begging sense, observable” (Boyd 1982, p. 614). 3See for example Anderson (1992), p. 69. 4Notice that, rigorously speaking, there are elements of the world that are caused or constituted by our minds (for example mental representations); obviously, the realist thesis (A) does not refer to them. In my work, I will in general intend the terms “the world” and “reality”, when they are used to state realist theses, in a sense that does not include those mind-dependent elements.  5They could maintain that what we call “the world” is nothing but a structured collection of sense data. 
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justification”1 and with no correspondence relationship between language and the world. This is indeed the case with certain classes of empirical sentences (for instance, about theoretical objects and past events).2 Dummett has specified that the truth of these sentences should be identified with conclusive (i.e. stable and complete) justification,3 and he seems to believe that conclusive justification can actually be attained in certain cases.4  As Putnam has explained, “Dummett’s view [is] that the justification conditions for sentences [… can be] fixed once and for all by a recursive definition”.5 This is so because Dummett believes or tends to believe that the justification conditions for statements are already fixed once and for all in our current linguistic practices.6 Consequently, if a sentence actually obtained conclusive justification, not only would its justification coincide with some kind of current evidence but it would also depend on current justification standards. In this double sense truth as conclusive justification is, from Dummett’s perspective, a kind of current justification.   Though Dummett has not emphasised it, a consequence of his intra-linguistic notion of truth is that one can no longer assert that there are facts independent of our language that make the disputed statements true or false. For, the only facts which these sentences can be about are defined by means of the sentences themselves; for instance, by the platitude that:  “p” is true if and only if it is a fact that p.  For this reason, Dummett can be said to accept an intra-linguistic notion of a fact.   When anti-realism is taken as a global position – i.e. when it is referred to sentences in general – it entails rejecting the thesis (B), according to which the world is independent of language. For, in these conditions, the only world which one can describe and speak of depends on our language. This however does not involve that our language or our minds create the world. For the anti-realist can recognise – to use an expression of Putnam – that “there are experiential inputs to knowledge”7 caused by the external world, though those inputs and the world can be described only from within                                                 1Putnam (1983d), p. 84. 2For Dummett’s anti-realist position, see Dummett (1978a) and (1978b). 3See for instance Dummett (1973), p. 514. 4See Putnam (1983a), p. xvii. 5Putnam (1983d), p. 85. 6See for instance Dummett (1976), pp. 69-70. 7Putnam (1981), p. 54. 
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language. What this perspective requires is that even the truth of our most basic sentences (e.g. those about sense data) is not some kind of correspondence with extra-linguistic facts.1 One could say that the contemporary anti-realists do not deny the causally independent existence of reality, but its language-independent objectivity.  Roughly, Dummett’s anti-realism, when it is held as a global position, appears to rely upon the following ontological and semantic tenets:  (A) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds. (B*) The world is not independent of language. (C*) Truth is some kind of current justification.   Putnam had for some years accepted all the metaphysical realist theses (A)-(C); then, in the late seventies – in his internalist “conversion” – he rejected some of them. In particular, the “conversion” consisted in the rejection of the claims (C) and (B) – namely, the very ones that the anti-realist does not accept. Putnam’s arguments against (C) and (B) are however original and, in any case, completely different from Dummett’s.  The arguments by Dummett aim specifically to refute the thesis (C). They move from the assumption that “The dispute [… between realists and anti-realists] concerns the notion of truth appropriate for statements of the disputed class”;2 that is, whether this notion has to be conceived as evidence-transcendent or as some form of justification. The general scheme of the arguments is, in my opinion, the following: Dummett contends that, since sentences are understood by grasping their truth conditions, the dispute about the nature of truth concerns whether the competent speaker understands sentences by knowing evidence-transcendent truth conditions or mere justification conditions. Then, he focuses upon undecidable sentences; namely, the ones for which the competent speaker has no effective procedure to establish in a conclusive way their truth or falsity in any circumstance. This class may include counterfactuals, sentences about facts existing in inaccessible regions of space and time, sentences about someone else’s mental states, etc. Dummett finally argues that the competent speaker cannot but understand these sentences by knowing their justification conditions and not their evidence-transcendent truth conditions. The point is that – according to Dummett – to know the evidence-transcendent conditions of truth of a                                                 1See Putnam (1979), p. 128. 2Dummett (1978b), p. 146. 
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sentence, a speaker must have an effective procedure to establish the sentence’s truth or falsity in a conclusive way, but this is just impossible for undecidable sentences. In conclusion, at least the truth of undecidable sentences must be thought of as some kind of justification.1  Although Dummett’s arguments have admittedly induced Putnam to criticise metaphysical realism,2 Putnam seems to have never accepted them. In his last attempt to defend metaphysical realism, Putnam rejected the crucial assumption of Dummett’s arguments: that sentences are understood by grasping their truth conditions. Putnam urged splitting up the theory of understanding and the theory of truth. Understanding should have been grounded in a Wittgensteinian notion of linguistic usage that allows verification (or similar epistemic notions), but not truth, to have a role in understanding. On the other hand, the notion of truth as correspondence with the extra-linguistic world should have been introduced in philosophical discourse just to provide an explanation of the success and the failure of science and of our general linguistic behaviour.3  Putnam has argued against the theses (B) and (C) of metaphysical realism by means of a series of objections that in no way presuppose Dummett’s thesis that sentences are understood by grasping their truth conditions. The Model-Theoretic Argument, the Brains-in-a-Vat Argument and, more recently, The Argument from Conceptual Relativity are surely the most famous of them. They all aim to show that the notion of truth as a correspondence between sentences and extra-linguistic facts and the idea that the world is structured independently of language are in themselves incoherent and, therefore, unintelligible. (I will briefly discuss these arguments in the Appendix of the thesis)  After his internalist “conversion”, Putnam endorsed the theses (A) and (B*) of contemporary anti-realism, but he has rejected the thesis (C*), according to which, truth is some kind of current justification. Putnam in fact did not accept Dummett’s claim that the justification conditions for sentences can be fixed once and for all. Following Quine, he urged that “the justification conditions for sentences change as our total body of knowledge changes”4 with the result that:  
                                                1For Dummett’s anti-realist arguments, see for instance Dummett (1976), pp. 70-72 and pp. 81-83 and Dummett (1978c), pp. 216-217 and pp. 224-225. 2See, for instance, the Preface of Putnam (1979). 3See “Reference and Understanding”, in ibid. 4Putnam (1983d), p. 84. 
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Not only may we find out that statements we now regard as justified are false, but we may even find out that procedures we now regard as justificatory are not, and that different justification procedures are better.1  Putnam has urged that, if truth were identified with some kind of current justification, statements may change their truth-value in the long run, but this contrasts with widespread realist intuitions about the features of truth (“truth is supposed to be a property of a statement that cannot be lost”2). Since reliable justification procedures and statements conclusively justified can be envisaged to be available in the ideal end of the knowledge process, Putnam has claimed that:  [T]ruth is to be identified with justification in the sense of idealized justification.3  Which means that:  [T]he true is what would be justified under optimal [epistemic] conditions.4  Where the optimal epistemic conditions for the justification of sentences are determined on the grounds of the total body of knowledge attained in the ideal end of the knowledge process.   In other internal realist papers, Putnam has defined truth as idealised rational acceptability, that is:  [S]ome sort of ideal coherence of our belief with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our beliefs system.5  Here “coherence” does not mean mere logical consistency, but it refers to a complex concept that includes many other epistemic virtues too (like, simplicity and explanatory power). In this characterisation, a statement is true if and only if it is deducible from the most coherent theory one could in principle attain. This characterisation of truth does 
                                                1Putnam (1983d), p. 85. 2Ibid., p. 84. 3Putnam (1983a), p. xvii. 4Putnam (1983g), p. 280. 5Putnam (1981), pp. 49-50. Putnam’s italic. 
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not conflict with the claim that truth is idealised justification. For the holistic nature of epistemic justification involves that, in general, a statement’s optimal conditions of justification are satisfied if and only if a maximally coherent theory entailing the statement is attained. The account of truth given in terms of idealised rational acceptability is more general than the one given in terms optimal conditions of justification. For, as I will show, one can establish what the ideal conditions of justification for a sentence are only after attaining a maximally coherent theory embodying that sentence.  To sum up, in his internalist turn, Putnam replaced the thesis (C*), endorsed by Dummett, by the following claim:  (C**) Truth is idealised rational acceptability.  Putnam named the form of realism rejected by Dummett and himself, based upon the theses (A)-(C), “metaphysical realism” and has called the philosophical position specified by the tenets (A), (B*) and (C**) “internal realism” – that is:  (A) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds. (B*) The world is not independent of language. (C**) Truth is idealised rational acceptability.1   Putnam has recently emphasised that:  The “internal realist” picture was an attempt to show the compatibility of [… Dummett’s idea that truth can never be totally recognition-transcendent] with commonsense realism.2  Internal realism can indeed be thought of as an attempted synthesis of anti-realism and metaphysical realism able to retain the advantages and to avoid the defects of both of them. Internal realism shares, with anti-realism, an epistemic conception of truth; thus it escapes from the charge of incoherence made against metaphysical realism. On the 
                                                1As we will see below, in Ch. 1 and in Ch. 2, Putnam’s definitions of both metaphysical and internal realism are in fact more sophisticated. Putnam has however recognised that his internalist perspective can approximately be identified with Dummett’s anti-realist perspective. See, for instance, Putnam (1981), p. 56. 2Putnam (1994), pp. 256-257. 
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other hand, internal realism includes a notion of truth more sophisticated than the anti-realist notion. This makes it able to retain many of the realist features of metaphysical realism.   III. The alleged realist character of internal realism  Putnam believes that, though metaphysical realism is untenable, this does not show ipso facto the impossibility of realism. For internal realism fully matches the intuitive characteristics that a realist position should have. Putnam has for instance emphasised that, by identifying truth with idealised justification, the intuitive realist requirement according to which “some of the statements which are now justified may turn out not to be true”1 will be fully satisfied. Putnam has also urged that internal realism “is not a view in which the mind makes up the world”.2 For his position, as well as metaphysical realism, admits that the world is not caused or constituted by our minds.  The above claims can be developed methodically by specific theses about the world (or reality) and truth. Independently of the thesis (C) – according to which, truth is a correspondence between language and the extra-linguistic world – and the thesis (B) – according to which, the world is independent of language – the intuitions of the realists mostly say, to begin with, that what we call “the world” is something neither created, caused nor constituted by our minds (for instance, it is not made up out of our sense data).3 These intuitions furthermore say that it is the world – conceived as above – that makes sentences in general determinately either true or false.4 As a result, sentences are subject to the Bivalence Principle. Finally, most realists think that how the world actually is transcends our current descriptions and is independent of the descriptions of subjects and cultures in general. Consequently, most realists will think of truth as independent of current evidence and current criteria of epistemic justification and as objective, i.e. independent of the descriptions of subjects and cultures in general. Putnam’s position would seem to be able to comply with all these realist desiderata, at least in the first instance.  To begin with, to comply with the desideratum of the existence of a causally mind-independent reality, Putnam accepts – as I have indicated – the thesis (A), stating that                                                 1Putnam (1983d), p. 85. 2Putnam (1981), p. xi. 3I neglect here all the aspects of reality or all facts that are created, caused or constituted by our minds. 4I exclude, for instance, sentences in which vague predicates occur. 
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the world is not constituted or caused by our minds. Furthermore, to accommodate the realist intuition that empirical statements in general are made either true or false by the world not created by our minds, the internal realist can emphasise that what we describe by means of our statements is just the world not created by our minds. Putnam in fact recognises that we actually have perceptual experiences and that the latter are explained by hypothesising the existence of facts not created by our minds. Though perceptions, relationships existing between perceptions and independent facts and facts themselves can only be described from within our language; that is, by means of the platitude that:  it is a fact that p if and only if “p” is true.  The internal realist will then emphasise that the set of all existing facts – conceived as above – constitutes the causally mind-independent world mentioned in the thesis (A).  The internal realist will moreover emphasise that, in virtue of the fact that truth is idealised and not current justification, a wide number of sentences that are undecidable on Dummett’s anti-realist view will become decidable from the internal realist perspective (this could be the case, for instance, of scientific generalisations). Thus, a great quantity of empirical sentences will be liable to Bivalence.  Finally, if truth is identified with idealised rational acceptability, truth will turn out to be independent of current evidence and current criteria of assertibility and it will prove to a large extent objective. For idealised rational acceptability transcends current rational acceptability and it is conceived as independent of the beliefs that subjects and cultures in general have or may have.   IV. Internal realism is not a form of realism   One of the possible critical approaches to Putnam’s anti-metaphysical doctrine consists in assessing Putnam’s arguments against metaphysical realism. All these arguments are in fact still controversial as to their correct interpretation and soundness. Another critical approach to Putnam’s position is, leaving aside the question of the correctness of his anti-metaphysical arguments, to evaluate the internal coherence and the adequacy of internal realism. This is the approach of my work.  As I have emphasised, Putnam’s doctrine is first and foremost an attempt to re-propose realism in philosophy after the linguistic and anti-metaphysical turn. Putnam is 
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persuaded that, though truth is not a correspondence relationship and the world’s structure is not language-independent, it does not necessarily involve endorsing, for example, relativism, idealism or anti-realism, because realism – although not metaphysical realism – is still possible. The adequacy of Putnam’s doctrine has to be judged taking Putnam’s actual philosophical purposes into account. Internal realism will therefore prove acceptable if, above all, it can be shown to be a realist position in some non-trivial sense.  The main outcome of my investigation can be stated as follows: the internal realist notion of truth is ultimately elucidated by the notion of a theory that makes our beliefs maximally coherent with one another. In particular, on this view, a statement is true if and only if it is deducible from the most coherent theory one could in principle attain. Such a theory should be thought of as the epistemically best theory that ideal inquirers – i.e. beings having idealised sensible and intellectual faculties – would build up if they existed. The internal realist should think of such ideal inquirers as members of a possible extension of the community of human speakers. In this conception, a sentence p is true (if it is) because:  (C) If there were ideal inquirers, they would justify p (i.e. they would construct, on the grounds of their experiences and intelligence, a maximally coherent theory that entails p).   In this thesis, I raise two general objections against internal realism that depend upon the above explanation of a statement’s truth. My first and minor objection shows that there are no sufficient grounds to conclude that internal realism is a form of realism. My second and major objection shows that there are sufficient grounds to conclude that realism is not a form of realism.  My minor objection starts by contending that it is not absurd to think that alternative, incompatible “maximally coherent” theories are possible. The main reason supporting this conjecture is the following: Putnam has indicated that the coherence standards for hypotheses and theories (or the notion of theory coherence) can be improved up to an ideal stage mostly by the reflective equilibrium method. I will point out that there is however no guarantee that the application of this method would yield univocal results. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that different groups of ideal inquirers may ultimately arrive at accepting alternative sets of coherence standards (i.e. alternative 
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notions of ideal coherence) that may respectively certify incompatible theories as “maximally coherent”.  In addition, I will argue that, even if the application of the reflective equilibrium method did yield unequivocal results, there would still be no guarantee that just one maximally coherent theory is possible. The internal realist accepts in fact a world-involving notion of theory coherence, according to which, the maximally coherent theory is one that, among other properties, explains the highest possible number of observational sentences that the ideal inquirers have asserted on the grounds of their perceptions. The trouble is, now, that the “maximally coherent” theory T may be underdetermined by evidence. For one cannot rule out the possibility that there is another theory T* incompatible with T, which explains equally well the same observational statements explained by T and that is equivalent to T for any other epistemic virtue involved in the concept of maximal coherence. In this case, all possible evidence could not discriminate between T and T* and both of then should be considered “maximally coherent”.  The objection goes on by pointing out that, if there were incompatible “maximally coherent” theories, there would be a sentence p such that both p and not-p are true, and this would be unacceptable, as against the Law of Non-Contradiction. I will argue that, to overcome this difficulty, Putnam cannot simply decide to consider true just these sentences that would be shared by all “maximally coherent” systems. For this solution would dismiss the very coherence “mechanism” that makes sentences true. The internal realist claims in fact that true sentences are those that, within a maximally comprehensive system, justify one another to the highest possible degree by explaining each other in the best possible way. On this view, a sentence p proves ideally justified and true if and only if the sentences that explain p within the system can be said to be ideally justified and true too. A problem with this attempted way out is that – for instance – if general laws and principles of alternative “maximally coherent” theories were incompatible, they could not be considered true, thus all the other sentences would remain without adequate explanation and justification, so that they could not be considered true either. More in general, the claim is that, since truth is a holistic matter in Putnam’s picture, if one part of a sentences’ system cannot be considered true neither can the other part.   The alternative solution to cope with the above difficulty is to claim that truth is a relative notion – in the sense that, when a statement is true, it is not so in an absolute sense of the term but is just true relative to a group of ideal inquirers or a “maximally 
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coherent” theory. In this case, if two “maximally coherent” theories T and T* entailed, respectively, p and not-p, the properties that would make, respectively, p and not-p true would be distinct, so that to claim that both p and not-p are true would not clash with the Law of Non-Contradiction, which forbids p and not-p to share the same truth value. In conclusion, if incompatible “maximally coherent” theories turned up, the internal realist should embrace a form of alethic relativism. This solution is quite intuitive and it appears to be prima facie compatible with the coherentist conception of rational acceptability and truth accepted by Putnam. To defend the plausibility of this solution, I will furthermore show that none of Putnam’s objections against the intelligibility and the rational acceptability of the relativist position actually work or are relevant in this case.  The argument goes on by contending that alethic relativism is not a form of realism, as it does not comply with one of the central realist requirements listed above. In particular, my contention is that the alethic relativist has no acceptable way to explain how sentences are made true or false by the world not caused or constituted by our minds. For he should explain how the world makes incompatible sentences true at the same time – in fact, from the relativist perspective, incompatible sentences may turn out to be true relative to different subjects or social groups. The relativist has apparently two alternatives to try to provide such an explanation: either he will assert that there is just one causally mind-independent world that is able to make incompatible sentences true at the same time because such a world has an incoherent structure – but this is simply absurd. Or the relativist will assert that there are many incompatible causally mind-independent worlds that exist just relatively to subjects, social groups or conceptual schemes, and that this is the reason why incompatible sentences can be true of reality at the same time (i.e. because they are true of different worlds). The second alternative explanation is scarcely acceptable too, as the concept of a world not constituted by our minds that exists just relatively to some culture or theory is intuitively incoherent (a relatively existent world will most naturally be thought of as constituted by our minds). Moreover, such an explanation does not comply with the realist intuition that the world is just one.  To sum up, my minor objection to internal realism is that, since the internal realist cannot rule out the possibility that there may be more than one “maximally coherent” theory, he must leave the door open to the possibility that internal realism is nothing but a form of alethic relativism, which is not realism. In these conditions, there are no sufficient grounds to conclude that internal realism is a form of realism.  
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 My major objection runs as follows: explaining the truth of a sentence p by claiming it is the case because  (C) If there were ideal inquirers, they would justify p (i.e. they would construct, on the grounds of their experiences and intelligence, a maximally coherent theory that entails p),  commits the internal realist to providing another explanation. That is, an account of the truth of the counterfactual (C). And the new explanation must allow the world not caused by our minds (or the minds of ideal inquirers) to play a role in fixing p’s truth-value. Otherwise, the realist desideratum that the causally mind-independent world makes statements true or false would prove unfulfilled.  The internal realist will think of providing such a world-involving explanation by claiming that (C) is true because, if there were ideal inquirers, they would actually have certain intra-linguistic perceptions (i.e. perceptions that can be described only from within language) and they would explain the latter by working up a maximally coherent theory T that hypothesises the existence of certain causally mind-independent facts described by p. This would, however, commit the internal realist to elucidate how it is possible that, if ideal inquirers existed, they would have just those intra-linguistic perceptions and not others (for instance, perceptions that support not-p). If the internal realist contended that this is true simply because the sentence “the ideal inquirers would have just those perceptions” would in turn be deducible from T, the world-involving notion of coherence of the internal realist would collapse into a world-independent notion of coherence. In other words, it would not be clear any longer why p and T should be said to be true of the causally independent world rather than true as just invented by the ideal inquirers.  At this point, it is quite clear that the only satisfactory world-involving explanation of the fact that the ideal inquirers would have specific perceptions is claiming that they would have just those perceptions because of the features of the world in itself. Yet, this explanation assumes that reality is somehow self-structured into objects and facts that cause certain perceptions and not others. Unfortunately, Putnam’s position has rejected this form of metaphysical realism from the very beginning. Thus, the internal realist is left with no answer for the question of how the world not caused or constituted by our minds makes statements true or false. 
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 In conclusion, while my minor objection just shows that internal realism may not comply with the realist requirement that our sentences are made true or false by facts not caused or constituted by our minds, my major objection is intended to show that internal realism cannot definitely comply with this central requirement. I do not see any possible way out for the internal realist facing these two objections; consequently, I conclude that internal realism is not a form of realism.   Finally, in my work I argue that, since Putnam’s attempt to ground realism in an epistemic notion of truth is, probably, the most sophisticated and complete and the best possible in philosophy, a plausible general conclusion to draw is that the very identification of truth with epistemic notions is incompatible with realism. I suggest that what realists could do at this point is to scrutinise Putnam’s arguments against the non-epistemic views of truth in order to try to show that they are actually inconclusive.   V. Chronology and exegetical worries  As a matter of chronology, Putnam inaugurated the internal realist doctrine after his anti-metaphysical turn marked by the publication of the last chapter of Meaning and the Moral Sciences (1978), by which metaphysical realism and the thesis that truth is a correspondence relationship between language and external reality were explicitly rejected. Putnam was developing the central intuitions of internal realism for about a decade. During this period, his most representative publications were Reason, Truth, and History (1981), which can be considered as the “manifesto” of internal realism, and some essays included in Realism and Reason – Philosophical Papers: Vol. 3 (1983).  The publication of The Many Faces of Realism (1987) and, then, of Representation and Reality (1988)1 marked the conclusion of the internal realist phase and the beginning of a new period, i.e. the pragmatic realist one (to use Putnam’s own terminology). In the first of the aforementioned books, Putnam characterised his general conception of realism emphasising the possibility of alternative descriptions of the world. However, he did not mention the thesis that truth is definable as a sort of idealised rational acceptability or idealised justification, which is, surely, the central claim of internal realism (or, at least, a claim making explicit the central tendency of 
                                                1This book was first published by MIT Press, Cambridge and London, in 1988. In my work, I will however refer to a later edition. 
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this anti-metaphysical position).1 In the second aforementioned book, Putnam explicitly rejected that thesis.  It is worth noticing that, in Representation and Reality, Putnam denied that, in his internal realist phase, his intention was that of reducing truth to an epistemic notion.2 There are however legitimate doubts that this is the most transparent and accurate interpretation of the philosophical view presented in Putnam’s major internal realist books.3 Putnam’s positions are often “fluid” and many of his papers have anticipated – sometimes incoherently – positions defended in successive essays. Thus, it is certainly possible that, in the period I have called the “internal realist phase”, Putnam sporadically thought of truth as a notion not completely reducible to idealised justification or idealised rational acceptability, though it does not emerge from his papers with clarity. Yet, on the other hand, there is massive textual evidence supporting the claim that, in the same phase, Putnam in general endorsed or had the strong tendency to endorse a conception that reduces truth to an epistemic notion (I will quote the relevant affirmations by Putnam in the next pages).  It should additionally be noticed that most philosophers, on the grounds of the actual claims made in Putnam’s internal realist papers, have taken internal realism as a doctrine in which truth is nothing but idealised justification. Consequently, the critical debate about internal realism has largely presupposed this interpretation of Putnam’s view. My research is focused more on this important debate than on the exact exegetic details of Putnam’s thought.                                                     1The contention that this thesis is central for internal realism might be contested by emphasising that what Putnam calls “internal realism” developed along a period of time longer than that indicated by me. My reply would be that I define “internal realism” as Putnam’s position in which the claim that truth is idealised rational acceptability is the central one. 2Putnam has affirmed: “I am not offering a reductive account of truth, in any sense (nor of warrant, for that matter). In Reason, Truth and History I explained the idea thus: “truth is idealized rational acceptability”. This formulation was taken by many as meaning that “rational acceptability” [...] is supposed (by me) to be more basic than “truth”; that I was offering a reduction of truth to epistemic notions. Nothing was farther from my intention. The suggestion is simply that truth and rational acceptability are interdependent notions. Unfortunately, in Reason, Truth and History I gave examples of only one side of the interdependence: examples of the way truth depends on rational acceptability. But it seems clear to me that the dependence goes both ways” (Putnam 1991a, p. 115). 3Indeed, Putnam has recently recognised that his internal realist period was (also?) characterised by the intention of reducing truth to idealised rational acceptability. He has said: “It was the hope that […] truth might actually be reduced to notions of “rational acceptability” and “better and worse epistemic situation” that did not themselves presuppose the notion of truth that was responsible for the residue of idealism in Reason, Truth and History” (Putnam, 1992, p. 373). 
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VI. The project and structure of this work  In broadest terms, the general project underlying my work is the following: in Chapter 1, I will single out the essential requirements that every general realist position must satisfy. In Chapter 2, I will try to provide the most coherent (and sympathetic) possible reconstruction of the position that Putnam has named “internal realism”, and I will show that this position complies in part with the essential realist requirements singled out in Chapter 1. In Chapter 3, I will clarify the conception of truth to which the internal realist is committed. In Chapter 4, I will argue that this conception of truth, though apparently coherent and in general acceptable, cannot comply with one of the essential realist requirements singled out in Chapter 1. In Chapter 5, I will conclude that, because of its conception of truth, internal realism is not a form of realism and that, because of Putnam’s failure, we can conclude that epistemic conceptions of truth in general are very probably incompatible with realism.    Here is a more detailed outline of the same project:   Chapter 1, “Preliminaries: realism and truth”, is meant to provide the reader with the notions indispensable to understand the position of internal realism and the objections and criticisms I raise against it throughout the thesis. In particular, I will first discuss the notion of metaphysical realism to which Putnam has opposed his anti-metaphysical view. Then, using the notion of metaphysical realism as a basis, I will single out the intuitive minimum requirements that any realist position must satisfy. I will next focus on the general notion of epistemic truth and I will identify three general positions that stem from the adoption of different epistemic notions of truth, that is: Dummett’s anti-realism, alethic relativism and Putnam’s internal realism.  Chapter 2, “Internal realism”, is meant to present the notion of internal realism and to cast light on its realist characteristics. I will initially provide an overview of Putnam’s position and, then, I will focus on its most central theses. In particular, I will go deeper into the analysis of the notion of truth as idealised justification and the notion of truth as maximal coherence; I will show what relationships exist between them and I will try to individuate their realist consequences. In my analysis, I will often contrast Putnam’s and Dummett’s conceptions of truth. In the end of the chapter, I will focus on the concept of equivalent descriptions that grounds Putnam’s pluralism about worldviews. 
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 Chapter 3, “Against ‘the Peircean theory of truth’”, is devoted to making the coherentist conception of truth which the internal realist is committed to clearer-cut. I will first urge that this conception can hardly be identified with the so-called “Peircean theory of truth”, as the latter does not match many realist desiderata and because it proves ultimately untenable. I will then argue that the coherentist conception of truth proper to the internal realist is one that conceives the maximally coherent theory in terms of the system of the world that ideal inquirers would construct if they existed.  Chapter 4, “Objections to internal realism”, aims to raise and to discuss objections against Putnam’s position; this is the central and the most complex chapter of my work. I will initially consider objections against Putnam’s position that I find inconclusive. To begin with, I will focus on objections against epistemic conceptions of truth in general (i.e. general arguments against the possibility to reduce truth to epistemic notions). I will show that none of them is conclusive or fully convincing. Afterwards, I will focus on a recent argument by Wright aiming to show that the appeal to counterfactual inquirers (or ideal inquirers) yields incoherent consequences. I will show that Putnam can in fact reject this objection. Then, I will focus upon Fitch’s celebrated proof – recently re-proposed by Williamson – against verificationist theories of truth. I will apply the objection specifically to Putnam’s position and I will show that it is straightforwardly answerable by the internal realist.  Next, I will raise two objections to internal realism that I see as conclusive. To begin with, I will urge that the internal realist cannot guarantee or even make plausible that there would be just one maximally coherent theory. I will argue that, if more than one  “maximally coherent” theory were possible, the only acceptable way that Putnam would have to cope with the ensuing logical difficulties would be to endorse alethic relativism, that is, admitting that truth is a notion relative to social groups or theories. This argument will require me to show that none of Putnam’s objections against the intelligibility and acceptability of the position of alethic relativism actually work or are actually relevant. Finally, I will argue that, if internal realist truth actually turned out to be a relative notion, Putnam’s position would not be a form of realism, as alethic relativism is not realism. Since Putnam cannot rule out the possibility that internal realism is a form of alethic relativism, there are no sufficient grounds to conclude that internal realism is a form of realism. The second objection suggests that the conception of truth of internal realism makes it impossible to explain how causally mind-independent reality makes our statements true or false. Since providing such an 
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explanation is a central realist desideratum, there are sufficient grounds to maintain that internal realism is not a form of realism.  Chapter 5, “Conclusion: realism is incompatible with truth as an epistemic notion”, aims to recap the results of my investigation and to present my overall appraisal of internal realism. I will conclude that, though Putnam’s doctrine appears to be a coherent position from a general point of view and it actually has many intuitive realist features, internal realism is not a form of realism. For it does not fulfil all necessary requirements for realism. In this final chapter, I will also determine the general significance of the failure of Putnam’s internal realist programme for the debate on realism in contemporary philosophy. I will conclude that, since internal realism constitutes the best possible attempt to produce an epistemic view of truth compatible with realism, Putnam’s failure shows the very identification of truth with epistemic notions is incompatible with realism.  The Appendix of the thesis focuses upon Putnam’s major arguments against metaphysical realism – namely, the Brains-in-a-Vat Argument, the Model-Theoretic Argument and the Conceptual Relativity Argument. I will present the arguments in detail and I will provide the outline of lines of argument against them. Such objections, if adequately developed, would very probably defeat Putnam’s arguments against metaphysical realism 
 25 1 Preliminaries: realism and truth      1.1 Introduction to the chapter  In this chapter, I will provide the conceptual background presupposed by the criticism of Putnam’s internal realism that I will develop in my work. I will first focus upon the concept of metaphysical realism, which, in my opinion, reflects more closely than other notions the traditional idea of realism in philosophy. I will expose the specific externalist theses that make this position a metaphysical position.  Then, I will use metaphysical realism as a basis from which to abstract the essential desiderata that every general philosophical position that aims at bearing the title of realism must satisfy. Such desiderata appear to be metaphysically neutral – in the sense that they can apparently be fulfilled both by philosophical positions that embody the externalist theses and by philosophical positions that, like internal realism, do not embody the externalist theses. These desiderata can therefore be employed to establish whether or not internal realism is a realist doctrine.  Afterwards, I will provide a characterisation of the general notion of epistemic truth and I will single out three general philosophical positions that stem from the adoption of different specifications of this notion, namely: Dummett’s anti-realism, alethic relativism and Putnam’s internal realism. The conclusions of the chapter will follow.   1.2 Metaphysical realism and externalism  I will now present in detail the notion of metaphysical realism; I will specifically refer to the analysis of this notion provided by Putnam in his early internal realist papers, since it is particularly clear. I will try to make it more accurate mostly by isolating the specific metaphysical component of metaphysical realism – that Putnam calls “externalism” – from the other components. 
 26 
 Putnam has described metaphysical realism as a general model of the relation of any possible true theory to the world.1 Roughly, this model maintains that the world is structured in itself independently of our descriptions and that every true theory corresponds to or is a “copy” of the self-structured facts of the world.  Putnam has recently depicted metaphysical realism as the “fantasy [...] that there is a totality of ‘forms’ or ‘universals’ or ‘properties’ fixed once and for all, and that every possible meaning of a word corresponds to one of these ‘forms’ or ‘universals’ or ‘properties’”.2 The metaphysical realist would also assume that “there is one definite totality of objects that can be classified [on the basis of their fixed properties]”3 so that “knowledge claims are simply claims about the distribution of these ‘properties’ over these ‘objects’”.4  Putnam has characterised the perspective of metaphysical realism by the following theses:   (MR1) [T]he world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects.5  (MR2) There is exactly one true and complete description of “the way the world is”.6  (MR3) Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things.7   Let us focus upon the content of these tenets. (MR1) is an ontological thesis affirming that the world is mind-independent. The mind-independence of the world can be conceived in at least two distinct ways:  (1) The world consists of a totality of objects that are not caused or constituted by our minds.  
                                                1See Putnam (1979), p. 123. 2Putnam (1994a), p. 448. 3Ibid., p. 449. 4Ibid., pp. 451-452. 5Putnam (1981), p. 49. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. 
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(2) The world consists of a totality of objects and classes of objects that are conceptually independent of our minds.  Undoubtedly, Putnam attributes to the metaphysical realist the belief that the totality of objects constituting the world is not caused or constituted by our minds. Thus, the doctrine of metaphysical realism will include (1), and (MR1) has to be interpreted also in this sense. Yet, the specific ontological claim of the metaphysical realist is surely (2). In fact, the metaphysical realist specifically maintains that the world is organised in a totality of objects and classes of objects independently of our conceptual schemes, theories and, in general, our representations.  Let us consider now (MR3). This is an alethic thesis affirming that truth is to be conceived as a correspondence relationship between the non-logical terms of some of our sentences – the ones called “true” – and the external things constituting the external facts described by those sentences. Putnam’s expression “external things” is surely equivalent to “things that do not depend on language” or “things that do not depend on our representations”. The metaphysical realist does not define the notion of truth in terms of knowledge or possible knowledge – he does not say, for instance, that p is true if and only if one can know or one can justify that p is the case. Thus, for him, truth is a non-epistemic notion.1 (I will return to the notion of epistemic below in this chapter, in Section 1.4)  (MR3) involves alethic realism. For Dummett, a realist conception of truth is, in the first place, any conception that allows that, if a statement is true, it is so regardless of whether or not we have or can have any justification for it – in other words, its truth conditions are evidence-transcendent (i.e. non-epistemic).2 Truth as a correspondence relationship between language and extra-linguistic world satisfies this requirement. Dummett has also repeatedly emphasised that a consequence of alethic realism is that sentences are subjected to the Bivalence Principle (i.e., for any sentence p, p is determinately either true or false). Bivalence is a consequence of the existence of language-independent facts that make the relevant statements either true or false.3  Putnam has specified that the metaphysical realist thinks of truth as radically non-epistemic since he believes that “the theory that is ‘ideal’ from the point of view of operational utility, inner beauty, and elegance, ‘plausibility’, simplicity, ‘conservatism’, 
                                                1See Putnam (1979), p. 125. 2See, for instance, Dummett (1978b), p. 146. 3See for instance Dummett (1978a), pp. xxx-xxxi. 
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etc., might be false”.1 I think that here Putnam wants to emphasise the following point: if one affirms that truth is non-epistemic without any further specification, one might simply intend by this that the concept of truth be not defined in terms of notions that relate to knowledge – for instance, it is not defined in terms of some kind of justification. This thesis is however compatible with the possibility that the property of being true and the property of being justified are linked by a relationship of metaphysical necessity, in the sense that, in all possible worlds, a statement is true if and only if it is justified, even if there is no conceptual link between truth and justification. Yet, the metaphysical realist rejects this thesis. For his contention is that truth is not epistemic for the very reason that we can think that, in some possible worlds, our best-justified statements are not true. (Notice that this involves taking epistemological scepticism as possibly true). In conclusion, by asserting that truth is radically non-epistemic, the metaphysical realist intends that neither analytical necessity nor metaphysical necessity join truth and knowledge together  (MR3) affirms that truth involves “some sort of correspondence” between words and external things. Although (MR3) is not clear on this point, Putnam attributes to the metaphysical realist the thesis that the correspondence relationship is univocal.2 The expression “some sort” seems to allude to the fact that metaphysical realists do not agree upon the material nature of the correspondence. There are at least two possibilities: correspondence could be grounded in either causal connections between language and external things or some alleged sui generis intentional power of our minds.3 The correspondence relationship constituting truth is based on a reference relationship between each linguistic term and each thing in the world, and kind of things of the world if the term is a general term. Since the correspondence relationship which truth consists of is univocal, the reference relationship must be univocal too.4  Let us now consider (MR2). This is a semantic thesis affirming that there is exactly one true and complete description of how the world is. Completeness is intended to be                                                 1Putnam (1979), p. 125. 2See for instance Putnam (1994c), p. 352. 3Notice that, though also the internal realist – as we will see – admits the existence of some sort of correspondence between words and things, he cannot admit any sort of correspondence between words and extra-linguistic things. The argument from conceptual relativity (see the Appendix) developed by Putnam aims to show that the very concept of an extra-linguistic thing or object (as a self-structured entity) is simply a nonsense. In his Model-Theoretic Argument (see the Appendix), Putnam could appear to concede to the metaphysical realist that there are language-independent things. Yet, as many have emphasised, the model-Theoretic one is an ad hominem argument, so that it does not involve any real concession to the metaphysical realist. 4If each linguistic term referred to alternative things in the world at the same time, there would be alternative correspondence relationships between terms and things that could make sentences true. Thus, the correspondence relationship which truth consists of would not be univocal. 
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the property that, for every meaningful statement p, either p or not-p is deducible from the description of the world. Notice that (MR1) and (MR3) do not entail (MR2): even if the world consists of one totality of objects that do not depend on our language and truth is correspondence with extra-linguistically organised facts of the world, it is not necessarily true that there is just one true and complete description of the world. One of the reasons preventing this inference is the possibility – stressed by Putnam himself – of equivalent descriptions.  According to Putnam, the “sophisticated metaphysical realist”, accepts the existence of equivalent descriptions in science and in everyday life. From his perspective, two equivalent descriptions depict the same invariant facts concerning the same language-independent objects by using different linguistic conventions, just as different “projections” – Mercator, Polaris, etc. – map the earth in different ways.1 In other words, the existence of equivalent descriptions hinges upon the possibility of organising the same independent reality in alternative conceptual frameworks by means of suitable linguistic conventions. Two equivalent descriptions have to share the same truth-value, as they are true or false of the same invariant extra-linguistic facts.  Putnam’s favourite example of equivalent descriptions concerns mereology.2 Suppose that in the world there are just three objects: A, B and C. The Polish logician Lesniewski’s mereology claims that, given a number of objects in the ordinary sense, there are necessarily other objects that are the “mereological sums” of the first ones. So, Lesniewski would have said that in the world there are not just three objects, but eight. Exactly: A, B, C, A+B, B+C, A+C, A+B+C and the null object that is part of all objects. The sophisticated metaphysical realist would in this case say that the two descriptions of the world – the “ordinary” one, according to which there are three objects, and Lesniewski’s, according to which there are eight objects – are equivalent descriptions. For they simply organise the same independent reality in alternative conceptual frameworks depending upon alternative linguistic conventions for the use of the term “object”. (I will analyse the general notion of equivalent descriptions in more detail in the next chapter, Section 2.7).  The sophisticated metaphysical realist accepts (MR1) and (MR3) but he maintains that, if there is a true and complete description of the world, there is an indefinite number of descriptions equivalent to the latter. Thus, he rejects (MR2). This raises a difficulty: since the sophisticated metaphysical realist does not embrace (MR2), the                                                 1See Putnam (1979), p. 132. 2See Putnam (1987), pp. 18-19. 
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latter cannot be – against Putnam’s claim – one of the defining theses of metaphysical realism. Note also that a “radical metaphysical realist”, who rejects the possibility of equivalent descriptions and endorses (MR2), should maintain that there are no conventional components in our descriptions (apart from the mere notational ones)1, but this appears strongly counterintuitive. In conclusion, only a few philosophers are likely to accept (MR2).  To overcome this difficulty, (MR2) should be re-formulated to take account also of the specific claim of the sophisticated metaphysical realist. My suggestion is that of resorting to the notion of a bare description, i.e. a description that includes no conventional elements apart from the notational ones. The sophisticated metaphysical realist conceives equivalent descriptions as conventional variations of more basic bare descriptions. A bare description would provide, so to speak, the factual and univocal content of all its possible conventional variations. This applies to equivalent descriptions of the world: their existence presupposes the existence of one true and complete bare description of reality. Since the sophisticated metaphysical realist affirms that there can be many true and complete descriptions of reality, he will also affirm that there is just one true and complete bare description of reality.2 Thus, the thesis of the existence of one bare description of reality would seem to be the specific metaphysical claim of the sophisticated realist. On the other hand, the “radical metaphysical realist” will endorse this claim because, for him, all descriptions are bare descriptions. On the grounds of these considerations, (MR2) can be re-formulated by the following statement:  (*) There is exactly one true and complete bare description of the world.   The metaphysical realist would seem to conceive (MR2) as a consequence of the conjunction of the ontological thesis (MR1) that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” and the alethic thesis (MR3) that “truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things”. The problem is that the above statement (*) does not follow from (MR1) and (MR3). For what the latter entails is, precisely, that there can at most                                                 1The metaphysical realist will accept that one can re-formulate the same theory simply replacing its terms with different terms – for instance, replacing “A” by “B” in any of A’s accurrences and only in them. Such a replacement can be said “mere notational” since it does not map the objects of the theory into new objects but it just changes their names. 2As we will see in the next chapter, the internal realist claims also that there can be alternative true descriptions of the world, but he rejects the very notion of a bare description. 
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be one true and complete bare description of the world. In conclusion, I will replace (MR2) by the following thesis:  (E2) There can at most be one true and complete bare description of the world.   Let us consider one last issue. Putnam calls metaphysical realism also “the God’s eye point of view” or “the externalist perspective” or “externalism”.1 There could however be a certain tension between these labels and the label “metaphysical realism”. “Externalist perspective”, “externalism” and “God’s eye point of view” seem to refer to a general philosophical view only weakly realist as involving just one particular form of realism, i.e. alethic realism. On the other hand, the term “metaphysical realism” refers, in Putnam’s philosophy, to a position more vigorously realist, which involves alethic realism and adds a further decisive realist thesis.  Externalism could be characterised as a model of any possible true theory to the world that does not specify whether, for example, the world is constituted or not constituted by our minds. Roughly, the model maintains that the world – whether it consists of sense data or of independently constituted objects – is structured in itself independently of our descriptions and that every true theory is supposed to copy the self-structured facts of the world (this is the alethic realist thesis).2 Metaphysical realism adds to these claims the statement that the world is not constituted or caused by our minds.  To avoid confusion, in the light of all considerations made so far, I will call “externalism” the position defined by the following metaphysical theses:  (E1) The world consists of some totality of objects and classes of objects that do not depend on our language.  (E2) There can at most be one true and complete bare description of the world.  (E3) Truth is a radically non-epistemic notion that involves a univocal, causal or sui generis correspondence relationship between the words and the world’s extra-linguistic objects.                                                 1See Putnam (1981), p. 49. 2Putnam probably uses just the term “externalism” to refer to this general point of view as it is based on the thesis that truth is a relationship between language and extra-linguistic things – that is, things external to language. 
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 Besides, I will call “metaphysical realism” the philosophical position defined by (E1), (E2) and (E3), with the addition of the following ontological realist thesis:  (OR) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds.1  Any position aiming to be distinguished from old-fashioned idealism (which affirms, roughly, that the world is caused or constituted by our minds) has to endorse (OR). Consequently, metaphysical realism has to include (OR). Notice, however, that someone who accepts this thesis does not appear to be necessarily committed also to (E1) or (E2) or (E3). In this sense, (OR) could be said to be metaphysically neutral. The theses (E1), (E2), (E3) and (OR) seem eventually to be able to capture the elaborated notion of metaphysical realism discussed by Putnam.   To recap, in this section, I have analysed the notion of metaphysical realism, which reflects the traditional idea of realism in philosophy. We have seen that metaphysical realism consists of the conjunction of the three externalist theses (E1)-(E3) – constituting the specific metaphysical component of metaphysical realism and involving alethic realism – and the ontological realist thesis (OR), which proves metaphysically neutral. The externalist theses (E1)-(E3) affirm, roughly, that the world – whether it consists of sense data or of independently constituted objects – is structured in itself independently of our descriptions and that every true theory is supposed to copy the self-structured facts of the world. Truth is conceived here as a radically non-epistemic notion that involves a univocal, causal or sui generis correspondence relationship between the words and the world’s extra-linguistic objects. The ontological realist thesis (OR) adds to these claims that the world is not constituted or caused by our minds.   1.3 Essential requirements for every realist position  In this section, I aim to individuate the necessary and sufficient conditions that every general realist position must satisfy. Since metaphysical realism is a form of realism, it has to fulfil these conditions: they can be thought of in terms of specific theses that are entailed by metaphysical realism, though they do not necessarily entail the latter. 
                                                1In the next pages, for the sake of simplicity, I will sometimes use the terms “externalism” and “metaphysical realism” (and their derivative expressions) indifferently. 
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 As we have seen, the realist character of metaphysical realism essentially rests upon an ontological component and an alethic component. The first component is given by the ontological realist thesis (OR), according to which, the world is not caused or constituted by our minds. (OR) is metaphysically neutral, so, it can be shared by possible realist positions that do not accept the externalist tenets. I have pointed out that ontological realism is a necessary component of any global position that aims to be distinguished from old-fashioned idealism. Thus, it is surely a necessary component of every global position that aims to be realist.  The second realist component of metaphysical realism is given by the externalist tenet (E3), which entails alethic realism. The alethic realist claims that truth is a correspondence relationship between language and the extra-linguistic world that transcends any kind of epistemic justification. It appears intuitive to me that one can be an alethic realist in a minimal sense even if one accepts a conception of truth weaker than that of (E3). In particular, the minimal alethic realist will just claim that truth is some kind of correspondence between language and the world (which is not necessarily conceived as an extra-linguistic entity) able to make empirical statements in general1 determinately either true or false (i.e. liable to Bivalence); the minimal alethic realist will also claim that truth transcends what we can currently justify or verify. Something more should be added. Though Dummett has not emphasised it, alethic realism entails that truth is an objective notion, i.e. it is independent of the beliefs, theories and conceptual schemes of every possible subject, social group and culture. Minimal alethic realism will save part of this strong notion of objectivity by claming that truth is independent of the beliefs, theories and conceptual schemes of subjects, social groups and cultures in general.  In conclusion, the alethic component of every global realist position can be specified by the following thesis: it is the world that makes our empirical statements in general determinately either true or false, and truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.  It is worth wondering whether other necessary conditions for realism must be considered. Some philosophers have defined realism also by means of epistemological theses – indeed, this typically happens in philosophy of science.2 The epistemological “realist” theses assert our effective ability in knowing reality to some extent. For 
                                                1I exclude vague predicates. 2See, for instance, the Introduction in Papineau (1999). 
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example, Boyd – one of the most able and influential advocates of scientific realism – has proposed the two following epistemological “realist” theses:  (ER1) The laws of a theory belonging to a mature science are typically approximately true.1  (ER2) Terms in a mature science typically refer.2  Someone who endorses (ER1) and (ER2) proposes the latter as the best explanation for the alleged phenomenon of convergence in scientific knowledge, i.e. the alleged fact that earlier confirmed theories are, in mature science, often limiting cases of later confirmed theories (in the sense that the theoretical laws of the former are often limiting cases of the theoretical laws of latter). In sum, the claim is that, since in science there is convergence, science allows us to know reality to some extent. For, the only acceptable way to explain convergence is by holding that the laws of the relevant scientific theories are approximately true and that their terms actually refer.  In my opinion, the claim that epistemological theses like the above ones are realist theses is indeed highly doubtful. To begin with – as we have seen – the metaphysical realist claims that truth is radically non-epistemic. This involves that the realist simply cannot accept, among the defining principles of his position, any thesis stating that truth is knowable to some extent. Indeed, I think that this point can be generalised to all forms of realism: realists in general cannot consider any thesis claiming that we know reality to some extent as one of the defining principles of their position. For it seems evident that even a sceptic can be a realist in the full sense. Let us consider, for example, the sceptical thesis according to which we can never conclude that scientists or people in general know reality to some extent. It seems to me that this thesis can be conjoined without incoherence with the claim that the world is not caused or constituted by our minds and the claim that the world makes our statements either true or false, and the intuitive realist character of the resultant position can hardly be denied.  In conclusion, I will not include any epistemic “realist” requirement among the necessary conditions that every general realist doctrine must satisfy. As I do not see other possible candidates, I think that the conditions we are looking for are reducible to the ontological and the alethic desiderata considered above, that is:                                                 1Boyd (1991), p. 95. 2Ibid. 
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The world is not caused or constituted by our minds,  and  The world makes empirical statements in general determinately either true or false, and truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.  Indeed, I think that these requirements constitute not only the necessary but also the sufficient conditions for every realist position. For it appears intuitive to me that, if a global philosophical position meets both these requirements, then it is a realist position in a straightforward sense.  It is important to notice that the expression “the world” occurring in the alethic condition must refer to the world not caused or constituted by our minds mentioned in the ontological condition. Consider in fact a position consisting of the conjunction of an ontological thesis and an alethic thesis like the following: the ontological thesis states that there is some sort of noumenal world not caused or constituted by our minds that is not able to make our statement true or false because we cannot refer to it. The alethic thesis states that there is a phenomenal world, constituted by our actual and possible sense data that makes our empirical statements in general determinately either true or false and such that truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general. It seems clear that such a position could not be considered realist in the full sense of the term. For its ontological claim and its alethic claim are not related to each other.  To conclude, the intuitive and essential characteristics of every global realist position are specifiable by the conjunction of the following two theses:  (R1) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds. (R2) The world not caused or constituted by our minds makes empirical statements in general determinately either true or false, and truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.  (R1) and (R2) appear to be metaphysically neutral in the sense that, though metaphysical realism entails both of them, they appear not to entail the latter. 
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Consequently, philosophical positions that do not accept the externalist tenets (E1)-(E3) could possibly entail (R1) and (R2) and be considered realist by full right.    1.4 Epistemic truth and its consequences  In his internalist period, Putnam notoriously rejected metaphysical realism by arguing that the externalist tenets (E1)-(E3) are conceptually incoherent1 (I briefly discuss Putnam’s most important arguments in the Appendix). Moreover, Putnam has suggested that, to avoid conceptual incoherence, the radically non-epistemic notion of truth of (E3) must be replaced by a specific epistemic notion. In this section, I will first focus upon the concept of epistemic truth in general. Then, I will identify three philosophical positions grounded in different specifications of this general concept – namely, Dummett’s anti-realism, alethic relativism and Putnam’s internal realism. Finally, I will show that the notions of truth proper to Dummett’s anti-realism and alethic relativism make these two positions fail to satisfy the essential condition for realism (R2).  The vague term “epistemic” refers in general to something that has some relation to knowledge. More specifically, in the recent philosophical debate, the expression “epistemic notion of truth” generally refers to a view in which truth is (at least in principle) knowable as it is conceived as essentially evidentially constrained. On this view, a statement is true if and only if a subject can (at least in principle) be aware of it. Philosophers who have accepted epistemic notions of truth have variously identified truth with – for example – verification, epistemic justification, warranted assertibility, maximal coherence among all our beliefs, what would be justified under epistemically ideal conditions, what we would be able to assert in the ideal limit of rational inquiry, and so on. This is the general sense in which I will use the expression “epistemic notion of truth”.  It is important to notice that the advocate of an epistemic conception of truth is entitled to say that there are facts that make sentences true or false. For he can appeal to the following schema, which intuitively holds for any sentence p:  (F) “p” is true if and only if it is a fact that p.  
                                                1See, for instance, “Realism and Reason”, in Putnam (1979). 
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(F) constitutes one of the a priori platitudes involved by the notion of truth (likewise the celebrated Schema T).1 Any instance of (F) appears to hold whatever notion of truth we might ever endorse. In other words, the schema seems to expose a metaphysically neutral feature of what we call “true”. Thus, whoever holds an epistemic conception of truth can appeal to (F) without any incoherence. Notice that, if one accepts (F), one is also allowed to claim that:  “p” is true of the fact that p;  “p” describes the fact that p; “p” corresponds to the fact that p.     Defining the notion of a fact by means of the notion of a true sentence allows the advocate of epistemic conceptions of truth to think of truth as an intra-linguistic correspondence relationship between sentences and facts. On this view, facts too can be said to be intra-linguistic entities.  Three very general philosophical positions that rest upon epistemic conceptions of truth are Dummett’s anti-realism, alethic relativism and internal realism. The anti-realist identifies truth with justification and he basically conceives justification as current justification – i.e. justification depending upon both current standards and current evidence (I will examine Dummett’s notion of truth in more detail in the next chapter, Section 2.3). The alethic relativist maintains, roughly, that truth is some sort of epistemic justification that is relative to – depending on the specific type of relativism – subjects, cultures, conceptual schemes and so on (I will specifically focus on this notion in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.4). Finally, the internal realist identifies truth with idealised rational acceptability (I will scrutinise the internal realist doctrine in the next two chapters) and Putnam has contended that this conception of truth is compatible with realism.  In Chapter 4, I will evaluate the correctness of Putnam’s contention by appealing to the essential requirements for realism (R1) and (R2) singled out above. In the remainder of this section, I wish to briefly investigate whether the other two philosophical positions grounded in epistemic notions of truth comply with these essential requirements for realism.  Though both anti-realism and alethic relativism appear to be prima facie allowed to claim that there is a reality that is not caused or constituted by our minds – so that they                                                 1See, for instance, Wright (1992), p. 34. I will briefly focus on the Schema T in Ch. 2, Sect. 2.3. 
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appear to be prima facie able to satisfy the ontological condition for realism (R1) – they certainly cannot fulfil the alethic condition for realism (R2). Thus, they are not realist doctrines. Let us first consider anti-realism. (R2) requires truth to be independent of current justification, but anti-realism identifies truth with just current justification. Indeed, anti-realism immediately clashes with (R2) for another reason too. As we will see in the following pages, Dummett admits that his conception of truth cannot guarantee that sentences are governed by Bivalence; and this implies that anti-realism cannot guarantee that the world makes sentences determinately either true or false, as (R2) requires.  Let us now turn to alethic relativism. The first point to notice is that, for alethic relativism, truth is relative to subjects or cultures. But this entails that truth depends on the beliefs of subjects or cultures in general – namely, the beliefs that subjects or cultures can justify on the grounds of their own standards. And this contradicts (R2). In my opinion, there is a more subtle reason why alethic relativism does not comply with (R2). As we have seen, (R2) requires the world not caused or constituted by our minds to make empirical statements true or false. Yet, I do not see any way in which alethic relativism could fulfil this condition. The relativist might perhaps contend that his position does not affirm that an empirical statement p, when asserted by a sincere speaker, is just invented by him. The relativist might urge that the speaker makes p on the grounds of his sensory experiences, and that the existence of those sensory experiences is adequately explained only by hypothesising that the facts described by p – which bring about the sensory experiences – are not caused or constituted by our minds. The relativist might finally emphasise that these mind-independent facts can be described from within language by appealing to a relativised version of the above platitude (F), according to which:  “p” is true relative to a subject or culture X if and only if it is a fact that p.  Yet, a problem with this explanation is that the relativist must recognise that when a sentence p is true relative to some subject or culture X, not-p may turn out to be true relative to some other subject or culture Y. But if this happens, using the above platitude, we obtain:  Since “p” is true relative to a subject or culture X, then it is a fact that p  
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and  Since “not-p” is true relative to a subject or culture Y, then it is a fact that not-p1  The problem is that no world not caused or constituted by our minds could ever contain both the fact that p and the fact that not-p at the same time. Thus, it seems that no world not caused or constituted by our minds could ever make p (relatively) true when p is so. But this is in conflict with the alethic condition for realism (R2). (In Chapter 4, Section 4.5.5, I will examine an apparent solution for the relativist and I will show it to be faulty).   To recapitulate, in this section, we have seen that an epistemic conception of truth is one that holds truth to be essentially evidentially constrained, so that a speaker must be able to be aware (at least in principle) of the truth of a statement when the statement is true. The advocate of epistemic conceptions of truth can admit the existence of intra-linguistic facts that make sentences true or false and he can think of truth as an intra-linguistic correspondence relationship between such facts and sentences. Dummett’s anti-realism, alethic relativism and internal realism are grounded in epistemic conceptions of truth – respectively, truth as current justification, truth as some kind of justification relative to subjects or cultures and truth as idealised rational acceptability. Dummett’s anti-realism and alethic relativism do not satisfy the alethic requirement (R2) for realism. The anti-realist notion of truth does not comply with this alethic requirement because it identifies truth with current justification and because it cannot attribute Bivalence to sentences in general. The relativist notion of truth does not comply with the alethic requirement as it makes truth dependent upon subjects or cultures and because the relativist cannot explain how the causally mind-independent world makes our statements true or false.  As we will see in the next pages, many of Putnam’s efforts, after his internalist turn, are directed to develop a conception of truth that avoids the problems of both anti-realism and alethic relativism.                                                     1Someone could object that the expression “it is a fact that not-p” makes no sense because negative facts do not exist. My reply is that the use of this expression does not commit us to believing in the existence of negative facts, for “not-p” can be conceived as referring to any positive fact q whose existence makes the sentence p false (or, equivalently, the sentence not-p true). 
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1.5 Conclusion of the chapter  In this chapter, I have focused upon notions presupposed by the criticism of internal realism that I will develop in the next chapters. To begin with, I have shown that metaphysical realism consists of an ontological thesis (OR) – which is metaphysically neutral – according to which, the world is not caused or constituted by our minds, and of three externalist theses (E1), (E2) and (E3) – which constitute the specific metaphysical component of metaphysical realism. (E1) claims that the world consists of some totality of objects and classes of objects that do not depend on our language. (E2) claims that there can at most be one true and complete bare description of the world. Finally, (E3) claims that truth is a radically non-epistemic notion that involves a univocal, causal or sui generis correspondence relationship between the words and the world’s extra-linguistic objects.  I have emphasised that Putnam has argued that the externalist theses (E1)-(E3) are conceptually incoherent and that he developed a philosophical position, called “internal realism”, that maintains – basically – that truth is an epistemic notion identifiable with idealised rational acceptability; this claim contradicts the externalist tenet (E3). Putnam contends that his position is still a realist doctrine in the full sense of the term.  The accurate appraisal of Putnam’s contention presupposes knowing the essential characteristics that every general realist position must satisfy. I have tried to abstract them from metaphysical realism, a doctrine that seems to reflect the traditional idea of realism in philosophy. The sufficient and necessary conditions that allow a general philosophical position to be a realist position consist of an ontological desideratum (R1) and an alethic desideratum (R2). (R1) requires the world not to be caused or constituted by our minds. (R2) requires the world not caused or constituted by our minds to make our empirical statements determinately either true or false, and truth to be independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general. (R1) and (R2) appear metaphysically neutral, thus they could possibly be fulfilled by internal realism.  Finally, I have indicated that Dummett’s anti-realism and alethic relativism are two further general philosophical positions that rest upon the adoption of an epistemic conception of truth. According to the anti-realist, truth is current justification and, according to the relativist, truth is some kind of justification relative to subjects or cultures. I have shown that both these doctrines fails to satisfy the realist desideratum 
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(R2). If internal realism is actually a realist position, its notion of truth must be able to overcome the deficiencies of both Dummett’s anti-realism and alethic relativism 
 42 2 Internal realism      2.1 Introduction to the chapter  This chapter is wholly devoted to the presentation of Putnam’s internal realism. To make my arguments against Putnam’s position stronger, I will try to provide, in this and in the next chapter, the most coherent (and sympathetic) possible reconstruction of internal realism that gives credit of all its actual realist features. I will then direct my objections specifically against this reconstruction of Putnam’s doctrine.  This chapter is organised as follows: I initially give an overview of internal realism in which I single out its central theses and the reasons why internal realism can be considered to be a realist position to some extent. Then, I focus on the internal realist notion of truth as idealised justification; I show that this notion originates from the attempt to improve Dummett’s notion of truth as current justification. Afterwards, I examine the internal realist notion of truth as maximal coherence among all our beliefs; I show the relationships existing between this concept of truth and that of truth as idealised justification. After that, I discuss the way in which the so-called “reflective equilibrium method” can – according to Putnam – improve the notion of coherence and rational acceptability up to an ideal level. I then illustrate two realist theses that follow from Putnam’s coherentism: the first claims that the meaning of theoretical statements is irreducible to the meaning of observational sentences; the second states that most empirical sentences satisfy Bivalence. Finally, I discuss the notion of equivalent descriptions accepted by Putnam and I explain how this notion makes his pluralism about worldviews possible. The conclusions of the chapter then follow.   2.2 Overview of internal realism  I shall now give an overview of the internal realist doctrine. In this outline, I will distinguish between the anti-metaphysical or internalist component of Putnam’s position – which entails the thesis that truth is an epistemic notion. i.e. idealised rational 
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acceptability – and its metaphysically neutral component – which entails ontological realism. I will also indicate how the conjunction of these two components apparently makes internal realism a realist position. To do that, I will appeal to the essential desiderata for realism (R1) and (R2) singled out in the previous chapter.  In the Preface of Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam has characterised internal realism as follows:  I shall advance a view in which the mind does not simply “copy” a world which admits of description by One True Theory. But my view is not a view in which the mind makes up the world, either (or makes it up subject to constraints imposed by “methodological canons” and mind-independent “sense-data”). If one must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world. Or, to make the metaphor even more Hegelian, the Universe makes up the Universe – with minds – collectively – playing a special role in the making up.1  In the quotation, I see at least three distinct claims. The first is that our true descriptions of the world are not mere copies of it and there may be more than just one true description of the world. This is, summarily, the specific anti-metaphysical (or anti-externalist) claim of Putnam’s position. As we will see, this is a consequence of the                                                 1Putnam (1981), p. xi. A source of perplexity for Putnam’s readers is often an earlier definition of internal realism – given by Putnam in “Realism and Reason” (last chapter of Meaning and the Moral Sciences) – according to which, internal realism is:  [An empirical theory explaining] the fact that scientific theories tend to “converge” in the sense that earlier theories are, very often, limiting cases of later theories (which is why it is possible to regard theoretical terms as preserving their reference across most changes of theory) (Putnam 1979, p. 123).  It is easy to see that internal realism, defined as above, is nothing but the general empirical theory apt to support the epistemological “realist” theses (ER1) and (ER2) that I considered in the previous chapter. This is at odds with the characterisations of internal realism given by Putnam in all other internal realist papers, which do not mention (correctly, in my view) any epistemological “realist” thesis. Yet, recently, Putnam has providentially dispelled any doubt by explaining what follows:  In “Realism and Reason” […] I did accept “internal realism”, so understood [i.e. defined as in the above quotation]; but “internal realism” was not a term for my new [anti-metaphysical] position; it was rather a term for a kind of scientific realism I had already accepted for some years, for a position (I now argued) both realists and antirealists could accept. But soon I discovered that everyone was using the term not as I had used it, but rather as a name for my new [anti-metaphysical] position! And it seemed easiest to me to go along with this, as I did in Reason, Truth and History (Putnam 1992, pp. 352-353).  It is important to notice that Putnam does not affirm here that, in the internal realist phase, he considered “internal realism” (i.e. scientific realism) as an essential part of internal realism, though he admits that he accepted “internal realism”. 
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internalist thesis that truth is an epistemic and intra-linguistic notion. The second claim is that the world – i.e. the world that we can describe from within our language – is actually mind-independent, in the sense that our minds do not make up (or cause or constitute) it. This second claim is an ontological realist thesis. There is, therefore, an immediate reason why internal realism can be said to be to some extent a realist position: it fulfils the condition for realism (R1), according to which the world is not caused or constituted by our minds. Some of Putnam’s critics have not recognised this component in his anti-metaphysical doctrine.1  The third claim in the above quotation is that “the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world”. This metaphor aims to synthesise the previous two affirmations. Focusing upon this figure, we can attain a preliminary sketch of the internal realist position. Surprisingly, Putnam has provided no explanation of this metaphor in the internal realist period. So, I will provide one, now, that appears very plausible to me.2   To begin with, the internal realist conceives the universe as including both the minds of language-users – which Putnam calls “the mind” – and all remaining things not created by language-users’ minds – which Putnam calls “the world”. Then, the internal realist denies that language-users can think of a world whose structure is independent of conceptual frameworks provided by their minds. At the same time, he urges that, since language-users’ minds do not make up the other things, in every true description of reality there is content provided by the world.  In conclusion, the metaphor “the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world” says – in my opinion – that the formal structures provided by language-users’ minds (the mind) and the independent content provided by the world (the world) jointly make up the world as conceptualised by language-users’ minds but distinct from the latter, as not constituted or caused by them (the mind and the world).  I wish to emphasise the difference between Putnam’s metaphor and one tinged with Kantian spirit, which might be put thus: the noumenal world (i.e. reality in itself) and the mind jointly make up the experiential world (i.e. reality for us). In Putnam’s anti-metaphysical realism, there is room neither for a noumenal world nor for an experiential world (conceived as opposed to the former). By the term “world”, Putnam means in fact 
                                                1See, for instance, Devitt (1984), pp. 191-192. 2In some of his recent papers, Putnam has come back to this metaphor, but the interpretation he has given presupposes the non-reducibility of truth to epistemic notions. See, for instance, Putnam (1991), pp. 422-423 (at p. 421, Putnam explicitly admits that truth is not reducible to justification or other epistemic notions). 
 45 
the world which we can refer to and speak about, that is, the one described by our everyday sentences and by our scientific theories. In brief, Putnam takes the world to be constituted by its being the referent of our commonly used term “the world”. This reality is, at the same time, not caused or constituted by our minds but not conceptually independent of them.  Let us now consider the internal realist position in more detail. According to Putnam, the specific anti-metaphysical tenets of internal realism constitute that which could be called the “internalist perspective” or “internalism”. The theses are the following:  (IR1) [The question:] what objects does the world consist of? is [… one] that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or description.1  (IR2) [T]here is more than one “true” theory or description of the world.2  (IR3) “Truth” [...] is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability [...] and not correspondence with [...] discourse-independent “states of affairs”.3   Putnam has clarified (IR3) by explaining that idealised rational acceptability has to be conceived as:  [S]ome sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our beliefs system.4  In this characterisation, a statement is true if and only if it is deducible from the most coherent theory one could in principle attain. Notice that this concept of coherence is a world-involving one, as a coherent system has to include descriptions of experiences (i.e. perceptions) that one has in fact had (I will go deeper into this concept of coherence in Section 2.4). The internal realist Putnam also provided a characterisation of truth alternative to (IR3), according to which:  
                                                1Putnam (1981), p. 49. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., pp. 49-50. 4Ibid. Putnam’s italic. 
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(IR3*) Truth is to be identified with justification in the sense of idealized justification.1  (IR3*) means that:  A statement is true […] if [and only if] it would be justified under epistemically ideal conditions.2   Notice that Putnam refers the concept of idealised rational acceptability to both single sentences and whole systems of sentences (i.e. theories)3 and, on the other hand, he speaks of conditions of idealised justification for, specifically, single sentences. Thus, the definition of truth of (IR3) is wider-ranging than that of (IR3*). As we will see in detail in Section 2.4, (IR3) is more general than (IR3*) also because the conditions of idealised justification for sentences are determinable only by means of the maximally coherent system of statements of which the sentences are part. For this reason, I will in general stick to (IR3) and the notion of idealized rational acceptability to refer to the internal realist conception of truth.  Putnam has described the relationship he takes to exist between the notion of truth and the notion of a fact as follows:  The view which I shall defend holds, to put it very roughly […], that the only criterion for what is a fact is what it is rational to accept.4   Putnam’s view could be contested, as there is no evident conceptual tie between the notion of rational acceptability and the notion of a fact. I believe however that Putnam’s claim can be made more precise. Because of his identification of truth with idealised rational acceptability, what Putnam would seem to appeal to is the following schema, which – as we have seen in the previous chapter – intuitively holds for any sentence p:  (F) “p” is true if and only if it is a fact that p.  
                                                1Putnam (1983a), p. xvii. 2Putnam (1983d), p. 84. 3Surely, a single sentence is ideally rationally justified if and only if it belongs to an ideally justified system. 4Putnam (1981), p. x. 
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From (IR3) and (F), it follows that, p is ideally rationally acceptable (or ideally justifiable) if and only if it is a fact that p. Defining the notion of a fact by means of the notion of a true sentence allows the internal realist to think of truth as an intra-linguistic correspondence relationship between sentences and facts, where facts are conceived as intra-linguistic entities too. (I will go deeper into the internal realist notion of a fact and reality at the end of the section)  (IR1) and (IR2) are implied by (IR3). If truth is thought of as an intra-linguistic relationship, then reference too must be conceived as an intra-linguistic relationship. For, if sentences are true of language-dependent facts, any sentence’s terms must refer to language-dependent objects (that is, the objects which the language-dependent facts are about). More exactly, the internalist thesis is that words single out their referents from within some conceptual scheme.1 In this case, one will say that something is an object existing in the world if and only if, in one’s conceptual framework, there is a specific (non-logical) term for that object and that term occurs in affirmative true sentences. The result is that:  “Objects” do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description.2  This shows that, if (IR3) is true, (IR1) is true too. Furthermore, alternative true descriptions of reality will turn up as our schemes of description change (i.e. as the way in which we cut up the world into objects changes). Thus, if (IR3) is true, (IR2) is true too. Though (IR2) is not explicit on this point, the possible alternative descriptions of the world can obviously not presuppose the existence of any bare description of it. For a bare description should represent objects as they are in themselves, but this is impossible if objects are claimed not to exist independently of conceptual schemes.  Notice finally that (IR1) and (IR3) clarify Putnam’s anti-metaphysical claim that our descriptions of the world are not copies of it. If a representation B is a copy of a fact A, A must be structured independently of B. Moreover, B must correspond to A, so that A and B share the same structure. Yet, according to (IR1), the world cannot be said to have any language-independent structure. Besides, according to (IR3), truth is not a correspondence relationship between language and the language-independent world. Thus, it makes no sense to affirm that our representations of the world are copies of it.                                                 1See, for instance, Putnam (1981), p. 52. 2Ibid. 
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 As in the case of the concepts of externalism and metaphysical realism, Putnam tends to use the terms “internalism” – defined by the three theses (IR1), (IR2) and (IR3) – and “internal realism” indifferently. Notice however that, if internal realism were characterised by only the above three theses, it would immediately fail to be a form of realism. For these theses do not say that the world and the objects mentioned in (IR1) and (IR2) are not caused or constituted by our minds; thus they do not fulfil the ontological requirement for realism (R1), according to which, the world is not caused or constituted by our minds. In consequence, internal realism cannot be identified with just internalism.  To avoid confusion, in the light of the above considerations, I will define the internalist perspective or internalism by the following theses:  (I1) Only within a theory or description, does it make sense to say what objects and classes of objects the world consists of.  (I2) There is more than one true description of the world and there is no bare description of the world.  (I3)  Truth is not a correspondence relationship between words and the world’s extra-linguistic things, but some sort of idealised rational acceptability.  Since (I3) entails (I1) and (I2), the former is the thesis which the internalist perspective is ultimately grounded in.  As we have seen, Putnam indeed conceives internal realism as a form of ontological realism. We can therefore obtain the definition of internal realism by adding to (I1), (I2) and (I3) the metaphysically neutral ontological thesis:  (OR) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds.   Internal realism is, to some extent, a realist doctrine because it includes a form of ontological realism and this makes it satisfy the ontological condition for realism (R1). Recently, Putnam has however emphasised that:  
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The “internal realist” picture was an attempt to show the compatibility of [… Dummett’s idea that truth can never be totally recognition-transcendent] with commonsense realism.1  This makes it clear that internal realism was thought of by Putnam as not only a form of ontological realism but as a complete form of realism. If internal realism is a complete form of realism, it must satisfy the alethic condition for realism (R2) too. For (R1) and (R2) together single out the necessary and sufficient conditions for any realist position.  I remind the reader that the latter condition requires that:  The world not caused or constituted by our minds makes empirical statements in general determinately either true or false, and truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.   As we will see in the next section, since truth for the internal realist coincides with idealised justification, truth transcends current justification and it is objective, i.e. independent of the beliefs of individuals and cultures in general. Besides, as we will see in Section 2.4, the notion of truth as idealised rational acceptability (and not current rational acceptability) entails that many – or even most – sentences are liable to Bivalence. Finally, as I will explain in the same section, Putnam maintains that our perceptions provide us with an epistemic access to the world not created by our minds. In conclusion, because of all these features, the internal realist notion of truth appears to satisfy the realist condition (R2); thus, since (R1) is satisfied too, internal realism would seem to be a genuine form of realism, as Putnam’s contend.  Before concluding this section, I wish to give a first hint of how the epistemic access to the independent world would work from the internal realist perspective. In brief, Putnam’s idea is that the internal realist has to assert that there is a reality not caused or constituted by our minds – though describable only from within a theory – to explain the fact that we do have perceptions. The internal realist conceives such a reality as one that can be correctly described by the empirical statements entailed by the most coherent theory about the world we could in principle build up. On this view, “truth is a substantial property of [… a statement], one which depends upon both what the [… statement] means and upon the world”.2 According to the internal realist, the truth or                                                 1Putnam (1994), pp. 256-257. 2Putnam (1983g), p. 281. The second emphasis is mine.  
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falsity of empirical sentences is therefore largely determined by the world not caused or constituted by our minds.  It is worth emphasising that not only does Putnam’s conception of truth apparently comply with the intuitions of realists in general, but also Putnam’s conception of reality – which I have briefly sketched above – does. Let us go a little deeper into this conception. What the internal realist calls “reality” or “the world” can be characterised by means of the notion of a fact, as reality can be said to be the set of all empirical facts. As we have seen, from the internal realist perspective, the notion of a fact can be defined by the schema according to which, for any sentence p,  (F) “p” is true if and only if it is a fact that p.  The internal realist can therefore conceive reality in terms of those facts whose existence follows from the above biconditional, when the totality of true empirical sentences is given. One could more simply say that the reality of the internal realist consists of the facts described by all ideally rationally acceptable sentences about the world and only those.  The intuitions of most realists say1 – in my opinion – that what we call “reality” is not caused or constituted by our minds, that it transcends our currently justified descriptions of it and the descriptions of it accepted by subjects and cultures in general. Finally, the claim of most realists is that what we call “reality” is determined, in the sense that, if p is an empirical sentence,2 either it is a fact that p or it is a fact that not-p.  The internal realist conception of reality apparently fulfils to a large extent all these desiderata. To begin with, as I have indicated, the facts constituting the reality of the internal realist are thought of as not caused or constituted by our minds. Moreover, since the notion of a fact is defined, by the schema (F), by means of the notion of a true (i.e. ideally justified) sentence, the world of the internal realist (conceived as the set of all empirical facts) will largely transcend our currently justified descriptions of it and the ones accepted by individuals and cultures in general. Finally, since truth as idealised rational acceptability entails that a high number of empirical sentences are liable to Bivalence, as a consequence of the schema (F), it holds that, for most empirical sentences p, either it is a fact that p or it is a fact that not-p. In conclusion, Putnam’s notion of reality can be said to be a realist notion of reality.                                                 1Notice that this realist conception of reality is entailed by the ontological and alethic conditions for realism (R1) and (R2).  2I exclude sentences with vague predicates. 
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 To sum up, in this section, we have seen that Putnam’s internal realism is the philosophical position according to which, roughly, the world is actually not caused or constituted by our minds, though it is describable only from within language. More exactly, internal realism consists of the conjunction of the three internalist (or anti-metaphysical) theses (I1), (I2) and (I3) and the ontological thesis (OR), which is metaphysically neutral and is shared by metaphysical realism too. (I1) claims that, only within a theory or description does it make sense to say what objects and classes of objects the world consists of. (I2) affirms that there is more than one true description of the world and there is no bare description of the world. Finally, (I3) affirms that truth is not a correspondence relationship between words and the world’s extra-linguistic things, but some sort of idealised rational acceptability. The ontological thesis (OR) claims – as we know – that the world is not caused or constituted by our minds.  I have emphasised that (I3) is the central internalist tenet, as it entails both (I1) and (I2). Putnam has specified the content (I3) by claiming that idealised rational acceptability has to be thought of as ideal coherence among all our beliefs and our experiences. Putnam has alternatively defined truth as idealised justification; that is, in terms of ideal conditions of justification for sentences. I have however pointed out that the first definition of truth is more general than the second and I have anticipated that the first involves the second. I have also indicated that the internal realist, by appealing to the platitude that “p” is true if and only if it is a fact that p, recognises the existence of intra-linguistic facts that make sentences true or false and he thinks of truth as an intra-linguistic correspondence relationship between such facts and sentences.  In this section, I have preliminarily indicated that internal realism appears to comply with both the essential conditions for realism (R1) and (R2) – I will go deeper into these issues in the next section. The fulfilment of (R1) is entailed by the ontological realist thesis (OR), which is part of internal realism. Moreover, the identification of truth with idealised justification entails that truth transcends current justification, that truth is objective (i.e. independent of subjects and cultures in general) and that a very high number of sentences is liable to Bivalence. Finally, Putnam’s world-involving concept of coherence appears to entail that we have an effective epistemic access to the world not caused or constituted by our minds so that empirical sentences can be said to be true or false of that world. These properties of internal realist truth – if real – entail the fulfilment of the alethic condition for realism (R2). In this case, internal realism would turn out to be a realist position in the full sense of the term.  
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2.3 Putnam’s conception of truth as a refinement of Dummett’s  In the previous section, we have seen that Putnam has defined truth both as idealised rational acceptability and as idealised justification. In this section, I will specifically focus on Putnam’s definition of truth as idealised justification. I will show that this notion of truth mainly originates from the attempt to improve Dummett’s notion of truth to make it fit realist desiderata.  I will first focus on Putnam’s claim that truth is an essentially normative notion. Then, I will consider Dummett’s conception of truth; in particular, I will dwell upon the concept of sentence undecidability. Afterwards, I will explain Putnam’s criticisms of Dummett’s conception of truth. Finally, I will present in detail Putnam’s thesis that truth is to be identified with idealised justification.  According to the internal realist, truth cannot be thought of as a correspondence relationship between sentences and extra-linguistic facts, as this thesis is conceptually incoherent.1 An alternative view of truth that does not involve a correspondence of this type is the disquotational one. As Putnam has emphasised, the disquotationalist claims that all there is to say about the nature of truth is given by a theory including all and only the possible examples of the Schema T, or Disquotational Schema, for our language. In other words, this theory simply consists of the schema:  “p” is true if and only if p,  contained in a meta-linguistic extension of our language. The schema is taken to have a true instance for each declarative sentence p of our language.2  The reason why the internal realist could be tempted by the disquotational theory is that, on this view, truth appears to be a metaphysically neutral notion. The disquotationalist affirms in fact that the term “true” is simply a device for “semantic ascent”, i.e. for raising assertions from the level of our language (or object language) to the level of a metalanguage of our language. And the use of this formal device appears  not to commit one to any particular metaphysical position and, in particular, not to metaphysical realism.3 
                                                1See mostly the Model-Theoretic Argument in the Appendix. 2See Putnam (1983a), p. xiv. 3See Putnam (1983d), p. 76. See also Putnam (1981), pp. 128-129. 
 53 
 Putnam emphasises that the disquotationalist, to avoid a vicious circle (i.e. to assume the notion of truth in the account of the same notion), has to presuppose that we understand the sentences of our language by grasping their conditions of assertibility or justification – and not of truth1 – and that we conceive the logical connectives as functions of those conditions. This is the case with the connective “if and only if” occurring in the Disquotational Schema. In fact, according to Putnam:   [The disquotational thesis] is not that we understand “true” by learning that “‘Snow is white’ is true” is true if and only if it is true that snow is white, but that we understand “true” by being trained to assert “‘Snow is white’ is true” when (and only when) we are prepared to assert “snow is white”, and similarly in similar cases.2   The disquotational point of view can also help the internal realist to resolve the problem of the reference of linguistic terms without appealing to metaphysical notions. A disquotational theory of reference holds that all there is to say about the nature of reference is given by a theory including, for each non-logical term t of our language, an instance of the following schema:  “t” refers to objects x if and only if any x is t.3  No appeal to any “metaphysical” relationship of reference is made here. So, from the disquotational point of view, reference also appears to be a metaphysically neutral notion.  Putnam urges that the pure disquotational conception of truth is an inadequate account of truth, for, in such a conception, the predicate “is true” is not meant to ascribe any property to a sentence. The reason is that for the pure disquotationalist to say – for instance – that “Snow is white” is true is just another way to say that snow is white by using a meta-linguistic device, and there is nothing more than it.4 This is why the pure 
                                                1Putnam writes that “The disquotational view is at home in a larger view on which our understanding of our first language comes about through the internalisation of assertibility conditions and not through the learning of truth conditions in the realist sense” (Putnam, 1983a, p. xiv).  2Ibid., p. xiv. 3See ibid., p. xv. 4See Putnam (1983g), p. 278 
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disquotational conception of truth has no explanatory power, in the sense that it does not explain why sentences are true when they are so.1  Differing from the pure disquotationalists, Putnam wants to preserve the “central insight of realism: that truth is a substantive property of assertions”.2 Given the central role of the notion of an assertion in the Schema T, Putnam contends that the disquotational view could achieve some explanatory power only if something substantial about the notion of an assertion is added. His suggestion is that “we have to recognize that asserting is guided by notions of correctness and incorrectness”3 and that those notions refer to actual properties of certain sentences.4 Though we cannot think of the properties of correctness and incorrectness in terms of correspondence with extra-linguistic facts, we can still think of them in terms of satisfaction and non-satisfaction of the rational standards underlying our assertoric practices. Following this line of thinking, we can strengthen the disquotational view by conceiving the Schema T as stating that a sentence is true if and only if it is correctly assertible – namely, if and only if it is epistemically justifiable.  Putnam urges that to deny that there is any property of correctness or rightness pertinent to our assertions and thoughts involves, ultimately, denying that assertions and thoughts are actually assertions and thoughts.5 Putnam in fact emphasises that any physicalist view that aimed to reduce speaking and thinking to the production of respectively, noises and sub-vocalisations that happen merely in accordance with certain causal patterns, without considering any normative aspect, would be inadequate. One of the reasons is that:  On such a [reductionist] account, we cannot genuinely disagree with each other: if I produce a noise and you produce the noise “No, that’s wrong,” then we have no more disagreed with each other than if I produce a noise and you produce a groan or a grunt. Nor can we agree with each other any more than we can disagree with each other: if I produce a noise and you produce the same noise, then this is no more agreement than if a bough creaks and then another creaks in the same way.6  
                                                1See Putnam (1983a), p. xvi. 2Putnam (1983g), p. 280. 3Putnam (1983a), p. xiv. 4See ibid., pp. xiv-xv. 5See ibid., p. xv. 6Putnam (1994d), p. 322. As Putnam emphasises, this is a famous objection by Frege. 
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Putnam’s point (which is, in my opinion, straightforward) is that, to account for the possibility of the trivial fact that speakers agree and disagree with each other, we have to focus upon the meanings of sentences, which in turn involves considering the rules and the conventions by which the latter are correctly asserted. This is why, according to Putnam, the elimination of the normative dimension from language and thought is impossible and the attempt to do it is nothing but “attempted mental suicide”.1  Though a pure disquotational theory of truth could not help philosophers who reject metaphysical realism and still stick to realist intuitions, Dummett’s view of truth could turn out to be helpful to them, at least to some extent. Putnam emphasises that:  Dummett considers the learning of a language to be the learning of a practice and not of a set of correspondences; he considers the speaker’s knowledge of his native language to consist in the implicit knowledge of the conditions under which the sentences of that language are assertible (a sort of recognition ability); but he rejects the physicalist identification of asserting with uttering [...]. Rather, he identifies knowing when a sentence is assertible with knowing when it would be justified. The use of the word “true” is not, on this theory, a mere sign that a sentence is being “reaffirmed”, as it is on the disquotational theory. To be true is to be justified.2   Dummett’s theory is supposed to specify the truth conditions for any of the possible declarative sentences of our language by a recursive definition that gives the truth conditions of the logically complex sentences given the truth conditions of the primitive ones.3 Dummett seems to identify truth with conclusive justification; that is, with stable (as opposed to revisable) and complete (as opposed to partial) justification.4 In particular, from his perspective, to say that a sentence p is true means that p is conclusively justifiable and to say that p is false means that it is conclusively justifiable that p is not justifiable – this is the case in which not-p is conclusively justifiable.5 As is well known, Dummett’s conception of truth arises from the attempt to generalise to other areas of discourse the notion of truth he considers appropriate for the Mathematical Intuitionists. On this view, a sentence p is true when there is a                                                 1Putnam (1983f), p. 246. 2Putnam (1983a), p. xvi. 3See Putnam (1983d), p. 85. 4See for instance Dummett (1973), p. 514. 5This follows by the examples developed in Dummett (1978b). 
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(constructive) proof that p follows from a given set of axioms. On the other hand, p is false in case there is a proof that any (constructive) proof of p would lead to contradiction; this means that there is a (constructive) proof that not-p follows from the set of axioms.  The Mathematical Intuitionists notoriously do not deny the existence of undecidable sentences; that is, sentences such that it is not the case that either they or their logical negations are deducible from a given set of axioms. Undecidable sentences cannot be said to be either true or false. Because of this, the Intuitionists reject the Bivalence Principle (any sentence is either true or false)1 as a general principle of logic.   Like the Intuitionists, Dummett acknowledges the existence of undecidable statements. According to Dummett:  An undecidable sentence is simply one whose sense is such that, though in certain effectively recognizable situations we acknowledge it as true, in others we acknowledge it as false, and in yet others no decision is possible, we possess no effective means for bringing about a situation which is one or other of the first two kinds.2  In sum, an undecidable sentence is one that cannot in every situation be decided to be either true or false since we have no general procedure allowing this. According to Dummett, undecidable sentences may include, for instance: subjunctive-conditionals, statements referring to regions of space or time inaccessible even in principle, statements about someone else’s mental states and statements quantifying over potentially infinite domains.3  I will now provide some examples of undecidable sentences to make this notion clearer. Let us consider, for instance, the subjunctive-conditional:  (U1) If one were immersed in such and such zone of the Mediterranean Sea now, one would see some fishes.  
                                                1See Dummett (1978a), p. xix. 2Dummett (1973), pp. 468. 3See for instance Dummett (1978b). 
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If someone is in that zone now, (U1)’s antecedent is true, so (U1) can be verified or falsified. Yet, if nobody is in that zone now, (U1)’s antecedent is false and (U1)’s truth-value is undecidable.  Let us consider another undecidable sentence; for instance the following:  (U2) Ancient Romans made up objects of such and such a shape.  If someone found archaeological finds having that shape, (U2) would be verified; yet, if this did not happen, (U2)’s truth-value should plausibly be considered undecidable.1  Dummett tends to conceive the justification criteria of sentences as already fixed once and for all.2 Consequently, on his view, the fact that certain sentences are undecidable does not depend on possible changes in their justification criteria but on the fact that all evidence we are able to attain upon the grounds of those criteria could always be irrelevant, partial or revisable. Thus undecidability is, for Dummett, essentially a consequence of limitations in our detecting abilities. Finally, like the Intuitionists, Dummett has argued that the existence of undecidable sentences implies that the Bivalence Principle has no general validity in logic, since it does not apply to these sentences.3  So far, I have discussed Putnam’s contention that truth is an essentially normative notion and I have presented a conception of truth, namely Dummett’s, that does comply with this essential requirement. Now, I wish to consider the reasons why Putnam believes that Dummett’s conception truth is, despite its merits, irremediably faulty.  Putnam contends that Dummett’s conception of truth as justification is in trouble for at least two reasons: the first hinges upon Dummett’s implicit assumption that the conditions of (conclusive or non-conclusive) justification for the sentences of a natural language are in general surveyable, i.e. they can be specified in an effective way.4 The second source of trouble is that Dummett claims – or he seems to claim – that our everyday linguistic practices provide in certain cases conclusive justification – and therefore truth – for sentences.5 Putnam disagrees on both these points. 
                                                1That we have found no such archaeological finds can depend on both the fact that Romans did not produce such objects and the fact that the evidence for that production is lost forever. 2On this, see Alston (1996), pp. 110-115. 3See Dummett (1978a), p. xxx. 4See Putnam (1983a), pp. xvi –xvii. 5See ibid., p. xvii.  
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 Putnam accepts Dummett’s suggestion that truth has to be conceived in terms of some sort of stable and complete justification, since he admits that: “truth is to be identified with justification in the sense of idealised justification”.1 As we will see below, idealised justification is conceived as stable and complete. Yet, Putnam distinguishes between surface truth conditions and truth conditions of sentences.2 For instance, the surface truth conditions of “There is a chair in this office now” are expressed by the trivial T-sentence:  “There is a chair in this office now” is true if and only if there is a chair in this office now.   On the other hand, the truth conditions of the same sentence will be specified by the requirement that, in optimal epistemic conditions, a competent and sincere speaker would assert that there is a chair in this office now, for he would find it conclusively justified. Where the optimal epistemic conditions might, for example, be:  [O]ne’s having good vision, being in [… this] office now with the light on, not having taken a hallucinogenic agent, etc.3   Putnam recognises that “it is possible to survey the surface truth conditions for sentences of a language (if the language has been canonically formalised)”.4 In fact, if p is a declarative sentence, its surface truth conditions are immediately specified by the instance of the Schema T relative to p (i.e. “p” is true if and only if p). Yet, he emphasises that the surface truth conditions of any sentence do not really explain what it is for that sentence to be true. On the other hand, truth conditions – in the considered sense – explain it by making a sentence’s idealised justification conditions explicit. Putnam however urges that truth conditions are not in general surveyable. The reason is that truth conditions are in most cases non-specifiable in advance. Putnam writes:  What Dummett misses, on my view, is that what we acquire [in acquiring a language practice] is not a knowledge that can be applied as if it were an algorithm. We do learn that in certain circumstances we are supposed to accept                                                 1Putnam (1983a), p. xvii. 2See ibid., second footnote. 3Ibid. 4Ibid., second footnote. 
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“There is a chair in front of me” (normally). But we are expected to use our heads. We can refuse to accept “There is a chair in front of me” even when it looks to us exactly as if there is a chair in front of us, if our general intelligence screams “override”. The impossibility (in practice at least) of formalizing the assertibility conditions for arbitrary sentences is just the impossibility of formalizing general intelligence itself.1    Although Putnam is not explicit on this, I think that he could make similar considerations for reference conditions as well. It seems in fact possible to distinguish between reference conditions and mere surface reference conditions. For instance, the surface reference conditions of the word “Gold” are expressed by the following trivial statement:  “Gold” refers to any object x if and only if x is gold.  On the other hand, the reference conditions of this general term will consist in a (indefinitely extensible) sentence specifying some of the relevant properties of gold – such as its typical colour, its specific weight and hardness – that the experts of our linguistic community – for instance, the chemists – are supposed to know.2 Putnam would admit that the surface reference conditions of our words are surveyable, though they do not give enough information to make one able to single out their referents. (For instance, by only knowing that “Gold” refers to an object x if and only if x is gold, without knowing what a piece of gold looks like, we simply cannot single out the referents of the word “Gold”). On the other hand, Putnam would surely recognise that, though reference conditions provide actual information to correctly identify the referents of our words, they are, for reasons analogous to the above, not surveyable in general (the experts too “are expected to use […their] heads” in many cases!). 
                                                1Putnam (1983a), p. xviii. Putnam continued to make objections of this kind to Dummett’s semantics during all his internal realist period and even in the following phases. 2As is well known, Putnam maintains that in many cases we understand the meaning of terms of our language without being able to single out their reference. For instance, the speaker who can be said to understand the meaning of “gold” is not supposed to be able to establish whether or not an object x is gold. What the competent speaker is required to do, in this case, is to show that he possesses the stereotype commonly associated with the term. That is, a standard minimum amount of information allowing him to participate in collective discussions about the relevant object (see Putnam 1979, p. 98). According to Putnam, only the experts of our linguistic community know the exact conditions of reference of many of the terms that we commonly use. This is a consequence of what Putnam calls “the linguistic division of labour”, a phenomenon that would characterise all human communities (see Putnam 1975b, pp. 227-229). 
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 Putnam also criticises Dummett’s contention that our current linguistic practices are able to provide conclusive justification for certain sentences. Against Dummett, Putnam urges that in most cases there is no conclusive justification for sentences, as justification conditions change over time. This is mostly a consequence of Quine’s epistemological holism. Let us focus on this celebrated thesis.  Quine has argued that, in science, it is never possible to deduce an experimental statement from a single hypothesis alone.1 Rather, a hypothesis, in order to produce testable consequences, has to be conjoined with many other auxiliary assumptions. The latter include – for instance – assumptions about background conditions, about the reliability of the instruments employed, but also mathematics, logic and sentences that are meant to fix the meanings of the terms used. Quine has emphasised that, faced with observations incompatible with a hypothesis’ predictions, scientists do not necessarily consider the hypothesis falsified by the evidence, as they can choose to change some of the auxiliary assumptions necessary to entail those predictions. Thus, it sometimes happens that scientists decide that it is more reasonable to change the meaning of their terms rather than to reject a particular hypothesis. Actually, Quine once contended that, in certain cases, scientists might even find reasonable “amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws”2 rather than an empirical theory. All this shows, in Quine’s opinion, that the rigid distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences is to be abandoned together with the idea that mathematics and logic have a status radically different from that of empirical science. Quine’s famous conclusion is that:  [O]ur statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.3   Though the claim that logical laws in general can be refuted by experience is questionable (to say, for instance, that the Law of Non-Contradiction is refutable on the grounds of empirical evidence appears very counterintuitive to me), Quine’s epistemological holism aims to show that, in science, the sharp distinction between a priori and a posteriori truths does not apply, as (almost) every sentence may be rejected before recalcitrant evidence. The sentences that may be rejected certainly include – among others – those that fix the justification conditions for statements. 
                                                1See mainly Quine (1953). 2Ibid., p. 43. My italic. 3Ibid., p. 41. 
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 In accordance with these considerations, Putnam emphasises that Quine’s holism entails that we may discover that “procedures we now regard as justificatory are not, and that different justification procedures are better”,1 so that “the justification conditions for sentences change as our total body of knowledge changes, and cannot be taken as fixed once and for all”.2 This phenomenon plausibly affects the justification conditions of both observational and theoretical sentences, thus, of all empirical sentences in general.   Putnam urges that the tensed nature of justification conditions for sentences prevents us from identifying truth with current justification, as Dummett appears to believe. The fact is that:   [T]ruth is supposed to be a property of a statement that cannot be lost, whereas justification can be lost. The statement “The earth is flat” was, very likely, rationally acceptable 3,000 years ago; but it is not rationally acceptable today. Yet it would be wrong to say that “the earth is flat” was true 3,000 years ago; for that would mean that the earth has changed its shape.3  Putnam emphasises, in addition, that “[current] justification is […] relative to a person [… and] is a matter of degree whereas truth is not”.4 Notice that here Putnam specifically refers to a realist notion of truth. In fact, a non-realist could well contend that truth is a matter of degree, that it can be lost in time and that it is relative to subjects. The three properties that Putnam attributes to truth follow from the alethic requirement for realism (R2). In fact, since (R2) requires that empirical sentences are determinately ether true or false, truth is not thought of as something that can be lost (the world determines sentences’ truth-values once and for all) and as a matter of degree. Moreover, (R2) requires that truth is independent of subjects in general and so that it is not relative to them.   After examining Putnam’s objections to Dummett’s anti-realist conception of truth, let us now consider what truth is for the internal realist. Putnam’s claim is that “truth is 
                                                1Putnam (1983d), p. 85. 2Ibid. 3Putnam (1981), p. 55. 4Putnam (1983d), p. 84. Putnam has noticed that “truth is sometimes spoken of as a matter of degree (e.g., we sometimes say, ‘the earth is a sphere’ is approximately true), but the ‘degree’ here is the accuracy of the statement, and not its degree of acceptability or justification” (Putnam 1981, p. 55). 
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idealised justification”.1 I think that Putnam’s implicit reasoning to sustain this conclusion is the following: the tensed nature of the conditions of justification for sentences is a consequence of the fact that such standards are replaced with new standards continuously in time. This replacement is not a “blind” substitution but it is (or should be) an evolution towards better and better conditions of justification (that is, conditions that are part of a whole system of statements that faces “the tribunal of sense experience” better and better). Putnam’s conclusion is that truth should identified with that which would prove justified on the grounds of the standards and the evidence attained in the ideal end of this evolution process.  For Putnam, to say that truth is idealised justification means that:  A statement is true […] if [and only if] it would be justified under epistemically ideal conditions.2   [W]here optimal conditions depend on the particular assertion, context, and interests in complex ways.3   Putnam has urged that:  [This conception of truth] does preserve a central insight of realism: that truth is a substantive property of assertions, and one which depends on facts which in general go beyond the present memory and experience of the speaker.4  More generally, it appears immediately correct to say that, if truth is idealised justification, truth is (a substantive property that is) independent of what is currently justified and independent also of the beliefs accepted by subjects and cultures in general, as these beliefs are not generally ideally justified. These two consequences satisfy in part the alethic requirement for realism (R2).   Notice moreover that, if truth is idealised justification, truth-value cannot be lost over time and it is not a matter of degree. I have emphasised before that these two properties follow – from the point of view of minimal realism – from the alethic requirement, included in (R2), that empirical sentences in general are determinately                                                 1Putnam (1983g), p. 280. 2Putnam (1983d), p. 84. 3Putnam (1983g), p. 280. 4Ibid. 
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ether true or false. Indeed this is a consequence of truth as idealised justification too: if truth is defined in this way, it is quite intuitive to think that most of the sentences undecidable on the grounds of Dummett’s conception of truth will turn out to be decidable. I prefer to deal with the issue of sentences’ decidability in the next sections, devoted to Putnam’s coherentist conception of truth, since the problem of sentence decidability is connected to that of the completeness and comprehensiveness of the maximally coherent theory by which truth is defined in that conception.  Putnam has finally claimed that the internal realist is aware that:   [W]e cannot really attain epistemically ideal conditions for many sorts of statements, and if we ever can, we cannot be certain beyond the theoretical possibility of someday having to change our mind that we have attained them.1   Yet, in Putnam’s opinion, to speak of such conditions still makes sense because “we can approximate them to a very high degree of accuracy”2 In this respect, epistemically ideal conditions are like “frictionless planes”. For:  [F]rictionless planes cannot really be attained either, and yet talk of frictionless planes has “cash value” because we can approximate them to a very high degree of accuracy. Similarly, we can approximate epistemically ideal conditions for many sorts of statements to a high degree, and with a high degree of certainty, and this is what gives talk of what would be justified under such conditions “cash value”.3   A number of points should be emphasised before concluding this section. First, notice the use of the conditional tense in Putnam’s above definition of a true statement (“A statement is true if and only if it would be justified in epistemically ideal conditions”). As a result, the internal realist notion of truth does not involve that a statement is true if and only if it is or will be justified in epistemically ideal conditions. What it indeed affirms is that:  
                                                1Putnam (1983d), p. 84. See also Putnam (1981), p. 55. 2Putnam (1983d), p. 84. See also Putnam (1981), p. 56. 3Putnam (1983d), pp. 84-85. See also Putnam (1981), p. 55. 
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A statement p is true if and only if, if a competent and sincere speaker were in ideal epistemic conditions, he would assert p, as he would find p justified.  Since the right-hand side of the above biconditional is a subjunctive-conditional, the internal realist notion of truth allows us to think of a sentence p as having a truth-value even if nobody will ever verify (or falsify) p in the actual world. In that case, the subjunctive-conditional will be thought of as a true (or false) counterfactual conditional.  Notice also that there are two distinct kinds of idealisation in the internal realist notion of justification under optimal epistemic conditions. The first concerns the nature of the standards of justification that define these conditions: in this sense, idealisation emerges in the fact that the standards would be achieved in the ideal culmination of the process aiming to define better and better conditions of justification for sentences. The second form of idealisation concerns the actual achievement of the conditions described by the best of these standards: in this sense, idealisation consists in the requirement that these conditions are to be attained in a perfect way.  I will now recap the main points of this section. Putnam has argued that the internal realist cannot accept the disquotational conception of truth, though it is metaphysically neutral and it would not commit him to a non-epistemic notion of truth. The trouble is that the disquotational view cannot account for the realist idea that truth is a substantive property of (certain) sentences. Putnam has emphasised that Dummett’s conception of truth – according to which, to be true is to be conclusively justified on the grounds of current evidence and current standards of justification – is not affected by this difficulty. For Dummett’s position identifies a sentence’s truth with the substantive property of being correct on the grounds of given justification standards. I have indicated that, if truth is identified with current conclusive justification, many sentences will turn out to be undecidable. For both they and they logical negations will turn out not to be currently conclusively justifiable.  According to Putnam, Dummett’s conception of truth is faulty because, to begin with, truth conditions for sentences are in general not surveyable, contrary to what Dummett maintains. A second reason is that the current justification conditions of most sentences can in fact not provide conclusive justification, for they change as our whole knowledge system change – this is mostly a consequence of Quinean holism. If truth were identified with the warrant provided by current justification conditions, the main problem would be that sentences’ truth-values would change in time. But this is 
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incompatible with the alethic condition for realism (R2) asserting that our empirical statements are determinately either true or false.  Putnam’s proposal is to identify truth with what would be conclusively justified if our whole knowledge system developed to an ideal level. This means to assert that, a statement is true if and only if it would be justified under epistemically ideal conditions. If truth is identified with idealised justification, sentences’ truth-values do not change in time. I have also indicated that, if truth is idealised justification, truth is independent of what is currently justified and of the beliefs accepted by subjects and cultures in general. This satisfies in part the alethic requirement for realism (R2). Putnam is aware that we cannot really attain epistemically ideal conditions for many sorts of statements, yet, in his opinion, to speak of such conditions makes sense because we can approximate them to a very high degree of accuracy.   2.4 Truth as ideal coherence  In his most important internal realist book, Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam has claimed that “‘Truth’, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability”1 and he has specified that idealised rational acceptability is to be conceived – roughly – as “some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other”.2 In this section, I will specifically focus on this characterisation of truth. I will initially analyse the concept of theory coherence by dissecting it into its basic components. After that, I will discuss the problem of whether the maximally coherent theory has to be conceived as a complete theory. I will then explain why Putnam’s notion of theory coherence is a world-involving notion. Finally, I will expose the relationships that, in my opinion, hold between the internal realist definition of truth as idealised justification and the internal realist definition of truth as idealised rational acceptability or maximal coherence.  Putnam has emphasised that:  What makes a statement, or a whole system of statements – a theory or conceptual scheme – rationally acceptable is, in large part, its coherence and fit; coherence of “theoretical” or less experiential beliefs with one another and with more                                                 1Putnam (1981), p. 49. 2Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
 66 
experiential beliefs, and also coherence of experiential beliefs with theoretical beliefs.1  Consequently, idealised rational acceptability can be characterised in terms of:  [S]ome sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our beliefs system.2    When truth is defined in coherentist terms, a natural way to characterise the truth of single sentences is the following:   For any statement p, p is true if and only if p is derivable from the most coherent theory T we could in principle attain.  Though Putnam has not emphasised this point, the coherentist characterisation of truth shows something that is not immediately evident on the grounds of the notion of truth as idealised justification: namely, that the truth of any statement necessarily depends on the truth of many other statements (I return to this important observation in the end of the section).  The coherence of the maximally coherent theory should not be conceived as simple logical consistency but as a more complex property. Though, in my opinion, Putnam has never exactly defined coherence, we can collect under the general concept that Putnam has in mind at least the following theoretical virtues: logical consistency, explanatory power, functional simplicity, comprehensiveness and empirical strength.3 In this picture, the maximally coherent theory is a logically consistent set of statements T (logical consistency) including scientific laws and hypotheses such that any of T’s sentences (both theoretical and observational sentences) is explained in the best possible way in virtue of being derivable from T (explanatory power). T is also supposed to include the simplest possible set of hypotheses (functional simplicity)4 able to entail the highest possible number of meaningful statements (comprehensiveness). Finally,                                                 1Putnam (1981), pp. 54-55. 2Ibid., pp. 49-50. Putnam’s emphasis. 3Putnam has mentioned and discussed some of them in ibid., pp. 129-134. 4Putnam calls “functionally simple” a theory “which obeys Ockham's razor” (ibid.., p.133). That is, a theory that does not introduce any kind of object which plays no role in explanation of experience. 
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(empirical strength) T has to entail the highest possible number of observational statements that competent and sincere speakers could ever make, on the grounds of their immediate experience, in the past, the present and the future. (As we will see below, it is this last requirement that is able to “bring in” the external world).  It is worth emphasising that Putnam appears to think of the maximally coherent system of sentences as not the one that we will achieve in a given future time but, rather, the one that we would attain if we were in particularly favourable epistemic circumstances. Putnam in fact emphasises that:  [T]ruth is an idealisation of rational acceptability. We speak as if there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions, and we call a statement “true” if it would be justified [i.e. rationally accepted] under such conditions.1  This conception of truth does not commit the internal realist to claiming that a statement is true if and only if we will attain a theory that is the maximally coherent one and that entails the statement. This conception simply commits the internal realist to affirming that a statement is true if and only if we would attain such a theory if we were in particularly favourable circumstances (e.g. if we were sufficiently clever, if our lives were adequately long, etc.). I will go deeper into this conception of a counterfactual, ideally coherent theory in the next chapter. The first coherentist alternative roughly corresponds to the so-called “Peircean theory of truth”, according to which, truth is what we will achieve “at the end of inquiry”. Notoriously, Pierce defined truth as “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed by all who investigate”.2 The internal realist conception of truth has sometimes been mistakenly assimilated to this view.3   Some coherentists have ascribed to the ideal theory T the attribute of being not merely as comprehensive as possible but in fact complete. Completeness is the property that, for every statement p, either p or not-p is deducible from T. When truth is defined in coherentist terms, a natural way to characterise the truth-values of single sentences is the following:  
                                                1Putnam (1981), p. 55. 2Peirce (1935), p. 139. My italic. It is debatable whether this celebrated quotation is faithful to Peirce’s actual conception of truth. See for instance Wright (2000), p. 336. This is why I prefer to put the expression “the Peircean theory of truth” in quotation marks. 3See, for instance, Johnston (1993). 
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For any statement p, p is true if and only if p is derivable from the most coherent theory T we could in principle attain and that p is false if and only if not-p is derivable from T.  Since the maximally coherent theory T is supposed to determine not only the truth but, more generally, the truth-values of sentences, any failure of completeness for T will entail the existence of undecidable sentences and then the failure of the Bivalence Principle.  Putnam did not focus upon the problem of completeness in his internal realist phase. Yet, it is reasonable to believe that, if he had done so, he would probably have concluded that completeness is not to be included among the essential properties of a maximally coherent theory. As Wright has emphasised:  There seems no good reason to impose any such completeness requirement – no particular reason why all questions which are empirical in content should become decidable under ideal conditions. Indeed, to take seriously the indeterminacies postulated by contemporary physical theory is to consider that there is reason to the contrary.1  Quantum mechanics affirms that quantum particles have measurable properties that can be experimentally determined with a high degree of precision just in case other properties of the same particles are not determined with the same degree of precision or are not determined at all, and there is no way to establish their values by means of theoretical inferences.2 If quantum mechanics is correct, physicists are doomed to face sentences such that neither they nor their negations could ever be justified. Accordingly, if quantum mechanics were embodied into the epistemically ideal theory, the latter would necessarily turn out to be incomplete. As Wright has pointed out, this consideration will probably push the internal realist to think of the maximally coherent theory as incomplete and to reject the Principle of Bivalence as a general principle.3  Since, for the internal realist, truth is defined as ideal coherence, internal realism can properly be claimed to be a form of coherentism. Putnam has however emphasised that 
                                                1Wright (1992), p. 49. 2This is true at least according to a widely shared interpretation of the quantum mechanics formalism. 3See ibid., p. 39. It is interesting that, in the pragmatic realist phase, Putnam has rejected the possibility of a complete theory of the world by appealing to reasons substantially analogous to those indicated by Wright. See Putnam (1990a), p. viii and Putnam (1994), p. 280. 
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his position is not a form of – so to speak – world-independent coherentism but, rather, a form of world-involving coherentism. The reason is that:  Internal realism does not deny that there are experiential inputs to knowledge; knowledge is not a story with no constraints except internal coherence; but it does deny that there are any inputs which are not themselves to some extent shaped by our concepts, by the vocabulary we use to report and describe them, or any inputs which admit of only one description, independent of all conceptual choices.1  As I have pointed in the introduction of this chapter, “experiential inputs” are supposed to bring us into contact with the world not caused or constituted by our minds that the internal realist admits to exist. According to Putnam, evidence for the existence of such “inputs” comes in general from everyday life. For example:  If [... people] were foolish enough to pick a conceptual system that told them they could fly and to act upon it by jumping out of a window, they would, if they were lucky enough to survive, see the weakness of the latter view at once.2   In the internal realist period, Putnam tends to think of the “experiential inputs” in terms of sensations or qualia3 although, at the same time, he appears to conceive of the basic observational reports (i.e. those asserted on the grounds of the speaker’s immediate experience) as statements directly concerning middle-sized material objects. (We have seen before the case of the sentence “There is a chair in this office now” that Putnam would seem to consider as a basic observational report). This apparent contradiction could be explained by Putnam’s belief that, though “there are such things as sensations, or qualia […, t]hese may not be objects of perception”.4 In this picture,                                                 1Putnam (1981), p. 54. Putnam’s emphasis. 2Ibid. 3Putnam (1994a), p. 463, writes: “That [in the internal realist period] I was still assuming something like the sense-datum picture can be seen from my explicit rejection of Austin’s views in ‘Models and Reality’”. My italic. For Putnam’s rejection of Austin’s views, see the next footnote. 4Putnam (1983b), p. 15. Here is the whole passage:  Although the philosopher John Austin and the psychologist Fred Skinner both tried to drive sense data out of existence, it seems to me that most philosophers and psychologists think that there are such things as sensations, or qualia. These may not be objects of perception, as was once thought (it is becoming increasingly fashionable to view them as states or conditions of the sentient subject, as Reichenbach long ago urged we should); we may not have incorrigible knowledge concerning them; they may be somewhat ill-defined entities rather than the perfectly sharp particulars they were once taken to be; but it seems reasonable to hold that they are part of the 
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the subject describing his immediate perceptual experience makes something like unconscious inferences from his sense data to their objective material causes.  The internal realist Putnam endorses the largely accepted view that human knowledge starts with observations and goes on to trying to provide correct explanations of them. Accordingly, Putnam assumes that one of the evidential bases of our cognitive systems consists in the observational statements asserted by competent and sincere speakers. Yet, in Putnam’s coherentist picture, these statements are not supposed to be incorrigible – like the ones of the old-fashioned empiricists – but they are claimed to benefit from a sort of prima face justification (they are, in this sense, “self-warranting”).1 The assumption is that a competent and sincere speaker will utter a given observational sentence only if the appropriate epistemic conditions appear to him to occur. Prima facie justification can however be dismissed successively on the grounds of lack of coherence between these sentences and other asserted sentences – where “coherence” is to be conceived in the wide sense considered above.  In Putnam’s coherentist picture, rational inquiry appears to proceed, in general, as follows: the explanation of uttered observational sentences requires the assertion of appropriate theoretical sentences entailing the former. These theoretical sentences must prove coherent with all other asserted observational and theoretical sentences. If a loss of coherence among statements occurs somewhere in the system, some asserted theoretical sentences or some asserted observational sentences have to be rejected. The choice of the statements to be rejected depends on which rejection is more profitable for increasing the degree of coherence of the whole system. For instance, in a given situation, we could reject certain observational sentences since it allows the accepted theoretical hypotheses to “save” a great deal of asserted observational sentences that would be rejected if the hypotheses were changed. In another situation, we could reject some theoretical sentences since, for instance, their replacement with new hypotheses provides the system with a higher degree of simplicity and explanatory power.  Processes like the above are supposed to continue until the largest possible quantity of sentences is explained in the simplest possible way by one system that includes the highest possible number of observational statements asserted by competent and sincere 
                                                                                                                                          legitimate subject matter of cognitive psychology and philosophy, and not mere pseudo-entities invented by bad psychology and bad philosophy.  1Putnam for instance writes that, in an anti-realist epistemology, “a primitive sentence – say, ‘I see a cow’ – will be assertible if and only if verified. And we say it is verified by saying the sentence itself, ‘I see a cow’. To use a term of Roderick Firth’s, ‘I see a cow’ is ‘self-warranting’ in this kind of epistemology – not in the sense of being incorrigible” (Putnam 1979, p. 128). 
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speakers. The idea is that, in such a system, all sentences justify reciprocally to the highest possible degree (observational statements support theoretical statements by confirming the latter, theoretical statements support observational statements by explaining the latter and, finally, theoretical statements support each other by explaining reciprocally). These sentences and only these can be said to be true (i.e. ideally rationally acceptable).   Though Putnam has not emphasised this, I think that a theory T will not be considered maximally coherent if just all its theoretical virtues are maximised, as this may turn out to be impossible (for example, in certain cases, an augment of T’s explanatory power could be attained only if T’s empirical strength is reduced). Consequently, T will be said to be maximally coherent if and only if any of its theoretical virtues are maximised in an overall sense; namely, if and only if any of T’s epistemic virtues are increased to the highest possible degree compatible with the fact that also T’s other epistemic virtues are augmented to their highest possible degree. In this case, there may be situations in which it has to be known whether, for instance, a possible increase of comprehensiveness has to be preferred to a possible augmentation of functional simplicity or vice versa. The full accomplishment of the coherence processes presupposes therefore the existence of the sort of trade-offs among the theoretical virtues implied by the notion of coherence.  Notice finally that, since the “experiential-inputs” yielded by the world not caused or constituted by our minds is an essential constraint to the construction of the maximally coherent theory T, it makes sense to say that such a theory describes that causally mind-independent reality from within language. Accordingly, it also makes sense to say that the sentences deducible from T are true of that reality and that the sentences whose logical negations are deducible from T are false of it. This satisfies a consequence of the alethic condition for realism (R2), that is, the requirement that causally mind-independent reality makes our statements true or false.  After this detailed exposition of the internal realist notion of theory coherence, let us consider a last important issue. It might not be immediately clear what relationships there are between this account of truth, given in terms of ideal coherence, and that given in terms of idealised justification conditions for sentences, analysed in the above section. The internal realist Putnam has indeed provided no elucidation of it. In my opinion, two facts are relevant in its clarification. To begin with, it should be noticed that Putnam refers the concept of idealised rational acceptability to both single sentences and whole systems of sentences (i.e. theories), and the concept of idealised 
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justification to just single sentences. For this reason, the notion of truth as idealised rational acceptability is wider-ranging than the notion of truth as idealised justification. Moreover, the account of truth in terms of idealised rational acceptability is more general than that in terms of conditions of idealised justification for single sentences, as the latter conditions are determinable only by means of the ideally rationally acceptable system of statements of which the sentences are part. Let us see why this is so.  To begin with, notice that the processes described above, by which the maximally coherent theory is attained, can surely not permit the rejection of a sentence previously accepted if its justification conditions given in terms of epistemic conditions for the speaker do not allow it. This means that, when a particular statement is rejected, the relative epistemic conditions must be shown not to have occurred or, alternatively, the description of these conditions has to be suitably modified; and both the solutions might involve new adjustments somewhere in the system. Notice that this picture of the coherence processes is compatible with Quine’s epistemological holism and with Putnam’s contention that the conditions of justification of single sentences evolve over time.  Moreover, it seems to me that, if the ideally coherent system were attained, its constitutive sentences should be true also according to their conditions of justification in terms of epistemic conditions for the speaker (in all cases in which such conditions are conceivable). In fact, it is just in this situation that the fulfilment of a sentence’s justification conditions gives it non-revisable justification, which is identified, by Putnam, with truth. On the other hand, it appears also correct to affirm that, if a sentence is certified as true according to its justification conditions, the sentence must be part of the most coherent system of statements we could ever obtain. Wright has given some considerations – that I find convincing – to support this conclusion.  Wright has emphasised that, since the internal realist conceives truth as a stable and absolute1 property, the kind of justification which truth is to be identified with has to be indefeasible (otherwise it would not be stable) and non-improvable by any further information (otherwise it would not be absolute).2 Wright urges that, to ensure the fulfilment of these two conditions, we have no choice but “to require that circumstances count as epistemically ideal with respect to a particular statement just in case no further information relevant to it exists to be had”.3 Thus, in order to secure indefeasible and 
                                                1In the sense of not being a matter of degree. 2See Wright (1992), pp. 44-45. 3Ibid., p. 45. 
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non-improvable justification for a given statement, one has to possess all information relevant for that statement. Then, Wright emphasises that:  [Justification] is a highly systematic – holistic – property of beliefs: the status of a body of information as support for a particular belief turns not simply on the character of the information and the content of the belief but on what beliefs are held as background. […] It is not exaggeration to say that any piece of information may, in the context of an appropriate epistemic background, be relevant to any particular belief.1   The only way to ensure that all relevant information for the justification of a sentence is considered is, plausibly, that of achieving – so to speak – the definitive epistemic background in conjunction with all possible evidence; in other words, the maximally coherent theory.  These considerations allow the internal realist to conclude that, if p is a sentence having conditions of justification in terms of epistemic conditions, p is ideally justified if and only if p is deducible from the most coherent system of statements we could in principle obtain.  To summarise, Putnam has defined truth as idealised rational acceptability; according to this definition, a sentence is ideally rationally acceptable if and only if it would be deducible from the most coherent theory we could in principle attain. Ideal coherence is obtained by maximising, in an overall sense, at least the following theoretical virtues of a logically consistent theory: explanatory power, functional simplicity, comprehensiveness and empirical strength. The maximally coherent theory by which truth is defined, due to consequences of quantum mechanics, would probably turn out not to be complete; incompleteness entails the existence of undecidable sentences and that the Principle of Bivalence does not hold.  The coherentism embraced by Putnam is a world-involving coherentism. For the maximally coherent theory is supposed to be able to explain (prima facie justified but defeasible) statements asserted by sincere and competent speakers on the grounds of their immediate perceptions, and immediate perceptions are thought of as brought about by the world not caused or constituted by our minds. This characteristic of Putnam’s coherentism makes his position satisfy a consequence of the alethic condition for 
                                                1Wright (1992), p. 45. 
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realism (R2), that is, the requirement that statements are made true or false by causally mind-independent reality.  Finally, as for the relationships holding between Putnam’s notion of truth as idealised justification and Putnam’s notion of truth as idealised rational acceptability, I have emphasised the following: the notion of truth as idealised rational acceptability is wider-ranging than the notion of truth as idealised justification. For Putnam refers the concept of idealised rational acceptability to both single sentences and theories, and the concept of idealised justification to just single sentences. Moreover, the account of truth in terms of idealised rational acceptability is more general than that in terms of conditions of idealised justification for single sentences, as the latter conditions are determinable only by means of the ideally rationally acceptable system of statements of which the sentences are part.   2.5 The reflective equilibrium process determines the notion of coherence  In the previous section, I focused upon the internal realist conception of truth as idealised rational acceptability and ideal coherence. In this section and in the next, I intend to dwell upon some characteristics of this conception that are relevant for my investigation. In particular, in this section, I will analyse the method by which, according to Putnam, the general notion of theory coherence can be refined and developed up to an ideal level – that is, the so called “method of the reflective equilibrium”. This analysis will provide the grounds for an objection against internal realism that I will develop in Chapter 4 and that targets the reliability of this justification method.  In the following pages, I will first present an argument by Putnam aiming to show that the notion of rational acceptability and theory coherence evolve or should evolve over time, so that they cannot be just defined by the standards of rationality in favour in given cultures or traditions. After that, I will present an outline of the method of the reflective equilibrium that – according to Putnam – would allow such an evolution.  In Putnam’s view, not only the conditions of justification of single sentences evolve in time – as we have seen in the previous pages – by means of a huge and endless coherence process, but also general criteria of rational acceptability do. This happens with the very theoretical virtues (like simplicity and explanatory power) that are part of the general property of theoretical coherence. In brief, according to Putnam: 
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We use our criteria of rational acceptability to build up a theoretical picture of the “empirical world” and then as that picture develops we revise our very criteria of rational acceptability in the light of that picture and so on and so on forever.1  Putnam contends that our general standards of rationality must evolve over time, as this is somehow intrinsic to rationality itself. The reason is that the standards themselves ask for justification, and justification can be achieved without involving any vicious circularity only by means of something like the coherence process sketched in the quotation (I will return to this claim in a while).  To support his view, Putnam focuses upon what he calls “criterial conceptions of rationality”; namely, the conceptions that identify the criteria of rational acceptability with the standards de facto available in a given culture.2 In Putnam’s view, these conceptions are untenable because:  [I]f it is true that only statements that can be criterially verified can be rationally acceptable, that statement itself cannot be criterially verified, and hence cannot be rationally acceptable. If there is such a thing as rationality at all [...] then it is self-refuting to argue for the position that [... rationality] is identical with or properly contained in what the institutionalised norms of the culture determine to be instances of it. For no such argument can be certified to be correct, or even probably correct, by those norms alone.3  Let us try to unravel this very condensed argument. Its core appears to be contained in the claim that:   If it were rationally acceptable that:  (A) Only statements justifiable according to the criteria of a culture C are rationally acceptable,  
                                                1Putnam (1981), p. 134. 2See ibid., p. 110. Putnam counts as advocates of a criterial conception of rationality the Logical Positivists, some of the “ordinary language” philosophers of Oxford, the late Wittgenstein and Quine (with doubts about both of the latter two). See also Putnam (1983e), pp. 188-189. 3Putnam (1981), p. 111. See also Putnam (1983e), p. 189. 
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the statement (A) itself would not be justifiable according to the criteria of C; thus, (A) would not be rationally acceptable. Hence, (A) is not rationally acceptable.   Notice that (A) is the central principle of any criterial conception of rationality. Putnam claims that such a principle is self-refuting. The reason is that, if (A) were rationally acceptable, then only statements justifiable according to the criteria of C would be rationally acceptable; but (A) cannot be justifiable according to these criteria, for the thesis that (A) is justifiable according to them is viciously circular. To sum up, if (A) were rationally acceptable, it would not be rationally acceptable. Therefore, (A) is not rationally acceptable. To put more formally this reasoning, its structure is the following:   (A)  ¬(A)  ¬(A)   Putnam’s conclusion is that the criterial conceptions of rationality must be rejected and that rationality must be something wider than what is simply certified by criteria of rational acceptability de facto accepted in given cultures.1 In Putnam’s opinion, we have, in other words, to recognise that reason is transcendent, namely, “a regulative idea that we use to criticise the conduct of all activities and institutions”.2 By this “regulative idea”, everybody and, in particular, philosophers and epistemologists can criticise and justify the criteria of rational acceptability themselves. This involves conceiving philosophy not as a theory or a fixed corpus of principles but, rather, as an activity. In ethics, for example, philosophical activity appears to be involved in a very general process running as follows:  [W]e start with judgments that individual acts are right or wrong, (“observation reports”, so to speak) and we gradually formulate maxims (not exceptionless generalisations) based on those judgments, often accompanied by reasons or illustrative examples [...]. These maxims in turn affect and alter our judgments about individual cases, so that new maxims supplementing or modifying the earlier ones may appear. After thousands of years of this dialectic between                                                 1See Putnam (1981), p. 113. 2Ibid. 
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maxims and judgments about individual cases, a philosopher may come along and propose a moral conception (a “theory”), which may alter both maxims and singular judgments and so on.1   This describes something similar to Rawls’ conception of moral philosophy as grounded in the method of reflective equilibrium. Roughly speaking, it involves the process of bringing particular judgements about what is morally correct and general ethical principles into agreement by means of continuous reciprocal adjustments.2 This method seems to have been explicitly proposed for the first time by N. Goodman to solve the problem of the justification of the principles for inductive inferences.3 A similar procedure may be generalised to all philosophy, which is, in Putnam’s view, “almost coextensive with a theory of rationality”.4  Very plausibly, Putnam would specifically consider the method of wide reflective equilibrium5 as the one proper to philosophy and the theory of rationality. The advocates of wide reflective equilibrium argue that, to obtain a full justification of a subject’s rational acceptability standards, one has to broaden the scope of the judgements and principles that are to be brought into reciprocal coherence. In practice, one should require that the rational principles brought into equilibrium by a person must be coherent with any other accepted belief of the same subject. A moral philosopher should, for instance, include in the reflective equilibrium process also epistemological, semantic, metaphysical, and psychological assumptions that are part of his knowledge background. N. Daniels has sketched how this process could develop in ethics as follows:  We begin by collecting the person’s initial moral judgments. [...] We then propose alternative sets of moral principles that have varying degrees of “fit” with the moral judgments. We do not simply settle for the best fit of principles with judgments. [...] Instead, we advance philosophical arguments intended to bring out the relative strengths and weaknesses of the alternative sets of principles. [...] These arguments can be construed as inferences from some set of relevant background theories. [...] Assume that some particular set of arguments wins and                                                 1Putnam (1981), p. 104. See also Putnam (1983e), pp. 201-202. 2See Rawls (1971), pp. 19-21 and 48-51, and Rawls (1974). 3See Goodman (1965), pp. 65-68. 4Putnam (1981), pp. 104-105. See also Putnam (1983e), p. 202. 5About the notion of wide reflective equilibrium, see Rawls (1974). 
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that the moral agent is persuaded that some set of principles is more acceptable than the others. [...] We can imagine the agent working back and forth, making adjustments to his considered judgments, his principles and his background theories. In this way he arrives at an equilibrium point that consists of the ordered triple [... of a set of moral judgments, a set of moral principles and a set of background theories].1  The same process can occur in the justification of one’s epistemological principles. Thus, Putnam’s idea is that, by a sort of dialectical process between particular judgements about which sentences, hypotheses and theories are rationally acceptable and general principles of rational acceptability (which include notions like those of explanatory power and simplicity), the latter can be increasingly improved over time.  The requirement of being in (wide) reflective equilibrium can be considered as a meta-standard of rational acceptability, as it certifies the adequacy of general rules of rational acceptability. Putnam suggests the following general desiderata (or meta-standards of acceptability) for any system of rational principles:  (1) [T]he desire that one’s basic assumptions, at least, should have wide appeal; (2) the desire that one’s system should be able to withstand rational criticism; (3) the desire that the [… rationality] recommended should be liveable.2   The desideratum (2) is that of reflective equilibrium. It is my opinion that Putnam should specify a fourth desideratum for systems of epistemological principles. Namely, the requirement that the principles of the system be theoretically fruitful – in the sense that well-confirmed hypotheses that prove acceptable on the grounds of those principles should always be possible. (It is surely not sensible to accept a notion of, for instance, explanatory force that no new confirmed hypothesis is able to satisfy).  Putnam emphasises that the improvement of the general standards of rational acceptability depends, at bottom, on the same natural facts that those norms allow us to discover.3 He also urges that the “evolution” of these standards depends, at the top, on the progressive understanding of our conceptions of Eudaimonia or human flourishing.4 
                                                1Daniels (1979), pp. 258-259. 2Putnam (1981), p. 105. See also Putnam (1983e), p. 202. 3See Putnam (1981), p. 134. 4See ibid. 
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He argues for the second kind of dependence, pointing out that people that did not respect the most common epistemological standards of rationality in thinking  [W]ould be regarded as crazy in the sense of having sick minds; and the characterisation of their minds as sick is an ethical one, or verges on the ethical.1  The reason is that:  [O]ur image of an ideal theoretical intelligence is simply a part of our ideal of total human flourishing [...] as Plato and Aristotle saw.2  The standards of rational acceptability would therefore depend, to some extent, upon our moral views; thus, the more we deepen the understanding of the latter, the more our knowledge of principles of rational acceptability and coherence can increase and get better.3  Let us sum up the main points discussed so far. According to Putnam, general standards of rational acceptability, together with the notion of theory coherence, evolve or should evolve over time, so that they cannot simply be identified with the standards in favour in given cultures or traditions. The reason for this is that the standards accepted in any culture ask for justification, and non-circular justification can only be achieved by means of the process of reflective equilibrium. That is, one that involves bringing particular judgements about what is rationally acceptable and general principles of rational acceptability into agreement by means of continuous reciprocal adjustments. General standards of rational acceptability, to be fully acceptable, must fulfil the requirement of being in wide reflective equilibrium (i.e. being coherent with any other accepted belief of a given subject) and the requirements of having wide appeal, recommending a liveable rationality and being theoretically fruitful.  As a final point, I wish to emphasise an important consequence for the internal realist notion of truth that follows from the conception of rational acceptability just sketched. It is now clear that the maximally coherent theory by which the internal realist defines truth must be conceived as one that is judged maximally coherent on the grounds of the                                                 1Putnam (1981), p. 132. 2Putnam (1990d), p. 141. See also Putnam (1981), p. 134. 3See Putnam (1990b), p. 25. Since Putnam identifies truth with idealised rational acceptability and he defines the notion of a fact by that of a true sentence, his surprising conclusion is that “without values we would not have a world” (ibid). See also Putnam (1981), pp. 134-135. 
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ideal notion of coherence. That is, the notion of coherence attained in the ideal end of the reflective equilibrium process and that fully satisfies the other three meta-standards of rational acceptability listed above. For, only upon the grounds of this notion of coherence, could sentences derivable by the maximally coherent theory be said to be definitely rationally acceptable.   2.6 Realist consequences of coherentism: decidability and anti-reductionism  In this section, I wish to set out two realist characteristics of the coherentist conception of truth that Putnam himself has not emphasised. In particular, I will first show that Putnam’s identification of truth with ideal coherence has the probable effect of turning many of the sentences that Dummett would consider undecidable into decidable statements. After that, I will show that Putnam’s coherentism about truth also provides the internal realist with a sound basis for semantic anti-reductionism.  Since Dummett neglects any idealised epistemic perspective, he has concluded that, for many statements, both they and their logical negations can at the most attain partial or defeasible justification. A sentence p having such properties must be considered undecidable, as p cannot be conclusively decided to be either true or false. This may be the case, for instance, if p concerns a remote historical event. For, even if one obtained some piece of evidence supporting p at the time t, it would in general be possible to find new evidence supporting not-p (and defeating the present evidence for p) at the time t+n.  On Putnam’s account, which leaves room for philosophical idealisation, in the above case, either p or not-p may well end up being embodied in a maximally coherent theory. Thus, p may be liable to conclusive justification or refutation, and would prove determinately either true or false. This seems to be true not only for most sentences about past events but also for most empirical generalisations and, in general, for all sentences for which a scenario making them undecidable in epistemically idealised circumstances is hardly imaginable. In the next chapter, I will show that the internal realist is committed to think of the maximally coherent theory as one developed by ideal inquirers, that is, ideal thinkers, perceivers and performers, eternally existing, provided with an ideal memory and committed to acquire all possible evidence. It is quite intuitive to think that such a theory would be close to being complete. Earlier, in 
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Section 2.4, I have in fact suggested reasons for denying that the epistemically ideal theory would be fully complete.  Notice however that, even if completeness can probably not be achieved, Putnam’s position, when compared with Dummett’s, appears to extend enormously the domain of the sentences having a definite truth-value. And this is extremely relevant for Putnam’s doctrine, which aims to be a realist position. Dummett has repeatedly emphasised that a necessary condition for being a realist about certain classes of sentences is that one attributes Bivalence to them, for Bivalence is a consequence of the existence of language-independent facts that make the relative statements determinately either true or false.1 I have indicated that the requirement of Bivalence indeed characterises realism in general, as it is included among the requirements of the alethic condition for realism (R2). Bivalence is, in general, a consequence of the existence of facts (not necessarily language-independent) that make the relative statements determinately either true or false. As we have seen, the internal realist can conceive these facts as intra-linguistic entities. Since the internal realist is able to extend the decidability domain of sentences to include, probably, most meaningful empirical statements, the internal realist can claim that empirical sentences in general are made definitely either true or false by the world. This allows internal realism to satisfy the requirement, according to which empirical sentences in general must be liable to Bivalence, included the alethic condition for realism (R2).  Putnam’s coherentism about truth also provides the internal realist with a sound basis for semantic anti-reductionism. Internal realism is in fact characterised by at least two sorts of anti-reductionism. One concerns theoretical sentences – i.e. the meaning of theoretical sentences cannot be reduced to the meaning of observational sentences – and the other concerns present sentences regarding the past – i.e. the meaning of sentences about past events cannot be reduced to the meaning of sentences about present events.   The term “meaning” is ambiguous between “sense” and “reference”. Let us first consider the second interpretation of the term “meaning”. In this interpretation, Putnam’s anti-reductionism affirms that the reference of theoretical sentences cannot be reduced to the reference of observational sentences and that the reference of sentences about past events cannot be reduced to the reference of sentences about present events. So conceived an anti-reductionism can be shown to be a consequence of the internal realist thesis that truth is ideal coherence. The reference of a declarative statement can be thought of as constituted by the facts that make the statement true when they exist.                                                 1See for instance Dummett (1978a), pp. xxx-xxxi. 
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The two forms of anti-reductionism proper to internal realism will therefore affirm that (1) the facts making theoretical sentences true are not the same facts making observational sentences true and (2) the facts making sentences about the past true are not the same facts making sentences about the present true.  Anti-reductionism given in terms of (1) allows the internal realist to endorse a rich form of ontological realism according to which the world is populated by both everyday observable objects and invisible theoretical entities. This makes Putnam’s position match the intuitions of most realists about the general kind of objects constituting the world’s “furniture”. But anti-reductionism given in terms of (2) is central for internal realism too. In fact, as Putnam has emphasised:   [T]here is a realist intuition – namely, that there is a substantive kind of rightness (or wrongness) that my statement that I had cereals for breakfast this morning possesses as a consequence of what happened this morning, and not as a consequence of my present memory and experience – which must be preserved even if one finds metaphysical realism unintelligible (as I do).1  The reason why this intuition is realist is that:  If I view my utterances as noises which are to be appraised at each instant for some kind of rightness and wrongness which depends only on my experiences and memories at that instant, then I am perilously close to being a solipsist of the present instant.2  And, of course, the solipsist of the present instant is not a realist.  Let us first consider anti-reductionism of the kind (1). The coherentist conception of truth entails that there are true observational sentences only if there are true theoretical sentences. For the coherence of a system of statements requires the latter to have explanatory power, and only the presence of theoretical sentences can provide a system with such a property. Moreover, the (intra-linguistic) facts making true the theoretical sentences of a coherent system cannot be the same (intra-linguistic) facts that make true the observational sentences of the system. Otherwise, the explanatory power of the 
                                                1Putnam (1994d), p. 329, footnote 11. This paper was published for the first time in 1983, in Leigh C. (ed.), How Many Questions? Essays in Honour of Sidney Morgenbesser, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis. 2Putnam (1983g), pp. 279-280. 
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theoretical sentences would be annulled. In conclusion, anti-reductionism of the kind (1) – according to which, the facts making theoretical sentences true are not the same facts making observational sentences true – is a consequence of the coherentist theory of truth of internal realism. (Notice that this conception of truth also involves the impossibility of classical forms of instrumentalism, according to which theoretical sentences are mere predictive devices destitute of reference and truth-value. The fact is – again – that the explanatory role of the maximally coherent system of statements cannot allow any such forms of instrumentalism).  The coherentist account of anti-reductionism of the kind (2) – according to which, the facts making sentences about the past true are not the same facts making sentences about the present true – is analogous to the previous one. Let us suppose that someone contended that the (intra-linguistic) facts f1 making true the sentence “In Africa there were dinosaurs millions of years ago” are identical to the (intra-linguistic) facts f that make true the sentence “In Africa there are dinosaur fossils now”. The coherentist will object that the past (intra-linguistic) facts f1 cannot be identical to the present (intra-linguistic) facts f. Otherwise the explanatory role of the sentence “In Africa there were dinosaurs millions of years ago” in the explanation of the truth and acceptability of the sentence “In Africa there are dinosaur fossils now” would be annulled. In general, past facts cannot be reduced to present facts because the former are necessary to explain the latter in the same way as theoretical facts are necessary to explain observational facts.  As I have emphasised before, the term “meaning” can also be conceived as a synonym of “sense”. In this interpretation of the term “meaning”, the anti-reductionist affirms that the sense of theoretical sentences cannot be reduced to the sense of observational sentences and that the sense of sentences about the past cannot be reduced to the sense of sentences about the present. These kinds of anti-reductionism follow from the coherentist theory of truth of the internal realists too. For Putnam accepts the thesis that the sense of a statement is given, in general, by its use,1 and theoretical sentences have inferential uses depending on their explanatory function that are proper to no observational sentences. Something similar can be said about the different explanatory uses of sentences concerning past facts and those concerning present facts.  
                                                1Putnam follows Wittgenstein in believing that “understanding a language consists in being able to use it” (Putnam 1979, p. 97). Putnam accepts the thesis that to understand a sign involves having certain relevant concepts, but he claims that having concepts simply means to be able to use signs in certain publicly controllable ways. He also admits that a sign might be a mental entity (a “thought-sign”); in that case, there must be some way to check publicly the correct use of that sign (see, for instance, Putnam 1981, pp. 17-18). 
 84 
 In this section, I have shown that the coherentist conception of truth embraced by Putnam allows him to make most empirical sentences decidable. This allows internal realism to largely satisfy the requirement according to which empirical sentences in general must be liable to Bivalence included in the alethic condition for realism (R2). Furthermore, I have shown that Putnam’s coherentism entails that the meaning of theoretical sentences cannot be reduced to the meaning of observational sentences and that the meaning of sentences about past events cannot be reduced to the meaning of sentences about present events. This provides the internal realist with a rich form of ontological realism that matches the intuitions of most realists about the general kind of objects and facts constituting the world’s “furniture”.   2.7 Putnam’s pluralism about worldviews  Before concluding this chapter, I wish to try to cast light on a last aspect of Putnam’s doctrine that some of Putnam’s critics have found problematic.1 Putnam has claimed that one important property of truth as idealised justification is convergence. In other words:  [T]ruth is expected to be stable or “convergent”; if both a statement and its negation could be “justified” [for different subjects or cultures, or in different theories or conceptual schemes], even if conditions were as ideal as one could hope to make them, there is no sense in thinking of the statement as having a truth-value.2  The trouble is that the claim that truth is convergent might appear to clash with the internalist tenet (I2), according to which there can be alternative true descriptions of the world and no bare description of it. The problem is that, since no shared bare content can be individuated, alternative descriptions could be said to depict the same reality as consisting of irreducibly different facts. Thus, if T1 and T2 are two of such descriptions, one could argue that (intuitively) T1 entails T2’s negation and vice versa. In this case, we have two incompatible descriptions that are “ideally justified” (for those who endorse them) and true, in plain contradiction with the thesis that truth is convergent.                                                 1See for instance Throop and Doran. (1991). 2Putnam (1981), p. 56. See also Putnam (1983d), p. 85.  
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 In this section, I will try to elucidate Putnam’s reply to criticisms of this sort. In particular, I will first go deeper into Putnam’s concept of equivalent descriptions. Then, I will try to explain why the appeal to this concept allows the internal realist to dismiss the apparent conflict between the truth convergence thesis and the tenet (I2).  Although, in the internal realist phase, Putnam was not explicit about how to reconcile (I2) with the truth convergence thesis, some clarification comes from his later papers.1 Roughly, the internal realist affirms that the possibility of attaining true and alternative descriptions of the world is a consequence of the possibility of using alternative linguistic conventions or sets of concepts to describe reality. But so-constructed descriptions are “translatable” or convertible into one another by mere formal tricks, and formal “translatability” makes sense of the claim that their truth is convergent.2 Let us go deeper into this explanation.  Putnam’s idea is – more exactly – that some of the alternative descriptions of reality resting upon the use of alternative sets of concepts can be considered equivalent descriptions, and the latter are those whose existence is admitted by the thesis (I2). Two theories or descriptions are equivalent, in Putnam’s view, when they are convertible into one another by means of mere formal devices and they satisfy certain requirements of epistemic equivalence.3  According to Putnam, two theories or descriptions T1 and T2 are equivalent4 if and only if (1) they are mutually relatively interpretable, (2) they deal with the same phenomena (described in different ways) and (3) they have the same explanatory power.5 As for the condition (1), T1 is relatively interpretable in another theory T2 if and only if:  [T]here exist possible definitions (i.e. formally possible definitions […]) of the terms of T1 in the language of T2 with the property that, if we “translate” the sentences of T1 into the language of T2 by means of those definitions, then all theorems of T1 become theorems of T2.6  
                                                1See for instance Putnam (1991). See also Johnson (1991). 2See ibid., pp. 327-328. 3See Putnam (1991), p. 405. 4See Putnam (1983c), p. 39. In this paper, Putnam refers the notion of equivalent descriptions to complete theories. This requirement is dropped later on. 5See ibid., pp. 38-39.  6Ibid., p. 38. 
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Putnam stresses that relative interpretability is a purely formal relation, as it in no way involves the meanings of the terms of T1 and T2, which are viewed as uninterpreted calculi.1 The condition (2) is indispensable to exclude situations in which, though T1 and T2 have the same logical structure, they describe distinct (or partially distinct) phenomena.2  Putnam appears to think that T1 and T2 can be seen as equivalent in a full sense only if they prove equivalent with respect to all their epistemic attributes. Consequently, T1 and T2 are required to be equivalent also with respect to each of properties constituting the notion of coherence analysed above – that is, at least the theoretical virtues of logical consistency, explanatory power, functional simplicity, comprehensiveness and empirical strength. The condition (3) specifies just one of these further equivalence requirements. Notice, however, that the mere fulfilment of the conditions (1) and (2) entails that T1 and T2 prove equivalent also for other virtues characterising coherence.  In particular, if T1 and T2 are mutually relatively interpretable and they deal with the same phenomena – as required by (1) and (2) – T1 and T2 will be equally comprehensive. For, any sentence derivable from T1 must be “translatable” into a sentence derivable from T2 and vice versa. Furthermore, if T1 and T2 satisfy the conditions (1) and (2), these theories will be equally empirically strong. For, any observational statement entailed by T1 must be “translatable” into an observational statement entailed by T2 and vice versa. Finally, notice that the fulfilment of the condition (1) entails that T1 is logically consistent if and only if T2 is logically consistent too.  That T1 and T2 have the same explanatory power seems not to follow from the fulfilment of (1) and (2). Since, for example, T1 could be converted into such a bizarre re-formulation T2 that it might appear to have no explanatory power at all. This is why, on my view, Putnam adds the condition (3) to (1) and (2) in characterising equivalent descriptions. Notice however that Putnam does not mention any condition concerning T1 and T2’s functional simplicity. Yet, it is reasonable to affirm that he should impose that two equivalent theories must be equally functionally simple, for the attainment of 
                                                1See Putnam (1983c), p. 38. 2Consider, for example, the logically possible case of two theories T1 and T2 that are mutually relatively interpretable, but T1 is a physical theory and T2 an economical theory. Notice that the condition (2) is relevant for the equivalence of global descriptions of the world insofar as they are not complete. Two global descriptions could be incomplete relatively to different phenomena, in this case, they could not be said to be equivalent.  
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this sort of equivalence does not appear to necessarily follow from any of the equivalence constraints considered so far.  Why is it difficult to recognise that the existence of equivalent descriptions is in accord with the truth convergence thesis? Putnam claims that a difficulty hinges on the fact that certain equivalent descriptions appear logically incompatible when taken according to their surface grammar.1 This applies, for instance, to the problem considered in the first chapter of the alternative descriptions about the number of objects the world contains.2 As the reader will recall, while in the “ordinary” description the world consists of three (and not eight) objects, according to Lesniewski’s mereological description the world consists of eight (and not three) objects. These descriptions appear therefore to be logically incompatible and, if they were actually incompatible, one could not claim they are both true at the same time without clashing with the thesis that truth is convergent. Putnam’s contention is however that descriptions of this kind are not really incompatible.  Putnam emphasises that a necessary requisite for the actual incompatibility of the two descriptions about the number of objects of the world is that the term “objects” and the term “exist” have the same meaning in both of them. Yet, it is Putnam’s opinion that we are not allowed to assert this. The reason is not that “objects” and “exist” have different meanings in the two descriptions, but that “the ordinary notion of meaning was simply not invented for this kind of case”.3  Let us consider the sentences “the world consists of three objects” and “the world consists of eight objects” obtained, respectively, employing the ordinary and Lesniewski’s notions of an object. From Putnam’s perspective, “There is no such thing as the ‘proposition’ which one of these sentences affirms and the other denies”,4 where a ‘proposition’ is thought of as a language-independent entity. For – this seems to be Putnam’s thesis – the meanings of sentences and their terms are language-dependent. This entails that whether or not “objects” and “exist” have, respectively, the same meanings in the two sentences is a question that can only be answered from within language. In other words, we could assert that it is true these expressions are synonymous only if we were able to ideally justify it. Putnam however emphasises that “the notion of ‘meaning’, and the ordinary practices of translation and paraphrase to 
                                                1See Putnam (1992a), p. 116. 2See above p. 27. 3Putnam (1991), pp. 405. See also Putnam (1992a), pp. 119. 4Putnam (1991), pp. 405. 
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which it is linked, crumble when confronted with such cases”,1 for they were “never meant to do that job”.2 In conclusion, we cannot assert that “the ordinary” and Lesniewski’s descriptions are really incompatible, as the claim that the term “objects” and the term “exist” have respectively the same meaning in both the descriptions could be ideally justified makes no sense.3 The same discourse is valid for all equivalent descriptions in general.  Indeed, the above considerations are unable to lead to the conclusion that “the ordinary” and Lesniewski’s descriptions are straightforwardly compatible – that is, compatible according to every relevant sense of this term. For someone might argue that the two descriptions provide two pictures of the same world that are intuitively inhomogeneous, so that there is a sense in which they are incompatible. Yet, in Putnam’s opinion, this intuitive incompatibility is destined to fade away once the descriptions are explicitly considered from the internalist perspective.  In brief, Putnam urges that, if we abandon the idea that our statements are meant to depict a language-independent reality and we accept the thesis that how reality is depends in part on language, we will spontaneously conclude that the facts described by two equivalent descriptions are substantially the same.4 For:  [I]n an ordinary sense of the phrase “state of affairs” the “same state of affairs” can be described either by saying that “There are three objects on the table” or “there are eight objects (counting mereological sums) on the table”.5  Where, by “in an ordinary sense of the phrase ‘state of affairs’”, Putnam means “just what anyone would mean by that phrase who was not giving it a metaphysical emphasis”.6  More generally, the point is that, in cases of equivalent descriptions:  [I]t makes no difference to our predictions or actions which of these schemes we use. Nor are these schemes equivalent only in the weak sense of what is sometimes called “empirical equivalence”, but […] each sentence in one of them                                                 1Putnam (1992a), p. 119. 2Ibid. 3Putnam however urges that “we think of [… this case] as analogous to a case of meaning variation; [for] we should say that the word ‘object’ and ‘exist’ have very different uses in these two [… descriptions]”  (Putnam 1991, p. 405).  4See Putnam (1992a), p. 117 and Putnam (1991), pp. 405-406. 5Ibid., p. 406. 6Putnam (1992a), p. 117 
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can be correlated in an effective way with a “translation” in the other scheme, and the sentence and its translation will have the same truth-value and the same explanatory power.1 [And this means that such descriptions are] in practice thoroughly equivalent.2  An immediate consequence is, according to Putnam, that equivalent descriptions depict – from within language – the same facts and they state, in a substantial sense, the same truth. Thus, the fact that we can use alternative conceptual sets to describe reality allows a sort of pluralism about descriptions of the world that does not undermine the thesis that truth is convergent.  I tend to sympathise with Putnam’s conclusion that, if we abandon the idea that our statements aim at depicting a language-independent reality, it is intuitive that the facts described by equivalent descriptions (defined as above) are substantially the same. Thus, (I2) yields no real trouble for the thesis of truth convergence, insofar as the alternative descriptions of the world that (I2) claims to be possible are conceived as equivalent descriptions. A more serious problem affecting the thesis of truth convergence is – on my view – that Putnam’s vision of truth as idealised rational acceptability described in this chapter leaves the door open to the possibility of alternative descriptions of reality that are “ideally rationally acceptable” but not equivalent in the sense just considered. Such descriptions would entail true sentences that should yet be considered genuinely incompatible. I will fully develop this objection in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.  To recap, in this section, I have discussed the possible criticism of internal realism according to which the internalist tenet (I2) and the claim that truth is convergent clash with one another. (I2) states that there can be alternative true descriptions of the world and no bare description of it. The truth convergence thesis claims that it is impossible that both a statement and its logical negation turn out to be true for different subjects or cultures, or in different conceptual schemes. I have indicated that there is in fact no conflict between the two theses because the internal realist specifically conceives the alternative true descriptions mentioned in (I2) as equivalent descriptions, and equivalent descriptions are genuinely compatible with one another.  Two descriptions are equivalent, in this sense, if and only if they are mutually relatively interpretable, they deal with the same phenomena (described in different                                                 1Putnam (1991), p. 405. See also Putnam (1992a), p. 117. 2Ibid., p. 116. Putnam’s italic. 
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ways) and they have the same explanatory power and are equally functionally simple. Putnam has argued that, from the internalist perspective, such descriptions cannot be considered incompatible in the strictly logical sense. For the claim that such descriptions respectively affirm and deny properties of the same objects could never be justified, as our practices of translation do not apply in these cases. Moreover, from the internalist perspective, such descriptions prove, in an intuitive sense, straightforwardly compatible. For, in an ordinary and non-metaphysical sense of the term “fact”, it appears natural to say that equivalent descriptions substantially depict the same facts.   2.8 Conclusion of the chapter   This chapter has given a presentation of internal realism, which is – according to Putnam – a general realist position that is meant to replace metaphysical realism once it has proved conceptually incoherent. In brief, internal realism is the philosophical position according to which the world is actually not caused or constituted by our minds, though it is describable only from within language. The internal realist recognises the existence of intra-linguistic facts that make sentences true or false and he thinks of truth as an intra-linguistic correspondence relationship between such facts and sentences. To spell this out, internal realism consists of the conjunction of the three internalist (or anti-metaphysical) theses (I1), (I2) and (I3) and the ontological thesis (OR).  The ontological thesis (OR) claims that the world is not caused or constituted by our minds. (I1) claims that, only within a theory or description, does it make sense to say what objects and classes of objects the world consists of. (I2) affirms that there is more than one true description of the world and there is no bare description of the world. I have shown that (I2) and the claim that truth is convergent do not clash with one another. For the internal realist conceives the alternative true descriptions mentioned in (I2) as equivalent descriptions, which are genuinely compatible with one another.  (I3) is the central internalist tenet, as it entails both (I1) and (I2). (I3) affirms that truth is some sort of idealised rational acceptability – namely, ideal coherence among all our beliefs and our (intra-linguistic) experiences. On this view, a sentence is true if and only if it would be deducible by the most coherent theory we could in principle attain. Coherence is a complex epistemic property of theories, aspects of which at least include explanatory power, functional simplicity, comprehensiveness and empirical strength, 
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whose exact definition is however attainable only at the ideal end of the reflective equilibrium process. Putnam has defined truth also as idealised justification, i.e. in terms of ideal conditions of assertibility for sentences. He has urged that, on this view, truth is a substantial and normative property of sentences. I have shown that this narrower-ranging definition of truth is indeed entailed by (I3).   As we have seen, internal realism apparently complies with both the essential conditions for realism (R1) and (R2); that is:  (R1) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds. (R2) The world not caused or constituted by our minds makes empirical statements in general determinately either true or false, and truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.  Let us start with the last condition. The identification of truth with idealised justification entails that truth transcends current justification, that truth is objective (i.e. independent of subjects and cultures in general) and that most empirical sentences are liable to Bivalence. Finally, the internal realist world-involving concept of coherence involves that we have an effective epistemic access to the world not caused or constituted by our minds, so that the empirical sentences that are determinately either true or false are so of that world. These properties of internal realist truth widely fulfil the alethic condition for realism (R2).  The fulfilment of (R1) is entailed by the ontological realist thesis (OR), which is part of internal realism. I have shown that Putnam’s coherentism entails semantic anti-reductionism about both theoretical sentences and sentences concerning past facts. This provides the internal realist with a rich form of ontological realism that matches the intuitions of most realists about the general kinds of objects and facts constituting the world’s “furniture”. Since both (R1) and (R2) are apparently satisfied, internal realism would seem to be a realist position in the full sense of the term. 
 92 3 Against “the Peircean theory of truth”      3.1 Introduction to the chapter  In the previous chapter, I have presented what I think is the most coherent possible reconstruction of Putnam’s internal realism. In accordance with such a reconstruction, Putnam’s position apparently satisfies the minimum requirements for a realist doctrine. In the next chapter, I will raise objections against this conclusion. The present chapter is meant to make the internal realist conception of truth clearer in order to pave the way for some of those objections. As I have emphasised in Section 2.4, Putnam does not endorse the so-called “Peircean theory of truth”, according to which truth is conceived in terms of the global theory we will achieve “at the end of inquiry”. This chapter is primarily meant to explain why Putnam cannot actually accept “the Peircean theory of truth” and to make the conception of truth that the internal realist is committed to explicit.  In the following pages, I will first focus upon the classical objection against coherentism about truth, according to which, this position involves a sort of infinite regress. I will show that the objection is actually faulty. Then, I will specifically focus upon “the Peircean theory of truth” and I will raise a number of objections against it. The objections are primarily meant to show that, since this position does not fit basic realist intuitions that depend on the alethic requirement for realism (R2), Putnam cannot accept the “Peircean” view. After that, I will show that the appeal to ideal inquirers – i.e., roughly, beings whose rational and sensible faculties are ideally developed – can solve all these difficulties. I will argue that the coherentist conception of truth that the internal realist must endorse is one that conceives the maximally coherent theory in terms of the system of the world that the ideal inquirers would construct if they existed. Subsequently, I will focus upon two objections to “the Peircean theory of truth” that do not depend upon realist intuitions and that I consider conclusive: one follows from Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorem, and Wright has recently developed the other. Both objections show that no maximally coherent theory conceived “à la Peirce” could 
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ever exist. Finally, I will show how the internal realist must conceive the maximally coherent theory made up by the ideal inquirers in order to answer these two objections.    3.2 The infinite regress objection  Before focusing upon difficulties of “the Peircean theory of truth”, in this section I will examine an objection to coherentism about truth in general, according to which, the coherentist would be committed to an infinite regress. I will show that this objection is indeed straightforwardly answerable.  The infinite regress objection runs as follows:1 the coherentist says that, for every sentence p, p is true if and only if p coheres with a set of sentences S. But to say that:  p coheres with a set of sentences S   means to say that:  “p coheres with a set of sentences S” is true.  And this, from the coherentist perspective, means that:  “p coheres with a set of sentences S” coheres with S.  But it in turn means that:  “‘p coheres with a set of sentences S’ coheres with S” is true.   And it entails that:   “‘p coheres with a set of sentences S’ coheres with S” coheres with S.  It is easy to see that this analysis of the coherentist definition of truth will go on infinitely. 
                                                1See, for instance, Kirkham (1997), p. 114-115. 
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 Let us examine the objection more closely. The claim is that the coherentist can say that p is true if and only if p coheres with S. But the coherentist cannot affirm that there is an extra-linguistic fact – i.e. the fact that p coheres with S – whose existence makes p true. For he will plausibly affirm that it is S that determines what facts exist. In the sense that, for example, we can say that it is a fact that q if and only if q is true, that is, if and only if q is coherent with S. But this means that facts are conceived as intra-linguistic entities!  In conclusion, when the coherentist says that p coheres with S, he must intend that this is a consequence of the truth of the sentence “p coheres with S”. And this means, in its turn, that the sentence “p coheres with S” coheres with S as well. At this point, the above reasoning will be repeated indefinitely. In sum, the objection would seem to say that, as soon as the coherentist tries to understand his main claim, he gets involved in an infinite regress. So, the main claim of the coherentist must be absurd and no rational being could actually endorse coherentism about truth.  It is my opinion that this objection is faulty. The reason is that, in general, to understand a claim, we do not have to understand all its logical consequences and all the sentences entailing that claim. For instance, we can perfectly understand a scientific theory without understanding its infinite consequences and we can perfectly understand a statement without understanding all infinite statements that entail that statement. So, we can affirm that the coherentist perfectly understands the meaning of “p coheres with S” and that this understanding does not involve any infinite regress.   3.3 The internal realist cannot accept “the Peircean theory of truth”  Now, I will specifically focus upon “the Peircean theory of truth” and I will show that the internal realist, and any other philosopher with realist tendencies, could never accept this conception of truth. For on the whole “the Peircean theory of truth” fails to comply with the alethic condition for realism (R2), as it cannot ensure a definite truth-value (i.e. either the truth or the falsity) for many empirical sentences.   Let us suppose that the internal realist conceives a maximally coherent theory after the “Peircean” fashion; that is to say, as the epistemically best theory that we human beings in the flesh will attain in a given future time (or that we will approximate more and more in time). 
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 The first objection I want to raise against to “the Peircean theory of truth” is that we have no guarantee that, for any sentence p, either p or not-p will be entailed by the epistemically best theory T we human beings will ever achieve. On the contrary, we should accept that, at least in certain areas, a great quantity of statements would turn out to not be decidable on the grounds of T. This would happen – to begin with – to sentences that rely on information that the human community could easily lose over time. Consider, for instance, the statement:   (P1) Caesar scratched his head while crossing the Rubicon.  Surely, someone (at least Caesar himself) had verifying or falsifying evidence for that sentence, but any trace of that evidence is – very probably – irremediably lost now. In this situation, it is implausible that (P1) or its logical negation will ever be deduced from a maximally coherent theory. Notice that infinitely many other sentences like (P1) could very easily be constructed.  A second kind of sentence that would turn out to be undecidable on the grounds of the “Peircean theory” T includes those statements for which no evidence has ever been acquired. I have the following example in mind:   (P2) On the 3rd of August 1800 at 11.24 p.m. the number of pigeons in Piazza San Marco in Venice which were facing the bell tower was odd.1  If nobody counted the number of pigeons facing the bell tower on that occasion, nobody could seriously believe that a maximally coherent theory will entail either the sentence (P2) or its logical negation. On the other hand, it is also implausible that someone actually counted all those pigeons at that precise instant. For two reasons at the least: first, it is hard to see why someone might have been committed to so an idle task; second, his limited sensory abilities would have made the task very hard to accomplish. Thus, (P2) or its negation could very probably not be entailed by any maximally coherent theory conceived after the “Peircean” fashion. Now, the specific reason is not that the memory of the relevant evidence has been irremediably lost but, rather, that that evidence has never been acquired. 
                                                1To make this sentence less vague, the concept of facing San Marco bell tower should be specified in details, but this is surely possible. 
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 To dispel any doubts, we can think of another statement like (P2) but referring to an event that was going on in a time far before the existence of human beings. For instance:  (P3) The number of all Tyrannosauruses that lived on earth was even.  Now, we have an even clearer example of a sentence p for which no relevant evidence in favour or against it has been acquired, and such that both p and not-p are extremely unlikely to be deducible from the best theory we will ever attain. Notice again that infinitely many other sentences like (P2) and (P3) could easily be constructed.  Finally, another kind of sentence that would very probably be undecidable “at the end of inquiry” includes those about objects whose existence will not be remembered by anybody at that time. As Putnam himself has recently emphasised, in order to establish the truth of a statement like “There is a chair in my study now”,   Being at or near to the end of “complete science” tens of thousands (billions?) of years in the future would not help; indeed, by that time, no one will know that I existed, or that there was a study there.1  It is worth emphasising that the set of sentences about objects whose existence will not be remembered “at the end of inquiry” includes probably most of our sentences about everyday objects and persons. Thus again that statements of this type are very easy to construct and that their number is enormous.  A “Peircean” internal realist might however reply to this objection that the problematic sentences of the three kinds just considered have indeed a definite truth-value since, for any of these sentences, either the counterfactual that describe the occurrence of its ideal verification or the counterfactual that describes the occurrence of its ideal falsification is true. Thus, for instance, A “Peircean” internal realist might contend that, in the case of the sentence about Caesar, only one of these two counterfactuals is true:  If one had been in the appropriate epistemically ideal situation, one would have verified that Caesar scratched his head while crossing the Rubicon.                                                  1Putnam (1994), p. 291, footnote 26. 
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If one had been in the appropriate epistemically ideal situation, one would have verified that Caesar did not scratch his head while crossing the Rubicon.   Yet, it is not clear at all what, from “the Peircean perspective”, could make one of these counterfactuals true. The counterfactuals would be true or false if they were, respectively, deducible or not deducible from the maximally coherent theory that we will attain “at the end of inquiry”. But, again, it is not clear why one of them should prove deducible from such a theory. This would indeed be the case if one of the sentences introduced by “that” in their consequents were derivable from it – namely, respectively, either “Caesar scratched his head while crossing the Rubicon” or  “Caesar did not scratch his head while crossing the Rubicon”. But this is just what can intuitively not be the case!  The objection I have made here raises a serious difficulty for internal realists who decided to embrace “the Peircean theory of truth”. For realists will say that it is intuitive that the sentences of the three kinds considered above have in general a definite truth-value.1 But, if these sentences have a definite truth-value, from “the Peircean perspective”, either they or their negations must be derivable from T; and this is not the case. Consequently, any internal realist who embraced “the Peircean theory of truth” could hardly be considered as a sound realist.  Something else should be noticed. The internal realist defines the concept of a fact by means of the concept of truth, but, from “the Peircean perspective”, a great quantity of sentences would have an indeterminate truth-value, as both they and their negation would not be derivable from the best theory we will attain. Consequently, any “Peircean” internal realist should admit that the world is indeterminate for a great quantity of facts; in the sense that, for many empirical sentences p, neither is it a fact that p nor is it a fact that not-p. But such an admission is at odds with the alleged realist character of Putnam’s doctrine. For most realists would surely say that the world is indeed determinate as to facts in general, in the sense that, if p is whatever empirical statement (which is meaningful and which does not include vague predicates, either it is a fact that p or it is a fact that not-p.  The above objections could be reinforced by means of considerations relative to the unverified predictions of a “Peircean” maximally coherent theory T. That is, all                                                 1The pragmatic realist Putnam, for instance, urged that, for a sound realist position: “some statements should depend for their truth on ‘conditions the obtaining of which may be, in principle, inaccessible to human beings’ (that is, inaccessible as things now stand, even if they were at one time accessible)” (Putnam 1992, p. 363). 
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particular sentences deducible from T that no speaker has been able to verify under epistemically optimal conditions, though such verifications would have been at least logically possible. For instance, let us suppose that, “at the end of rational research”, general information about cats will still be available. A piece of information consists in the generalisation that cats were not able to fly (I assume that, in that remote future, cats will not exist any longer). Let us also suppose that, in that age, there will still be memory of my cat Birba and of the period in which she was alive. In these conditions, the unverified statement:  (P4) On the 9th of September 2000 at 12.00 p.m., Birba was not able to fly,  will be deducible from the epistemically best theory T. For (P4) is deducible from the generalisation, included in T, that cats did not fly. Thus, (P4) has to be considered true.  The “Peircean” internal realist might be content to accept all this. Yet, realists could claim at this point that, from their perspective, it is intuitive that the unverified predictions of T could have proved false if they had been tested on the grounds of experience.1 This consideration, independently of the previous ones, could prevent the internal realist from identifying the “Peircean” maximally coherent theory with the true description of the world. For he could think that a realist requirement for the theory T by which truth is defined is that all its predictions – or, at least, most of them – must be tested on the grounds of experience.  There is a final reason for concern for the “Peircean” internal realist. If the maximally coherent theory T were thought of as one that human beings in the flesh will attain in future, the fact that sentences in general have a truth-value should be seen as merely contingent. For, after all, we may never attain any theory even close to being maximally coherent. A reason is that, as van Fraassen has nicely suggested, “Armageddon might occur too soon”.2 Yet, to claim that the fact that sentences have a truth-value is just contingent is counterintuitive and it could hardly be accepted by anyone with a realist attitude towards truth.  To recapitulate, the internal realist cannot accept “the Peircean theory of truth”, as it does not comply with the requirement of the decidability of empirical sentences included in the alethic condition for realism (R2). “The Peircean theory of truth” affirms that a sentence is true if and only if it is deducible from the epistemically best theory                                                 1On this, see Miller (1992), pp. 102-105. 2van Fraassen (1989), p. 7. 
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that we human beings in the flesh will attain in a given future time (or that we will approximate more and more in time). The problem is that, on such a theory, a great quantity of statements would turn out not to be decidable on the grounds of such a theory. In particular, this would be the case with all those that rely on information that is easily lost in the long run, all those for which no evidence has ever been acquired and, finally, all statements about objects whose existence will not be remembered in the future.  I have furthermore added that internal realists – as realists – could find “the Peircean theory of truth” unacceptable because it does not fulfil the realist intuitive requirement that all the predictions of the maximally coherent theory, by which truth is defined, must be tested on the grounds of experience. Finally, the internal realist – as a realist – will not be able to accept the consequence of “the Peircean theory of truth” according to which the fact that sentences have a truth-value is just contingent.   3.4 The solution of the difficulties: the appeal to the ideal inquirers  All criticisms of the “Peircean theory of truth” considered in the above section appear answerable in the following way: the internal realist will concede that we human beings in the flesh could never attain any maximally coherent theory from which all statements intuitively true or false are, respectively, derivable and non-derivable, and whose all or most predictions are empirically checked. Yet, the internal realist will also urge that ideal inquirers could attain such an ideal theory. Where an ideal inquirer is conceived as an ideal perceiver (namely, provided with maximally powerful and accurate perceptive faculties), eternally existing (or existing for the whole duration of the universe), who is provided with an ideal memory and is committed to acquire all possible evidence. So-defined beings will in fact be able to determine the truth-value of the statements that rely on information that is easily lost by us in the long run, of the statements for which no evidence has ever been acquired by us and, finally, of the statements about objects whose existence will not be remembered by us in the future. Furthermore, the ideal inquirers will be able to test, on the grounds of their experience, all (or most of) the predictions of the maximally coherent theory. Finally, it is quite plausible that such ideal beings would actually be able to construct the maximally coherent theory; thus, the fact that sentences have in general a definite truth-value will no longer appear contingent. 
 100 
 Indeed, the appeal to the ideal inquirers is – in my view – the only straightforward way that the internal realist has at his disposal to overcome the difficulties discussed in the above section. In the remainder of this section, I will focus on the notion of an ideal inquirer just sketched and I will try to make it as clear and accurate as possible. Finally, I will make the definition of truth that the internal realist appears to be committed to explicit.  The internal realist could motivate the introduction of the notion of an ideal inquirer by emphasising that we know, in general, how we have to improve the best theory that human beings might attain, in order to comply with realist desiderata, and the idea of a theory constructed by ideal inquirers is just a way to representing the limit of the process of improvement. The internal realist should moreover think of the ideal inquirers as members of a possible extension of the actual community of human speakers. So conceived, ideal inquirers would be able to conclusively verify or falsify sentences that we actually use and understand but that we will never be able to conclusively accept or reject.1  To avoid objections based on Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, I prefer in general speak of ideal inquirers (note the plural) rather than a single ideal inquirer. The fact is that ideal inquirers would construct the maximally coherent theory by using many sentences whose meaning will always be incomprehensible to us. Thus, if there were just one ideal inquirer, the semantic rules of those sentences should be thought of as his private rules; but, as Wittgenstein has argued, there cannot be private semantic rules. Consequently, a large number of statements embodied in the maximally coherent theory – including probably laws and general principles – could not be considered statements (in the next chapter, Section 4.5.4, I will show that the Private Language Argument actually works when truth is identified with epistemic notions like justification or rational acceptability).2 In that case, there would be no maximally coherent theory because the ideal inquirer’s “theory” would consist of disconnected and unexplained parts; as a result, the whole coherentist image of truth would be in trouble. (I go deeper into this kind of difficulty in next chapter, Section 4.5.3)  Notice that the notion of an ideal perceiver must not be intended as, simply, that of a being having our own perceptive faculties, though ideally strengthened. In fact, I agree with Alston in believing that:                                                  1Notice that this is in full harmony with Putnam’s idea of “the linguistic division of labour” characterising speaking communities in general. See above, p. 59, footnote 2. 2I will focus upon the Private Language Argument in the paragraph “The Argument from Wittgenstein”. 
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The cognitive design of human beings represents only one out a large multitude of possible designs for cognitive subjects […]. It seems clear that there could be corporeal cognitive subjects with forms of sensory receptivity different from ours – sensitivity to different forms of physical energy.1   Such creatures might actually exist even if the human beings might never come to contact with them. Realists will certainly consider statements that such “corporeal cognitive subjects” could make on the grounds of their immediate perceptions as true or false of the world, even though we could never share those kinds of perceptions (we can for instance think of beings capable of directly perceiving magnetic fields). If Putnam stuck to a conception of an ideal inquirer according to which the latter is a being provided with – among other properties – idealised human perceptive faculties, Putnam would face a difficulty. For he should concede that some of the true statements asserted by non-humans on the grounds of their immediate perceptions might not be deducible from the best theory that ideal inquirers could ever obtain on the grounds of their perceptions. In fact, if non-humans were sensitive to forms of energy that human beings can conceive but not directly perceive, ideal inquirers could perhaps predict what those creatures would assert in certain situations but, probably, not in all. For, in certain cases, all information that even ideal inquirers might obtain on the grounds of their sensitivity might be insufficient to determine the values of the relevant form of energy affecting those creatures’ receptor organs.  The internal realist will overcome this difficulty by conceiving an ideal perceiver as provided with all possible forms of “sensory receptivity” that we might ever imagine (an alternative is conceiving ideal inquirers as provided with all possible artificial detection instruments that make them able to detect all possible forms of energy).  Unfortunately, the specification of the notion of an ideal inquirer I have just suggested is still not adequate to cope with all the difficulties. For there may be cases in which the holding of epistemic conditions that are ideal for accepting or rejecting a statement p may preclude the holding of conditions that would be required if anyone is to rationally accept or reject another statement q. The internal realist has to conclude that, in these cases, if p is true or false, as ideal inquirers would respectively verify or falsify it, q has no truth-value, as ideal inquirers would not be able to verify or falsify it. Yet, realists will say that this is counterintuitive, for q will have a definite truth-value in most imaginable cases.                                                 1Alston (1996), p. 201. 
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 Let us consider an example provided by Künne and inspired by an episode of Fellini’s film “Roma”,  On a wall in a newly discovered catacomb, there is a fresco painting. It would disappear within seconds if one were to throw so much light on it that one could recognise what it depicts. But it would stay just long enough for carefully measuring its size in dim light. So you can either verify a statement [p] to the effect that on that wall there is now a fresco painting which depicts such-and-such, or you can verify a statement [q] to the effect that on that wall there is now a fresco-painting which measures so-and-so many square centimetres. But you cannot verify the conjunction of two such statements, – and yet both the statements of this conjunction have undoubtedly a definite truth-value).1  In this example, the problem is that there are two statements having – for the realist – a definite truth-value, but that cannot be verified or falsified together by human beings or ideal inquirers as defined so far. (Notice that, in Künne’s example, if p and q were not verified or falsified, they or their negations could very probably not be deduced by a maximally coherent theory). Other cases similar to this example are easy to imagine. Thus, in conclusion, if the internal realist stuck to a notion of ideal inquirers defined as above, internal realism would not comply with certain realist desiderata.  I think however that an internal realist position that admitted the possibility of ideal performers would be able to overcome this difficulty too. In fact, the objection at stake does not affirm that it is logically impossible to verify p and q together. It only affirms that, because of the particular features of the situation and our limited physical abilities, we cannot verify p and q together. But one can undoubtedly imagine beings so much quicker and more accurate than us at, for example, performing measurements, that they would be able to verify both p and q without any difficulty. It is surely possible to hypothesise different situations involving statements intuitively true or false that human beings could never verify or falsify because their limited physical abilities; However, objections of such a sort appear to be in general answerable by appealing to ideal performers. To sum up, an adequate notion of an ideal inquirer should entail that the latter is at least an ideal perceiver and performer, eternally existing, who is provided with an ideal memory and is committed to acquiring all possible evidence. 
                                                1Künne (UNPUBLISHED), pp. 22-23. 
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 A last, even obvious, qualification of the notion of an ideal inquirer is still due. (I have anticipated it before, saying that ideal inquirers would use many words whose meaning will always be incomprehensible to us). As Putnam has recently specified:  [I]t would be absurd to suppose that there could not be intelligent beings so much smarter than we that some of their thoughts could not even be understood by us.1  In addition, as Alston has noticed, we can conjecture the existence of creatures that are cognitively different from us. Namely,  [S]ubjects with different innate cognitive tendencies, propensities, and hardwired beliefs and concepts.2  As in the hypothesis of super-intelligent beings mentioned by Putnam, many of the statements asserted by these cognitively different subjects could hardly be grasped by us.  Most realists would probably claim that it is intuitive that the statements unintelligible by us envisaged in both conjectures are in general true or false. If the internal realist wanted to “save” this intuition, he should recognise that there might be true statements that could not be derived from the most coherent theory that the human beings or ideal inquirers (as conceived so far) will ever construct. To overcome this difficulty, the internal realist should conceive a maximally coherent theory as a description elaborated by an ideal thinker. In this picture, not only will an ideal thinker be as intelligent as possible, but his rational faculties will also be thought of as able to survey all possible “innate cognitive tendencies, propensities, and hardwired beliefs and concepts” and to make use of all possible cognitive patterns and conceptual schemes to work up hypotheses and theories.   The appeal to ideal thinkers is helpful to resolve another difficulty. As D. L. Anderson has emphasised:  In the areas of particle physics, for example, it is at least logically possible that at some deep level of investigation, there may simply be no theory which we are 
                                                1Putnam (1992), p. 364. 2Alston (1996), p. 201. 
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capable of grasping which will meet all the theoretical and operational constraints that we ourselves demand that successful theory meet.1  Anderson’s conjecture seems to hinge upon the realist belief – which I find plausible – that, in certain fields, there may be phenomena so complex that, due to our intellectual limits, we will never be able to describe them. If reality were defined in terms of the best theory human beings will be able to work up, this belief would be wiped away. Yet, it could be retained in case reality were defined in terms of an ideal theory that beings much more intelligent than us would make up if they existed.  To recap, we have seen that – mostly to make many empirical sentences have a definite truth-value and to fulfil the alethic condition for realism (R2) – the internal realist must conceive the maximally coherent theory by which truth is defined as one that ideal inquirers would develop if they existed. The internal realist should think of the ideal inquirers as members a possible extension of the actual community of human speakers. To avoid objections based on Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, the internal realist should refer to ideal inquirers rather than a single ideal inquirer. Finally, a definition of an ideal inquirer that apparently assigns a definite truth-value to all sentences that, on the grounds of realist insight, have a definite truth-value is the following: an ideal inquirer is an ideal thinker, perceiver and performer, eternally existing, provided with an ideal memory and committed to acquiring all possible evidence.  Notice that this conception of the maximally coherent theory commits the internal realist to the claim that a statement p is true because, if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert p. Such a definition of truth is given in terms of a subjunctive-conditional condition. We can specify it by the following equivalence:  (SCT) For every sentence p, p is true       if and only if  if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert p (i.e. they would develop, on the grounds of their experiences and intelligence, a maximally coherent theory that entails p).   In the next chapter, I will consider a number of different objections that are specifically directed against (SCT).                                                 1Anderson (1992), p. 77. 
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3.5 There can be no “Peircean” maximally coherent theory  The problems with “the Peircean theory of truth” are indeed more serious than those considered so far. In the previous two sections, I have shown that the realist cannot accept this vision of truth. In this section, I will focus on two different objections – one developed by myself1 and one recently developed by Wright2 – that push towards the more general conclusion that no “Peircean” maximally coherent theory is possible at all.  The first objection is a consequence of Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorem and it is meant to show – against the “Peircean” theorist – that we can neither attain any maximally coherent theory in any finite time nor approximate it more and more in time. The objection runs as follows: to unambiguously individuate the class of its logical consequences, the “Peircean” maximally coherent theory T should be expressed in a formal language. (For the sake of simplicity, I will neglect now all the objections made hitherto against such a theory). In this case, the language of T must be rich enough to express arithmetic; otherwise, many scientific truths – for example, physical laws – could not be derived by it. Therefore, T will very probably include the formal axioms of at least weak arithmetic or Robinson’s Arithmetic (henceforth R).3   From Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, it follows that, if R is logically consistent, there is at least one sentence p such that p is true in the standard interpretation of the language of R4 and such that neither p nor not-p is derivable from the axioms of R. It is a consequence of Gödel’s theorem too that there is no way to extend R’s axioms to avoid incompleteness. We could, of course, embody p into the axioms themselves; but, in this case – as Gödel has shown – we can construct another sentence p* true in the standard interpretation of R and such that neither p* nor not-p* is derivable from R&p. The same happens for any attempt to extend the new system R&p to overcome the new incompleteness; and so on ad infinitum. If the axioms of R are included in the epistemically ideal theory T, also the latter will prove incomplete in the above sense.5 
                                                1My objection has been inspired by Johnston’s one, which I see as incorrect. See below, p. 106, footnote 1. 2See Wright (1992), pp. 44-46. 3Notice that, though it is highly probable that the “Peircean” maximally coherent theory will end up embodying R (as the axioms of R are strongly intuitive and they are deeply integrated with other mathematical frameworks largely used in the most fruitful empirical sciences), it is not necessarily true that T will include R. This follows from Quine’s holism, which entails that even sentences commonly considered as analytically or logically true can, in certain cases, be changed or refused, in order to accommodate defying evidence. This might well be the case with some of the axioms of R. 4That is, the interpretation that interprets the terms of the formal language of R over numbers as defined by the non-formal axioms of arithmetic (e.g., Peano’s axioms).  5Notice that T is, as the maximally coherent theory, required to be logically consistent. 
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 This kind of incompleteness constitutes a difficulty for “the Peircean theory of truth”. For the sentence p of the above example is intuitively true, as it is true in the standard interpretation of R; yet p is not deducible from the ideally coherent theory T. Thus, on this view, p cannot be considered as true. The “Peircean” coherentist should therefore admit that there are mathematical truths that cannot be accounted for by his conception of truth.1  The most straightforward way to cope with this difficulty is that of including in T all the sentences of Gödel’s series p1, p2, … as part of T’s axioms, though they are infinite. Yet, an unpleasant consequence of this notion of a maximally coherent theory is that such a theory can no longer be thought of as one that we will actually attain in a determinate future time or that we will be able to approximate more and more in time. For, in order to single out all the infinite members of Gödel’s series p1, p2, …, one needs – plausibly – infinite time. So, no maximally coherent theory embodying Gödel’s series will ever be achieved by us in a determinate future time. On the other hand, it makes no sense to claim that any finite set of the members of Gödel’s series that we will single out in any finite time is closer than the other finite set formerly individuated to the infinite set of all the members of the series. Thus, no sequence of theories that we will work up in time could ever be said to increasingly approximate a maximally coherent theory that includes Gödel’s series.                                                  1Johnston (1993) has made an argument against “the Peircean theory of truth” that is based on the Gödel theorem and that concludes exactly as mine does. Yet, it seems to me that his argument is invalid. Johnston assumes, correctly, that if T is the maximally coherent theory, then:  (1) T implies that for any sentence S, S is provable in T iff S is true (ibid., p. 89).  Afterwards, Johnston argues as follows (I have italicised the step I contest):   T will be rich enough to include the weak arithmetic […] which suffices to introduce Gödel’s system of numbering arithmetic sentences so that those sentences can be understood as containing names for themselves. So we can form in the language of the ideal theory T the familiar Gödel sentence with the intuitive meaning of  (2) I am not provable in T.  The Gödel sentence is either provable in T or it is not. Suppose it is not provable in T. Then given what the Gödel sentence says, the Gödel sentence is true, and so by (1) it is provable in T. So we have shown by reductio that the Gödel sentence is provable in T. But then, given what the Gödel sentence says, T proves a falsehood and so is not an ideal theory (ibid.).  The problem is that the Gödel sentence says – in a proper sense – just what the interpretation of the language of T will make it say. The Gödel sentence “says” just in a metaphorical sense “I am not provable in T” – which means that we can interpret it so, by using “Gödel’s system of numbering arithmetic sentences [… by which] those sentences can be understood as containing names for themselves”. In sum, if the Gödel sentence is not provable in T, this does not make the sentence itself true, since it is only the interpretation of the language of T that makes it true or false, and the interpretation can make the sentence false just in this case, without raising any incoherence. That is why Johnston’s reductio is invalid. 
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 Johnston has suggested a way to soften these consequences of Gödel’s theorem. His proposal is that of thinking of the maximally coherent theory as:  [A]n indefinitely extensible hierarchy of theories all of which are empirically ideal, a hierarchy such that each member of the hierarchy is better than its predecessor in containing more mathematical […] truths. The hierarchy begins with an empirically ideal theory T. The [… “Peircean” coherentist’s] claim will now be that exactly if S is an empirical truth then S follows from T. The improvements on T which figure in the hierarchy are got by adding as axioms further a priori truths not provable in T.1  On this view, the maximally coherent theory is one having a core constituted by a finite number of axioms that are indefinitely extensible by the successive addition of members of Gödel’s series. The theory’s core is thought of as the most coherent possible description of the empirical world.  Johnston’s suggestion intends to save part of the “Peircean vision”. For the core of the maximally coherent theory – i.e. the description of the empirical world – is still conceivable, on this view, as something attainable in a given future or that can be approximated in time. What cannot be attained or approximated in time is the whole collection of the formal truths of arithmetic.  Indeed, I think that Johnston’s suggestion is not helpful. To begin with, notice that, if this proposal could actually be applied, the notion of a maximally coherent theory, which we would be committed to, would not be the notion of a “Peircean theory”, in the strict sense of the term. But the situation is even worse; for there is no guarantee that Johnston’s proposal can actually be applied. As we have seen, to save part of the “Peircean vision”, the core of the maximally coherent theory should be thought of as consisting of a finite number of axioms. The problem is that keeping the core sharply distinct from the members of Gödel’s series might turn out to be impossible, for some of them might be necessary to make empirical predictions. And the number of Gödel’s sentences necessary to all empirical predictions might turn out to be infinite. In this case, the maximally coherent theory could not have any core consisting of a finite number of axioms.  In conclusion, I think that my objection yields genuine trouble for “the Peircean theory of truth”. The reason is that if, in any finite time however extended, we will                                                 1Johnston (1993), p. 89. 
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never attain any maximally coherent theory and if saying that we will approximate such a theory in time makes no sense, then no “Peircean theory” will be possible. For a “Peircean theory” is just conceived in these unattainable terms.  Let us now turn to Wright’s objection. It aims to show that, since we could never recognise the situation of “the end of inquiry”, we will never be able to attain any “Peircean theory” and, for the same reason, to say that we can approximate such a theory increasingly over time makes no sense.  Wright starts by focusing upon:  The Peircean idea that truth is what is justified at an ideal limit of inquiry, when all empirical information is in.1   Wright then argues that “the Peircean view” is irreconcilable with the frictionless planes analogy drawn by Putnam considered before;2 namely, the claim that we can approximate epistemically ideal conditions for the justification of sentences to a very high degree of approximation as well as, in physics, we can approximate frictionless planes to a very high degree of approximation. The reason for the irreconcilability is that:  We understand what it would be for a mechanical system to operate under conditions of frictionlessness just to the extent that the laws of mechanics issue in determinate assignments to other parameters on the assumption of zero friction. To that extent, the hypothesis that – per impossibile – a particular system was frictionless might well allow of experimental corroboration. By contrast, it is hard to see how a subject who somehow accomplished a Peircean state of comprehensive empirical information, could have any intimation that she had done so. By what principle could such a subject discount the idea that there was still more to learn?3   In brief, Wright’s point is that, while we can quite clearly imagine the features of a frictionless plane and, consequently, we could recognise the attainment of such an object, we have no clue of what the situation where all empirical information is in could 
                                                1Wright (1992), p. 45. 2See above, p. 63. 3Wright (1992)., p. 46. 
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look like. So, it makes no sense to say that we could recognise the attainment of such a situation. (Consider for instance that, if the universe – i.e. the experiential world – were spatially finite and the speakers were able to explore and describe it from top to bottom, this would not help. For the speakers should also describe the universe in its temporal evolution and it would extend indefinitely the set of all observational sentences to be asserted to complete the description). Yet, if we cannot recognise the attainment of the situation in which all information is in, it makes no sense to say that we can approximate such a situation with a high degree of approximation.1 This entails that the very idea of a “Peircean” maximally coherent makes no sense either. Such a theory is, by definition, one that we are supposed to attain when all evidence is in, or one that we are supposed to increasingly approximate in time by approximating increasingly the state in which all evidence is in. Yet, since we cannot make any sense of the situation in which all evidence is in, neither can we make any sense of such a theory.  Notice that a crucial point (not emphasised by Wright) is that “Peircean” truth theorists cannot reply that we could in fact attain (or approximate) the situation of “the end of inquiry” though nobody will ever be able to know it. For this would presuppose the existence of an unknowable truth (that is, the truth of the statement “we are in the situation of ‘the end of inquiry’”), which is incompatible with Peirce’s (and Putnam’s) epistemic conception of truth. The “Peircean” situation of “the end of inquiry” can just be one that is known to be so.  In conclusion, since Gödel’s incompleteness theorem entails that we can neither achieve any “Peircean” maximally coherent theory in any finite time nor approximate it increasingly in time and since – as Wright has argued – we could never attain the situation of “the end of inquiry”, the idea of a “Peircean” maximally coherent theory must definitely be dropped out. This means that “the Peircean theory of truth” proves ultimately unacceptable.                                                   1The later Putnam has explicitly affirmed: “I do not know what an ideal limit of inquiry means” (Putnam 1991, p. 417). He has admitted that “Many people have thought that [… his] idealisation [of justification] was the same as Peirce’s, that what the figure of a ‘frictionless plane’ corresponds to is a situation (‘finished science’) in which the community would be in a position to justify every true statement (and to disconfirm every false one)” (Putnam 1990a, pp. vii-viii.). Yet, Putnam insists now that “[he has] never thought such a thing” (ibid., p. viii). What Putnam believes is, simply, “that there are better and worse epistemic situations with respect to particular statements” (ibid.). Thus, what Putnam appears to claim (now?) is that we can approximate optimal condition of justification for single sentence independently of having a whole system of the world. A problem with this view is that it is not clear how it is possible to “detach” the conditions of justification for a particular sentence from the background knowledge that they depend on. Putnam’s thesis is probably correct only for “self-warranting” sentences like “I feel pain now” and the most irrevocable logical truth, but it seems untenable if referred to sentences in general. 
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3.6 The internal realist notion of a maximally coherent theory  An important question is now whether recourse to ideal inquirers is helpful to overcome both the difficulty depending on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and that raised by Wright. The answer is – in my opinion – positive, but the notion of a maximally coherent theory has to be re-defined. In this section, I will first provide the suitable re-definition of this notion and I will urge that the internal realist is ultimately committed to it. Then, I will deal with the question of whether Putnam, in his internal realist phase, actually accepted this notion of a maximally coherent theory. Finally, I briefly consider a possible objection against this notion as presupposing the concept of ideal inquirers.  To answer the objection from Gödel’s theorem and that raised by Wright, we should stop speaking of one maximally coherent theory built up by ideal inquirers and start speaking of an indefinitely extendable series of maximally coherent theories T1, T2, T3, … built up by ideal inquirers and defined as follows: T1 is the maximally coherent theory relative to all the observational statements asserted until the time t1. T2 includes T1 and it is the maximally coherent theory relative to all the observational statements asserted until t2. T3 includes T2 and it is the maximally coherent theory relative to all the observational statements asserted until t3; and so on. (Notice that any theory of the series includes the observational statements that it explains.1 Consequently, the observational statements that are part of a theory will be part of all the successive theories of the infinite series). Finally, we should also impose that each theory Tn of the series must embody new formulas of Gödel’s sequence that are not contained in the previous theories Tn-1, Tn-2, Tn-3, … These new formulas include both those that are necessary for the Tn’s new empirical predictions and any new formula of Gödel’s sequence that ideal inquirers are able to single out between the construction of Tn-1 and Tn.  We could keep speaking of one “maximally coherent” theory if we refer this expression to the set of all sentences entailed by the theories T1, T2, T3, …. defined as above (in the following pages, I will stick to this usage). The ideally coherent theory, conceived in such a way, still singles out all true statements and only them.2 A consequence of the new definition is that the time required to attain the maximally                                                 1Perhaps the term “description” is more appropriate than “theory”, in this case. 2Notice that, on the grounds of this notion of a maximally coherent theory, we can still characterise the conditions of idealised justification of single sentences without evident problems. For instance, we can affirm that a description S of the justification conditions of a statement p correctly depicts p’s idealised justification conditions when S is deducible from a theory of the series T1, T2, T3, ... defined as above.  
 111 
coherent theory is indefinitely long, but this is not a difficulty at all when ideal inquirers come into play.  Notice finally that such an ideally coherent theory includes all the sentences of Gödel’s sequence and, all at once, the theory is not supposed to be attained in any finite time or to be increasingly approximated in time. Thus, it does not fall foul of the Gödel theorem objection. Furthermore, such a maximally coherent theory is not supposed to be attained “at the end of inquiry” or to be increasingly approximated insofar as we approximate “the end of inquiry”. Consequently, it does not face Wright’s objection either.  The internal realist appears to be committed to thinking of the maximally coherent theory by which truth is defined as one that ideal inquirers would develop in infinite time if they existed. For – as far as I can see it – there is no other way by which the internal realist could overcome all the problems affecting “the Peircean theory of truth” discussed in this chapter. Yet, it is quite certain that Putnam, in his internal realist period, did not accept this conception of the maximally coherent theory. Notice in fact that the analogy that Putnam claimed to exist between ideal conditions of justification for sentences and frictionless planes cannot hold on this notion of a maximally coherent theory (thus the analogy proves definitively mistaken). The fact is that we cannot approximate epistemically ideal conditions for the justification of sentences to a very high degree of approximation, as Putnam said. For it makes no sense to affirm that any of our theories can approximate the maximally coherent theory of the world defined as above.  Neither is it completely clear whether, in the internal realist period, Putnam accepted the general conclusion that the maximally coherent theory is one that ideal inquirers would construct or whether he thought of this theory as the best one that we human beings – i.e. creatures with limited cognitive capabilities – could hope to attain. This second alternative does not coincide with “the Peircean theory of truth”, as it involves neither that we will obtain such a theory nor that we will increasingly approximate it in time. Yet, since it contemplates the existence of only beings with limited cognitive abilities, it is not able to cope with almost all the difficulties that affect “the Peircean theory of truth” that I have considered in this chapter.1 
                                                1The only advantage towards “the Peircean theory of truth” is, apparently, that it does not involve that the fact that sentences have a truth-value is seen as merely contingent. 
 112 
 According to Alston, the internal realist Putnam “makes it abundantly clear”1 that the second alternative is indeed his conception. Alston quotes the following two passages from Reason, Truth and History as evidence for his thesis:  [A] true statement is a statement that a rational being would accept on sufficient experience of the kind that is actually possible for beings with our nature to have.2  “Truth”, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealised) rational acceptability – some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our beliefs system.3   These pieces of evidence are indeed debatable. For, in the first quotation, Putnam is speaking of Kant’s theory of truth and not of his own and, in the second, it is not clear whether “our” refers to just human beings or, more in general, to creatures with “a rational and a sensible nature” that can include ideal inquirers.  In other internal realist papers, which Alston neglects, Putnam appears to refer to something like ideal inquirers. In one of these, Putnam has for instance explained that:   [Internal realism] is not a “verificationism” which requires one to claim that statements about the past are to be understood by seeing how we would verify them in the future. All I ask is that what is supposed to be “true” be warrantable on the basis of experience and intelligence for creatures with “a rational and a sensible nature.” Talk of there being saber-toothed tigers here thirty thousand years ago, or beings who can verify mathematical and physical theories we cannot begin to understand (but who have brains and nervous systems), or talk of there being sentient beings outside my light cone, is not philosophically problematic for me.4  Notice that, in the above quotation, the creatures with “a rational and a sensible nature” for whom the true sentences must be “warrantable” can surely not be human beings. As, 
                                                1Alston (1996), p. 202. 2Putnam (1981), p. 64. My emphasis. 3Ibid., pp. 49-50. My emphasis. 4Putnam (1990c), p. 41 (the paper was first presented to the American Philosophical Association in 1982). 
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for instance, it is admitted that there can be mathematical and physical theories that can be true as verified by such creatures and that “we cannot begin to understand”. Here, Putnam might implicitly refer to ideal inquirers to characterise the notion of truth.  Someone might perhaps object that accepting the notion of a maximally coherent theory as defined in this section would entail accepting the notion of an ideal inquirer and that the latter involves accepting the notion of an omniscient being’s standpoint as meaningful, which is perilously close to the notion of God’s standpoint that the internal realist is supposed to have dropped. In sum, according to this possible criticism, the internal realist is ultimately committed to incoherence insofar as he tries to cope with the difficulties affecting “the Peircean theory of truth” by resorting to the idea of an ideal inquirer.1  In my view, such an objection would be misplaced. For Putnam – as we have seen – conceives the expression “God’s standpoint” as a synonym of “externalism” in the first place. And it is for this reason that he rejects the notion God’s standpoint.2 But the expression “ideal inquirer’s standpoint” is not at all a synonym of “externalism”. For the notion of an ideal inquirer, if defined as above, is grounded in none of the metaphysical theses characterising the externalist position. Putnam’s reasons for rejecting the notion of God’s standpoint3 are not ipso facto reasons to reject the notion of an ideal inquirer. Consequently, the internal realist is not committed to incoherence if he appeals to the idea of an ideal inquirer.  In conclusion, we have seen that the internal realist is committed to conceiving the maximally coherent theory as an indefinitely extensible series of maximally coherent theories able to explain all possible evidence and including all sentences of Gödel’s sequence. Such a notion of an ideally coherent theory can cope with both Wright’s objection and the one from Gödel’s theorem. The internal realist Putnam could not have accepted such a notion, as it is incompatible with his accepted analogy between ideal conditions of justification for sentences and frictionless planes in physics. It is not clear whether the internal realist Putnam accepted the general thesis that the maximally coherent theory is one that the ideal inquirers would attain or whether he thought of this theory as the best one that human beings could hope to attain. At any rate, the appeal to ideal inquirers is not incoherent with Putnam’s rejection of the externalist perspective, 
                                                1An objection of this sort is made by Alston (1996), p. 202. Alston however directs it to the anti-realist perspective in general and not specifically to Putnam’s view. 2See above p.31. 3See Putnam’s arguments against metaphysical realism in the Appendix of this thesis. 
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as the notion of an omniscient being’s standpoint does not necessarily involve externalist theses.    3.7 Conclusion of the chapter  In this chapter, I have focused on “the Peircean theory of truth”, according to which, the true sentences are those determined by the global theory that we will achieve “at the end of inquiry”. I have shown that the infinite regress objection against coherentism in general is straightforwardly answerable, thus it does not constitute a difficulty for “the Peircean theory of truth”.  I have however argued that the internal realist cannot accept this philosophical view. For, to begin with, if “the Peircean theory of truth” where conceptually coherent, it would not meet the realist requirement, included in the alethic condition for realism (R2), according to which empirical sentences must be determinately either true or false. The reason is that, if a “Peircean” maximally coherent theory existed, it would leave the truth-value of a great number of empirical sentences undetermined.  I have furthermore argued that the internal realist cannot accept “the Peircean theory of truth” because this conception proves conceptually incoherent. For, it follows from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem that we can neither attain any “Peircean” maximally coherent theory in any finite time nor approximate it increasingly in time. Moreover, Wright has persuasively argued that we could never arrive at the situation of “the end of inquiry” – that is, the one in which the “Peircean” maximally coherent theory is supposed to be achieved.  I have emphasised that the only way that the internal realist apparently has to overcome all these difficulties is that of conceiving the maximally coherent theory by which truth is defined as one that ideal inquirers would build up if they existed. I have defined an ideal inquirer as an ideal thinker, perceiver and performer, eternally existing, provided with an ideal memory and committed to acquire all possible evidence. I have also indicated that the maximally coherent theory that the ideal inquirers would build up must be conceived as an indefinitely extensible series of maximally coherent theories able to explain all possible evidence and including all sentences of Gödel’s sequence.  This notion of a maximally coherent theory commits the internal realist to the subjunctive-conditional definition of truth (SCT), according to which, for every 
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sentence p, p is true if and only if, if there were ideal inquirers, they would develop a maximally coherent theory from which p is derivable. 
 116 4 Objections to internal realism      4.1 Introduction to the chapter  In the previous two chapters, I have provided a detailed analysis of Putnam’s internal realism. I have shown that this philosophical position is apparently a form of realism, for it appears to comply with both the minimal conditions for realism (R1) and (R2) that I have singled out in Chapter 1. In this chapter, I intend to consider and raise a number of different objections against Putnam’s position. Most of them will challenge the very claim that internal realism is a form of realism. I will show that – contrary to Putnam’s contention – internal realism is not a form of realism. For, as soon as we analyse Putnam’s position more deeply, internal realism proves in fact unable to comply with the condition for realism (R2). The trouble is, in particular, that internal realism cannot fulfil the requirement that causally mind-independent reality makes our statements true or false.  In the following pages, I first consider arguments against internal realism that I find inconclusive. In particular, I will initially focus upon typical and general objections raised against the reduction of truth to epistemic notions. Since internal realism is grounded in the reduction of truth to an epistemic notion, these objections may strike it. I will however conclude that none of them is able to show, in a definite way, that the internal realist conception of truth is faulty. Then, I will consider two objections that aim to specifically hit the subjunctive-conditional definition of truth (SCT), which the internal realist is committed to.  The first objection has been developed by Wright and the second is based upon the well-known Fitch objection – recently re-proposed by Williamson – which I will explicitly direct against (SCT). Wright’s objection is meant to show that (SCT) entails absurd consequences. Fitch-Williamson’s objection, when directed against internal realism, aims to show that internal realism cannot comply with the alethic condition for realism (R2). I will however conclude that both these objections are answerable by the internal realist. 
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 After that, I will raise two objections against Putnam’s position that I believe are conclusive. To begin with, I will argue that internal realism may collapse into a form of alethic relativism and that alethic relativism is not realism, as it cannot explain how causally mind-independent reality makes our statements true or false. Since such an explanation is required by the fulfilment of the alethic condition for realism (R2), there are no sufficient grounds to claim that internal realism is a form of realism. Developing this objection will commit me to showing that Putnam’s most important arguments against alethic relativism are inconclusive or irrelevant.  My second and stronger objection will be that – independently of the above difficulty – the internal realist definition of truth (SCT) makes it impossible to explain how causally mind-independent reality makes our statements true or false. Consequently, there are sufficient grounds to conclude that internal realism is not a form of realism.   4.2 General objections to the reducibility of truth to epistemic notions  In this section, I will focus upon typical and general objections against the reducibility of truth to epistemic notions. Since the internal realist is committed to reducing truth to idealised rational acceptability – that is, to an epistemic notion – objections of this kind, if they work, yield genuine trouble for Putnam’s position.   In particular, I will first consider the general charge that the reduction of truth to epistemic notions is just counterintuitive. Then, I will focus upon two objections recently made by Kirkham; namely, that the identification of truth with epistemic notions undermines central inferential rules and that truth cannot be reduced to epistemic notions because, in many cases, we are taught what epistemic notions are just by contrasting them with truth. Afterwards, I will raise the objection to the effect that, since the notion of epistemic justification depends in general upon logical notions like that of entailment and consistency, which in turn presuppose the concept of truth, to reduce truth to epistemic justification is viciously circular. Finally, I will argue that epistemic justification if analysed, turns out to be nothing but justification as truth; and this implies, again, that the reduction of truth to epistemic justification is hopelessly circular. I will however show that the internal realist is apparently able to answer all these objections.  A criticism, which the internal realist conception of truth has surely to cope with, is the charge of being counterintuitive. Metaphysical realists could contend that the 
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theorists of truth as an epistemic notion are committed to a form of revisionism that replaces the intuitive concept of truth – which is not epistemic – with another concept. Let us consider how the internal realist could answer this objection.  To begin with, notice that Putnam is not alone in facing this charge. Many outstanding philosophers have in fact accepted the idea that truth is some sort of justification. Just to provide a few examples from the history of English speaking philosophy,1 F. H. Bradley affirmed that truth is “that which satisfies the intellect”,2 that is, “an ideal expression of the Universe, at once coherent and comprehensive”.3 B. Blanshard held that a proposition is true if it coheres with an all-comprehensive and fully articulated whole.4 C. S. Peirce’s famous thesis was that “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth”.5 Moreover, W. James claimed that “true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify”.6 Finally, J. Dewey held true ideas to be those that are instrumental to “an active reorganisation of the given environment, a removal of some specific trouble or perplexity”.7  All the above views, though different, share the basic claim that truth is not a correspondence between sentences and the language-independent world but the property shared by all linguistic frameworks that, roughly, help us to make coherent, to explain and to predict the course of the experience – in Rorty’s phrase, that help us to cope with the world.8 The authors of the above quotations have in general answered the criticism that their picture of truth is counterintuitive in two distinct ways. Some of them have insisted that this charge is false, for our intuitions indeed say that truth is an epistemic notion. Others have argued that, in philosophy, our immediate intuitions about notions and rules are in certain cases misleading, for they do not take the entire theoretical framework into account. In sum, for the advocates of this point of view, an adequate characterisation of the notion of truth can only be achieved at the end of a sort of reflective equilibrium process involving all relevant intuitions, notions, conceptions and rules that appear to be somehow connected to truth. 
                                                1The list of examples is based on Alston (1996), p. 189. 2Bradley (1914), p. 1. 3Ibid., p. 223. 4See Blanshard (1939), vol. 2, p. 264. 5Peirce (1935), p. 139. 6James (1975), p. 97. 7Dewey (1920), p. 256. 8See Rorty (1982), p. xiii. This central intuition characterising many epistemic views of truth could surely be accused of being vague. Notice however that this “defect” appears to be shared by the rival metaphysical pictures. For also the intuition that truth is some sort of correspondence is, after all, vague. 
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 As I have emphasised in Chapter 2,1 Putnam is sympathetic to the second of the two perspectives sketched above; and the defence of that standpoint would probably constitute his reply to the objection that his epistemic conception of truth is counterintuitive. It is difficult to deny that such a reply would appear reasonable and, to some extent, compelling. Philosophical activity is not a mere attempt to stick to our immediate intuitions at all costs. It consists, rather, in trying to work up a coherent and general framework in which to insert those intuitions. Accordingly, in this activity, the content of intuitions may be altered and revised at least to some extent.  Critics of the internal realist doctrine could however insist that Putnam’s epistemic conception of truth has moved too far from our original intuitions about truth, in the sense that it has ended up accounting for a completely different notion. Yet, it seems to me that Putnam would not be without resources even facing this specific objection. He could emphasise that his greatest efforts (in the internal realist phase) are just meant to show that his conception of truth preserves many of the intuitive properties of truth – which are, in Putnam’s opinion, realist properties.   To move to different objections, Kirkham has recently contended that the identification of truth with a given set of epistemic values will generate logical complications. The reason is that:  [T]he logic of truth is different from the logic of these other values. For example, anything deduced from a true statement must itself be true, but not everything deduced from a statement with, say, explanatory power will itself have explanatory power. To put the same point another way, equating truth with explanatory power conflicts with our intuitions about which rules of inference are truth-preserving: if it is true that p&q, it is true that p, but this rule no longer holds when “is true” means “has explanatory power”.2   The claim that our standard rules of inference are conceived as truth-preserving is certainly hardly debatable. Yet, facing Kirkham’s objection, Putnam could emphasise that, if truth were identified with the property of being deducible from the epistemically best theory we could in principle attain, the emphasised difficulty would not occur in general. For ordinary logical inferences would be truth-preserving even if truth were conceived in that way. For example, if p&q were deducible from such an ideal theory, p                                                 1See above, Sect. 2.5. 2Kirkham (1997), p. 52. 
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would also be deducible from that. This is a trivial consequence of the transitivity of entailment (if T entails A, which in turn entails B, then T entails B). So, if p&q were true, its consequence p would be true too.  One might reply that, if truth were identified with the property of being deducible from the most coherent theory we could in principle attain, classical logic should probably be replaced by intuitionist logic. For, if the Bivalence Principle fails, also the Principle of Excluded Middle does not hold any longer.1 Thus, some standard rules of inference should be rejected. On my view, this would however not be a compelling objection against the internal realist conception of truth. For Putnam could easily reply that most standard rules of inference can be retained by his conception of truth. Putnam could also challenge the claim that classic logic is actually correct or, alternatively, he could contend that The Principle of Excluded Middle Principle just hinges upon “intuitions” that would be abandoned if all our beliefs were in reflective equilibrium.  Kirkham has also argued that identifying truth with epistemic virtues, such as coherence, predictive power, explanatory power etc., would yield conceptual incoherence. Because:  In point of fact, we are taught what these other values are partly by contrasting them with truth. It is pointed out, for example, that false propositions can sometimes have a lot of explanatory power and true ones sometimes fail to have any.2   In my view, the internal realist could straightforwardly reply to this challenge by pointing out that, generally, we contrast theories having just some epistemic virtues, and some degree of them, with theories that we call “true”. For instance, we typically say that theories that are partially coherent and that entail a number of true predictions may nonetheless be false. The internal realist could emphasise that his conception of truth is able to account for linguistic practices of this sort. Besides, he could stress that we typically do not contrast a theory having all conceivable epistemic virtues (or, in some sense, the most important of them) at the highest possible degree, with a “true” theory. He could insist that it happens because the epistemically ideal theory simply is a true theory, in full accordance with the internal realist doctrine. 
                                                1A proof of it has been given by Wright (1992), pp. 12-44.  2Kirkham (1997), p. 52. 
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 I think, however, that a more sophisticated objection to epistemic views of truth is possible. The objection I want to make focuses upon logical notions that are presupposed by the concept of justification. It can be maintained, for instance, that the holistic nature of justification makes the available warrant for a sentence p depend on the warrant available for sentences that entail p or that are entailed by p. This shows that entailment is an essential ingredient of the concept of epistemic justification. On the other hand, it is hardly disputable that logical consistency is an essential ingredient of any coherentist picture of truth. The objection goes on by contending that these logical notions presuppose the very concept of truth, since they are defined in terms of truth. One could for instance urge that the meaning of the term “entail” is defined by means of the notion of truth. For, when we say that p entails q, we mean that q must be true if p is true. The same could be affirmed for the word “logically consistent”; one could in fact contend that a set of statements is consistent if and only if all the statements can be true at the same time. The conclusion is that any attempt to define truth in terms of justification or coherence would trap us in a vicious circle because such definitions would presuppose the very notion we want to define. Thus, the epistemic conceptions of truth in general – according to this objection – would ultimately prove unintelligible.  Kirkham has examined a loophole for advocates of epistemic conceptions of truth that face objections of this kind; it is his contention that the loophole is ultimately faulty. I do not agree with Kirkham about this. Kirkham specifically refers to a coherentist theory of truth in which it is essential that any true sentence be entailed by a maximally coherent system of sentences.1 (Notice that this is just the case of internal realism). In Kirkham’s opinion, a coherence theorist might try to avoid falling into circularity by defining entailment in terms of a certain set of rules of derivation. Namely, stipulating that:  p entails q if and only if q can be derived from p via one or more of the rules in R.2  Where R is a set of rules of inference whose members refer only to the syntactic structure of propositions and not to their truth-values.3 For instance, one such rule, called modus ponens, reads: “From a proposition of the form ‘if p, then q’ and the proposition p, one may derive the proposition q”.4                                                  1See Kirkham (1997), p. 106. 2Ibid., p. 107. 3See ibid. 4Ibid. 
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 In Kirkham’s opinion, such a definition of entailment, as it stands, cannot be accepted to define truth. For nothing is said about the correctness of R’s rules. Kirkham’s contention is, in other words, that one would not accept the above definition of entailment as a basis to define truth in case one could not be certified that R is a set of correct derivation rules. To show this, Kirkham resorts to the following “thought experiment”:  [Let us] consider another set of rules one of whose members is the rule, call it modus goofus, “From a proposition p, one may derive the proposition not-p.” Now suppose someone were to claim that a set of propositions that are mutually “entailing” via this second set of rules are, for that reason, true. No one would take seriously such a theory of truth, and the reason why no one would is not far from reach: modus goofus is not a correct rule.1    I think that Kirkham’s claim is incontestable. The intuitive principle underlying the above “thought experiment” is that, to obtain a characterisation of truth that one finds to be “correct” or “appropriate”, one will move from principles that appear to oneself to be “correct” or “appropriate”. The crucial question is what “correct” means in this context. What does modus ponens have that modus goofus does not have? In Kirkham’s opinion:  The obvious answer is that the former is truth-preserving, and the latter is not.2  If this is true, the coherentist is again trapped in the vicious circle that he tries to escape.  Though I tend to sympathise with Kirkham’s thesis that “correct” means truth-preserving – for it appears intuitive to me – I also think that the internal realist can challenge it. At first glance, there are at least two possible strategies at the internal realist’s disposal:3 he can claim that correctness is indeed defined in terms of values other than truth or, alternatively, he can insist that we possess a primitive and unanalyzable notion of a correct rule of inference.  The first solution consists in contending that modus ponens is correct because:   q has the epistemic virtues X, Y, Z… whenever p and “if p then q” have the same epistemic virtues X, Y, Z….                                                  1Kirkham (1997), p.107. 2Ibid. 3See also ibid. 
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As I have indicated, it can be argued that the replacement of truth with epistemic virtues is unacceptable because the rules that classical logic takes to be correct do not generally preserve values other than truth. I have replied that the rules that intuitionist logic takes to be correct do preserve the property of being entailed by the most coherent theory we could in principle attain. Yet, it is plain that the internal realist could not explain the correctness of modus ponens by resorting to the property of being entailed by such a theory without a vicious circle. For modus ponens is, in turn, supposed to provide an account of the notion of entailment. Thus, the first strategy proves actually impracticable to the internal realist.   Let us turn to the second strategy. Its content would seem to boil down to the following points: there is a non-analysable, normative property, called “logical correctness”, which is different from any other and is proper to just certain rules of derivation that refer only to the syntactic structure of sentences. This property makes the distinction clear a priori between correct and incorrect derivation rules, so any competent speaker can easily draw it. Finally, a statement p can be said to be entailed by another statement q (or to be correctly entailed by it) if and only if the rules underlying the derivation of p from q are logically correct in the above sense. It is worth noticing that endorsing such a view does not necessarily involve claiming that all logical rules – or all those that are generally considered so – must prove correct upon purely intuitive and non-analysable grounds. The advocates of this view could restrict themselves to asserting that just some of these principles – for instance, modus ponens – are liable to non-analysable “logical correctness”. They could furthermore concede that other debated rules – for instance, the Double Negation Law – do not have that property; so that, they could be accepted only if they proved to be coherent with our whole theoretical background.  Notice that the internal realist can resort to this notion of correctness also to define the notion of logical consistency for a set of sentences without appealing to the concept of truth. In brief, he could claim that a set of statements is defined as consistent if and only if it is not possible to derive from it, by correct derivation rules, a sentence of the form &¬ .  To sum up, it seems that the internal realist can answer the objection that logical notions presupposed by the concept of justification are defined in terms of truth, so that truth in turn cannot be defined in terms of justification without circularity. The internal realist can in fact contend that these notions are not defined in terms of truth but in pure syntactic terms. This presupposes – as we have seen – that we possess a primitive and 
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unanalyzable concept of a correct rule of inference. It could be objected that the internal realist’s answer is not likely to be convincing for those who are convinced we have no such primitive concept.1 This is surely true. Notice however that this difficulty does not entail that the thesis of the internal realist is incoherent or unintelligible, it just means that his position will not be universally accepted. On the other hand, it is very plausible that the idealists à la Bradley and the pragmatists “à la Peirce” will embrace a position similar to that sketched above. There is no reason why the internal realist could not join them by insisting that this is what our intuitions about truth and logic ultimately tell us.  I wish now to make a last general objection to the possibility of reducing truth to epistemic notions. The objection starts by claiming that the thesis that true sentences are nothing but justifiable statements is a vague thesis, for it provides no qualification of the kind of justification that has to be identified with truth.2 Advocates of truth as an epistemic notion could emphasise that, from their perspective, truth is to be identified with epistemic justification and not, for example, with moral or prudential justification, which apply to statements and beliefs as well.3 But even this specification would not be helpful here, as the very the concept of epistemic justification asks for clarification. Thus, the question that the epistemic truth theorist should answer to make his thesis clear is: What does it mean to say that a statement p is epistemically justified? Or: In virtue of what is p epistemically justified, when p is so? The objection goes on to claim that the correct answer to this question is that a statement is epistemically justified in virtue of being true (or probably true); and this is so because, when we say that someone’s statement is epistemically justified, we mean that someone’s statement is justified as true (or probably true). This presupposes a thesis to the effect that:  (EJT) Epistemic justification is justification as truth.   If (EJT) is correct, the conceptions of truth that aim to define truth by reducing it to justification, when analysed, turn out to affirm that a sentence p is true if and only if p is justifiable as true. But this is plainly circular, as the term “true” occurs in both the definiens and the definiendum! The conclusion is that the epistemic conceptions of truth 
                                                1See, for instance, Kirkham (1997), p. 107. 2This point is emphasised by Kirkham too. See ibid. pp. 50-51. 3An example of moral justification for statements regards the situations in which to lie is claimed to be morally permissible. In those cases we say, for instance, that to assert p is morally justified even if p is false. 
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are unintelligible and so unacceptable. This general objection applies to internal realism as well, since the internal realist affirms that truth is nothing but idealised justification.  I find the thesis (EJT) quite intuitive. Epistemic justification is essentially related to what we might call “the epistemic point of view”, and I believe that this point of view is essentially definable through the aim of achieving or making probable the truth of a body of belief or set of statements. Consequently, the concept of epistemic justification refers to conditions that are desirable or commendable from the point of view that aims at achieving (or at making probable) truth. In this sense, one can say that epistemic justification is justification as truth.1  Though I find (EJT) intuitively compelling, I also think that Putnam could challenge it if he were able to work out an alternative thesis about the nature of epistemic justification that does not appeal to the notion of truth and that is coherent with the internal realist conceptual framework. I wish now to examine two possible alternatives to (EJT) that could be held by internal realists. I will show that, though the first is indubitably faulty, the second one appears to be more promising.  To begin with, Putnam might try to reject (EJT) by insisting that:  (EJA) Epistemic justification is justification as assertibility.  On this view, to say that a true sentence is an epistemically justifiable one means to say that a true sentence is a sentence justifiable as assertible; this appears to specify the epistemic view of truth in a way that raises no vicious circularity.  Notice2 however that, in one sense of “assertible”, any statement is assertible if it is just physically capable of being asserted. In this case, the reduction of truth to justification should be understood as stating that the true statements are those warrantable as physically capable of being asserted. This can surely not be accepted. In the other sense of “assertible” – the only apparently acceptable sense – an assertible sentence is one that can be justifiably asserted. This turns (EJA) into:  (EJA*) Epistemic justification is justification as justifiable assertibility.  But now the trouble is that (EJA*) is, in a relevant sense, a vague thesis. For nothing is said about the exact sense of “justifiable” in the expression “justifiable assertibility”. In                                                 1On this thesis, see for instance Alston (1996), pp. 240-248. 2The objection I make to (EJT) is substantially similar to one made by Kirkham (1997), p. 51, to an analogous thesis. 
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other words, the question that remains unanswered is: in what sense is a sentence justifiably assertible? The claim that truth is epistemic justification in the sense of justifiable assertibility is as vague as the original claim that truth is epistemic justification. Thus, the alleged specification of the notion of epistemic justification achieved by the thesis (EJA) turns out to be no specification at all. But the result is even worse, for it could be maintained that it is intuitive that a statement can be justifiably asserted only if it is justified as true. In conclusion, by resorting to (EJA), the risk of a vicious circularity is only postponed, but not really avoided.   There is however – in my opinion – a more sophisticated way that internal realists could question the thesis according to which epistemic justification is justification as truth. In brief, Putnam could contend that what we call “the epistemic point of view” is defined by the aim of maximising not the truth but the coherence of a body of belief (where coherence is to be intended in a broad sense, in accordance with the characterisation of it provided in Chapter 2). Accordingly, Putnam will accept the thesis to the effect that:  (EJC) Epistemic justification is justification as coherence.   Now, the challenge to Putnam is to provide a non-circular characterisation of coherence. If Putnam can do so, the intuitions according to which “the epistemic point of view” is defined by the aim of maximising the truth are of no importance. (Putnam could challenge those intuitions by arguing that they are not reliable, for they do not take the entire theoretical framework into account). One could of course object that the very concept of coherence involves certain logical notions – such as those of entailment and consistency – that, in turn, involve the concept of truth. This would re-establish the vicious circularity that the internal realist tries to elude. However, as I have shown before, the internal realist is not necessarily committed to this conclusion. For he can coherently contend that these logical notions are definable without mentioning the notion of truth. Thus, in conclusion, the internal realist appears to be able to escape also from the objection that truth cannot be reduced to epistemic justification as the latter presuppose the notion of truth.  I will now summarise the results achieved hitherto: the reduction of truth to epistemic notions might be claimed to be counterintuitive. I have however emphasised that this claim is not universally accepted, and that – at any rate – our claimed immediate insight into notions and rules can legitimately be questioned in philosophy, 
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which probably aims to make our intuitions coherent more than to stick to them at all costs. Kirkham has argued that the identification of truth with epistemic notions undermines, in certain cases, our most central and non-dismissible inferential rules. I have however emphasised that this is not the case when truth is specifically reduced to idealised rational acceptability. Furthermore, Kirkham has observed that, in some cases, we are taught what certain epistemic notions are just by contrasting them with truth. I have replied that this usually does not happen with the notion of idealised rational acceptability. Afterwards, I raised the objection that, since the notion of epistemic justification depends upon logical notions like that of entailment and consistency, which in turn presuppose the concept of truth, to reduce truth to epistemic justification is hopelessly circular. I have however pointed out that the internal realist could reply that the basic logical notions can be conceived as grounded in the primitive property of logical correctness – which is not truth – so that to reduce truth to epistemic justification does not necessarily involve any viciously circularity. Finally, I have argued that epistemic justification (which truth is claimed to be reducible to), if qualified, turns out to be justification as truth; and this involves, again, a vicious circularity. I have however emphasised that the internal realist could reply that epistemic justification is nothing but justification as ideal coherence. I have indicated that Putnam can insist that his notion of coherence is intelligibly definable without appealing to the concept of truth. Thus, even in this case, the circularity can be avoided.  In conclusion, the general objections against the reduction of truth to epistemic notions examined in this section are not conclusive, or are not so if directed against the internal realist conception of truth. Other general objections of the same kind could probably be developed, and it is not absurd to think that some of them might turn out to be decisive. For instance, one could think that a more exhaustive analysis of the logical notions involved in the concept of epistemic justification might eventually show that some of these notions necessarily presuppose the concept of truth, so that it is actually impossible to reduce truth to justification without circularity. I have the feeling, however, that all criticisms of this sort ultimately rely upon dissimilar “intuitions” about truth, justification and related concepts that each of us has or may have, so that they will in general prove unconvincing to all those who have already accepted an epistemic conception of truth. Consequently, in the next sections, I prefer to focus on objections concerning difficulties affecting internal realism that do not hinge upon these sorts of subjective “intuitions”. Such objections, if successful, are more likely to turn out to be universally convincing. 
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4.3 Wright’s objection  In this and in the next sections of this chapter, I will consider objections that aim to hit the specific notion of truth that the internal realist is committed to. To start with, in the present section, I will focus upon a criticism recently made by Wright.1 This objection does not challenge the alleged realist character of Putnam’s position but, more generally, its conceptual coherence. I will first present the objection in detail and, then, I will show that Putnam can answer it by making the definition of truth (SCT) more precise. I will finally argue that alleged difficulties of the new definition of truth are just superficial and they do not imply that internal realist is incoherent.  As I have argued in the previous chapter, the internal realist appears to be committed the following definition of truth:  (SCT) For every sentence p, p is true       if and only if if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert p (i.e. they would develop, on the grounds of their experiences and intelligence, a maximally coherent theory that entails p).  A sentence p is true, according to (SCT), if and only if, in a possible world that contains ideal inquirers which is as close as possible to our actual world, the ideal inquirers would assert p.  As is well known, conceptual analysis involving subjunctive-conditionals often produces paradoxical and unacceptable consequences; these cases are generally epitomised in the expression “conditional fallacies”. Wright has recently claimed that the above definition of truth (or one like it) involves one in conditional fallacy.2 More specifically, Wright has argued that any definition of truth given in terms of a biconditional that has the same structure as (SCT), when applied to certain sentences, yields incoherent results. Here is Wright’s argument:  Assume any purported analysis […] of truth of the form:  (o) P is true      Q  Z(P).                                                 1See Wright (2000). 2See ibid. 
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where Q expresses a general epistemic idealisation, Z(…) is any condition on propositions – for instance, being judged to be true by the ideally rational and informed thinker whose existence is hypothesized by Q, or cohering with the maximally coherent set of beliefs whose existence is hypothesized by Q, and so on – and “  ” expresses the subjunctive-conditional.1 […] Suppose […] we take “Q will never obtain” [for P in (o)], thus obtaining:  “Q will never obtain” is true      Q  Z(Q will never obtain).  Then, […] we have a claim to the effect that conditions will always be less than epistemically ideal just in case thinkers who considered the matter under epistemically ideal conditions would suppose so. That is obviously unacceptable.2    I will now apply Wright’s objection specifically to (SCT), in order to single out what difficulties it raises for this definition of truth. Afterwards, I will examine possible solutions of these difficulties.  Let us assume that p, in (SCT), states that there is no ideal inquirer, in this case, we attain the following equivalence:  “There is no ideal inquirer” is true      if and only if  if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert, “There is no ideal inquirer”.   The peculiarity of the above equivalence is that the subjunctive-conditional included in it, that is  (1) If there were ideal inquirers, they would assert, “There is no ideal inquirer”,  is necessarily false from the internal realist perspective. For (SCT) entails: . (2) If “There are ideal inquirers” is true then, if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert, “There are ideal inquirers”. 
                                                1Wright (2000), p. 341. 2Ibid., p. 344.. 
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Since (SCT) is supposed to be an analytic statement, (SCT) is meant to define not only actual but also possible truths. Thus, (SCT) also entails: . (3) If “There are ideal inquirers” were true then, if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert, “There are ideal inquirers”.  But (3) entails:  (4) If there were ideal inquirers, they would assert, “There are ideal inquirers”,  Which is incompatible with (1).  The trouble with the biconditional of (SCT) is that it turns the sentence “There is no ideal inquirer”, which is – plausibly – a contingent truth, into a necessary falsity. In fact, since the right-hand side of (SCT) is necessarily false, its left-hand side is necessarily false too. This conclusion is strongly counterintuitive and unacceptable. (Notice that, by the same reasoning, “There are ideal inquirers” is turned into a necessary truth).  Let us consider possible solutions of this difficulty. To begin with, one might perhaps think of changing the logical structure of (SCT) in order to keep truth and idealised justification in a close association and, at the same time, to prevent the right-hand side of the biconditional from transmitting the necessary falsity to its left-hand side when problematic statements like the above are at stake. Let us for instance consider an alternative account of the close relationship that the internal realist claims to exist between truth and justification. It could be expressed in terms of the following sentence:  For any sentence p, if there are ideal inquirers, p is true if and only if they assert p.  Unfortunately, the solutions of this type hinge upon replacing (SCT) with something different from a biconditional and this involves undermining the possibility of reducing truth to an epistemic notion, against what the internal realist claims.  A more promising idea is, in my opinion, that of trying to specify the content of (SCT) in a way that leaves its logical structure untouched. One could in fact contend that (SCT) does not express exactly what the internal realist intends when he wants to define truth by appealing to the notion of ideal inquirers. The point is that ideal inquirers are called to deliberate on the assertibility of sentences relative to a world – 
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our actual world – that does not necessarily coincide with the world in which they themselves are supposed to exist. For the sake of precision, (SCT) should therefore be replaced by a definition like the following:  (SCT*) For every sentence p, p is true      if and only if if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert that it is the case that p in the actual world (i.e. they would develop, on the grounds of their experiences and intelligence, a maximally coherent theory entailing that it is the case that p in the actual world).   By employing (SCT*), the truth conditions of “There is no ideal inquirer” become:  “There is no ideal inquirer” is true      if and only if if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert that it is the case that “There is no ideal inquirer”  in the actual world.  This biconditional does not turn “There is no ideal inquirer” into a necessary falsity. For its right-hand side appears to not be a necessary falsity, but a contingent truth.  A difficulty of this way out from Wright’s objection might be that it is unclear how ideal inquirers, if they existed, could refer their assertions to our actual world, where – plausibly – there is no ideal inquirer. The advocates of (SCT*) must provide explanation of it, as (SCT*) presupposes that the ideal inquirers are able to refer to our actual world.  Williamson has recently argued that counterfactual beings in general could not refer to the actual world by simply using the term “actual world” or expressions like “p is actually true”. For “counterfactual uses of ‘actually’ do not refer to the actual world, just as your use of ‘I’ does not refer to me and past or future uses of ‘now’ do not refer to now”.1 Moreover:  [Though your] reference to me typically depends on a causal connection between you and me, mediated by perception and perhaps testimony […, counterfactual beings] cannot refer like that to this actual world, for they are not causally                                                 1Williamson (2000), p. 293. 
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connected to it. One cannot perceive a possible world other than one’s own, or receive testimony from it.1     Williamson also emphasises that “the obvious means of reference to a possible world W in a world other than W is descriptive”.2 In other words: “one specifies W by specifying what is true at W”.3 Yet, Williamson urges that this method will not work in the case at hand. Here is his argument:  Let c be a long conjunction which can be expressed in a counterfactual world X, and is true at this actual world and at no other world. Then perhaps knowers in X could grasp and know that [… p is true in the actual world] by knowing   (c p) [namely, that c entails p].4  Williamson indicates two main difficulties affecting this strategy:  [This solution] is too cheap, for if p is actually true, then it can be included as a conjunct of the long conjunction c describing the actual world. Thus, in counterfactually knowing [… that p is true in the actual world] by having knowledge that one would express as   (c p), one has knowledge no more substantive than knowledge of the trivial truth   ((p&c) p).5  In a different respect, the descriptive solution is too expansive, for it requires the counterfactual knower to specify the actual world down to the finest details in the conjunction c, a scarcely imaginable achievement.6   It is immediate that the second difficulty is settled when the counterfactual beings considered by Williamson are ideal inquirers. For one of the reasons why the internal realist has to appeal to them just hinges upon the necessity of “specify[ing] the actual world down to the finest details”. However, simply appealing to ideal inquirers cannot solve the first problem. Though Williamson is not clear at all on this point, it seems to                                                 1Williamson (2000), p. 293. 2Ibid., p. 294. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 
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me that the first problem does not concern reference, as when one says that c entails p, one actually refers to the possible world described by c, which could be our actual world. The difficulty is, rather, that knowledge of   (c p) cannot convey counterfactual knowledge that p is true in this actual world when the latter knowledge serves to define truth by means of epistemic notions like verification or justification. The fact is that, whilst knowledge of   (c p) is merely analytic, knowledge of the second type is supposed to be synthetic. What we are looking for is a kind of knowledge that counterfactual beings – i.e. ideal inquirers – can obtain on the grounds of their experience. On the internal realist view, the specific task of ideal inquirers in fact consists in conclusively verifying or falsifying on our behalf empirical statements for which we will always only have partial and revocable evidence.  The possible world of ideal inquirers is thought of as different from the actual one for the essential reason that, whilst, in the latter, there are no ideal inquirers that are members of the linguistic community of humans, in that possible world there are such beings. Ideal inquirers will therefore be able to refer to “the actual world” by simply describing a world as similar as possible to their own but in which they themselves do not exist. Consequently, it seems to me that synthetic knowledge that p is true in the actual world can be expressed, in the possible world of ideal inquirers, by the following counterfactual:  (CC) If there were no ideal inquirer, it would be the case that p.  The antecedent of the counterfactual of (CC) allows reference to our actual world insofar as the closest world to the one of the ideal inquirers that does not contain ideal inquirers is our actual world. The kind of knowledge expresses by (CC) is in general synthetic because, for most sentences p, from the statement “there were no ideal inquirers” one cannot derive “it would be the case that p”.  All true counterfactuals of the form (CC) should therefore be conceived as derivable from the maximally coherent theory built up by ideal inquirers. On this view, such counterfactuals determine all the true sentences of our actual world. In fact, for each statement p occurring in the consequent of these counterfactuals, the ideal inquirers appear to be entitled to say that it is the case that p in our actual world. And this entails, by (SCT*), that p is true of the actual world.  Williamson has however raised two objections against solutions of this kind for the problem of trans-worlds reference. Against Williamson, I will show that both objections 
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are indeed answerable by the internal realist. To begin with, according to Williamson, the appeal to counterfactuals like (CC) as a means of reference “regenerate the trivialisation argument”1 – namely, it provides us with analytic knowledge when we would need synthetic knowledge. To show it, Williamson generalises the reference method based upon counterfactuals as follows:  [The] proposal would be that if, in a world W, another world X would have obtained if the proposition q had been true, then knowledge in W that  if q had been true the proposition r would have been true  constitutes knowledge in W that r is true in X. Knowers in W need not describe X in detail. They describe one difference (q) from their world and let everything else be as close as possible to their world in the manner of the counterfactuals suppositions.2  Unfortunately, according to Williamson, the descriptive element in the antecedent of the counterfactual suffices to “regenerate the trivialisation argument”.  For suppose that, in the world W, the world X would have obtained if q had been true, and that r is true in X. Then, in W, X would have obtained if the conjunction q&r had been true; in the terms of a simple possible worlds semantics for the counterfactual conditional, if r is true in X and X is the closest world to W in which q is true then X is the closest world to W in which q&r is true.3  The consequence of this is that:  [K]nowledge in W of the counterfactual (q&r)  r [that is, is q&r were the case, then r would be the case] constitutes knowledge in W that r is true in X. But since r is a truth-functional consequence of q&r, the counterfactual (q&r)  r is a trivial necessary truth. Knowledge of it in W is knowledge of nothing interesting.4                                                  1Williamson (2000), p. 295. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 
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 Williamson’s reasoning is, in my opinion, faulty. The point is that knowledge in W of the counterfactual q  r is sufficient to constitute knowledge in W that r is true in X Williamson himself admits, in the first of the above three quotations, that, to refer to the possible world X, “Knowers in W need not describe X in detail. They describe one difference (q) from their world and let everything else be as close as possible to their world”. Thus, there is no need, for the knowers in W, to replace q by the conjunction q&r in the antecedent of the counterfactual at stake. Knowledge of q  r is synthetic, as from q one can in general not deduce r. Naturally, we can turn any synthetic conditional      into an analytic conditional by conjoining consequent and antecedent like this:   &     . And that is the case with q  r and (q&r)  r. Yet, this does not mean that      and q  r are now analytic sentences.  Williamson’s second objection to the solution for the problem of trans-worlds reference based upon counterfactuals like (CC) rests on the problem of specificity: in brief, “why should we suppose that there is a unique closest world to W in which q is true?”.1 Or, in other words, what entitles one to suppose that there is a unique closest world (that is, our actual world) to the one of the ideal inquirers in which they do not exist? Severe philosophers – e.g. D. Lewis – reject the uniqueness assumption in his semantics for counterfactuals.2 As Williamson emphasises, if we make the looser requirement that our actual world is just one of the closest worlds to that of the counterfactual inquirers (in our case, ideal inquirers) that do not contain counterfactual inquirers, “then it is not obviously legitimate to characterise them as knowing something specifically […] about our actual world”.3   Indeed, I believe that the internal realist can accept without problems the explanation of trans-worlds reference based upon counterfactuals like (CC). For using (SCT*) does not require that the ideal inquirers are able to refer specifically to our actual world, it simply requires that they are able to refer – without further specification – to it. I do not see any reason to impose a condition stronger than this. And the explanation of trans-worlds reference that I have suggested does fulfil this condition. Notice in fact that, if Williamson is right, the conclusion is that counterfactuals like (CC) actually provide a means by which the ideal inquirers can refer to the actual world, though, by means of them, when the ideal inquirers refer to our actual world, they refer to other possible worlds too. In conclusion, I think that the internal realist can accept the explanation of                                                 1Williamson (2000), p. 295. 2See Lewis (1973). 3Williamson (2000), p. 296. 
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trans-worlds reference based upon counterfactuals like (CC). Thus, they can accept (SCT*) too.  Let us review the main points of this section. The internal realist appears to be committed to the definition of truth (SCT), according to which, for every sentence p, p is true if and only if, if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert that p. Wright has argued that (SCT) involves a conditional fallacy, as it turns the sentence “There is no ideal inquirer”, which is plausibly a contingent truth, into a necessary falsity. I have pointed out that this difficulty can be eluded if (SCT) is changed into (SCT*), stating that, for every sentence p, p is true if and only if, if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert that it is the case that p in the actual world. This definition makes the internal realist conception of truth more precise.  I have emphasised that a possible problem of (SCT*) is that it is not immediately clear how the ideal inquirers, if they existed, could refer their assertions to our actual world – where, plausibly, there is no ideal inquirer. My suggestion is that the ideal inquirers could refer by a sentence p to our actual world by resorting to counterfactuals like (CC), which affirms that, if there were no ideal inquirer, it would be the case that p. It is in fact quite intuitive to think that the ideal inquirers would be able to refer to our actual world by simply describing a world as similar as possible to their own but in which they themselves do not exist.  Williamson has argued that this solution is faulty, as counterfactuals like (CC) provide us with analytic knowledge when we need synthetic knowledge. I have shown that this is false, as the knowledge provided by counterfactuals like (CC) is in general synthetic. Williamson has also argued that using these counterfactuals as a means of reference makes the ideal inquirers unable to refer specifically to our actual world. I have argued that this is true but irrelevant, as relying on (SCT*) to define truth requires that the ideal inquirers are able to refer to our actual world but it does not require that they are able to refer specifically to it. Thus, in conclusion Wright’s objection appears answerable by the internal realist.        
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4.4 Fitch-Williamson’s objection  I wish now to consider an objection against definitions of truth based on subjunctive-conditionals like (SCT) and (SCT*) that was initially made by Fitch and that has recently been re-presented and discussed in detail by Williamson.1 The objection, in Williamson’s formulation, is not directed specifically against internal realism but against what Williamson calls “weak verificationism” – namely, the thesis that every truth is knowable, in the sense that it is possible for it to be known (though it may rest forever unknown).2 The argument aims to show that one who accepts weak verificationism is ipso facto committed to the strongly counterintuitive thesis that, for every sentence p, it cannot be the case that p is true and it is unknown that p is true. If this is correct, weak verificationism is scarcely acceptable. Notice that, since the internal realist is committed to (SCT*), he is also committed to weak verificationism. For (SCT*) affirms that every truth is, by definition, knowable by some beings, namely, ideal inquirers. Thus, Fitch-Williamson’s argument is an objection against internal realism too.   In this section, I will first present Fitch-Williamson’s argument in its general formulation. Then, I will apply it to internal realism; I will emphasise that, if the argument works, internal realism turns out not to be a form of realism, as it cannot comply with the alethic requirement for realism (R2). After that, I will argue that Fitch-Williamson’s objection is in fact faulty, as it depends upon an inexact formulation of the concept of weak verificationism; I will show that, if the formulation is made more accurate, the argument becomes inconclusive. I will finally argue that two objections against the new formulation of the concept of weak verificationism are straightforwardly answerable by the internal realist.  According to Williamson, if p is a meaningful a sentence, ◊ an operator that means “it is possible that” and K another operator that stands for “it is known that”, weak verificationism claims that:  (WVER) p(p ◊Kp).3  
                                                1See Williamson (2000), Ch. 12. 2See ibid., p. 271. 3Ibid. 
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We can understand Kp as “some being at some time (i.e. past, present or future) knows that p”.1  (WVER) is one of the premises of the Fitch-Williamson’s argument. The argument uses two more premises consisting of two intuitive principles about knowledge. The first is that nothing can be known without being true (necessary factivehood of truth). If    is an operator that stands for “it is necessary that”, we can write it as:  (FACT) p  (Kp p).2  (FACT) is hardly debatable, for it appears to be a priori that one cannot know that p, if p is not true.  The other principle used by Williamson is that according to which, if a conjunction is known to be true, its conjuncts must be known to be true as well (necessary distributivity over conjunction of truth). In formal language:  (DIST) p q   (K(p&q) (Kp&Kq)).3  Someone might perhaps argue that it is not immediately evident that the knowledge of a conjunction distributes over its conjuncts in any case. So, (DIST) might be questioned. I think however that, if the operator K, in (DIST), specifically means “it is ideally justified that” – that is, if idealised justification is the form of knowledge at stake – the truth of (DIST) can scarcely be questioned. For the idealised justification of a conjunction entails the idealised justification of its conjuncts, thus, it distributes over them in any case.4 Thus, when Williamson’s argument is specifically directed against the conception of truth given in terms of (SCT*), (DIST) is not questionable.  The use of the modal operators ◊ and    obviously abides by the syntactic rules of modal logic. In particular, the argument presupposes that   ¬ entails ¬◊ and that    is preserved by derivation as defined in propositional logic.5  The argument runs as follows: replacing ¬Kp for p in (FACT), we obtain:  
                                                1Williamson (2000), pp. 273-274. 2Ibid., p. 271. 3Ibid. 4For other considerations about (DIST)’s acceptability see ibid., p. 284. 5See ibid., p. 273. 
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p   (K¬Kp ¬Kp).1  This expresses formally the intuitive claim that nothing can be known to be an unknown truth; more precisely, it says that, if p is known to be an unknown truth, then p is not known to be a truth.  Replacing ¬Kp for q in (DIST), we obtain:  (2) p   (K(p&¬Kp) (Kp&K¬Kp)).2  Since (1), is inconsistent with the consequent of the conditional of (2), that is, Kp&K¬Kp, and the consequences of necessary truths are themselves necessary, (1) and (2) entails:  (3) p   ¬K(p&¬Kp).3  Since necessary truths are those that are not possibly false, (3) is equivalent to:  (4) p ¬◊K(p&¬Kp).4  (4) asserts the intuitive principle to the effect that it is impossible that someone at some time knows both that p and that nobody at any time knows that p. Let us now go back to (WVER). Replacing p&¬Kp for p in it, we obtain:  (5) p ((p&¬Kp) ◊K(p&¬Kp)).5  Notice finally that (4) is the logical negation of the consequent of the conditional (5). (4) and (5) entail therefore:  (6) p ¬(p&¬Kp).6                                                  1Williamson (2000), p. 272. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 
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(6) states that, for every statement p, it cannot be the case that p is true but it is unknown that p is true. Namely, that it cannot be the case that p is true and that nobody at some time (past, present or future) knows that p.  Williamson emphasises that (6) is strongly counterintuitive.1 This is surely true for everyone endowed with realist tendencies towards truth. For instance, let us consider again the statement:  (P2) The 3th of August 1800 at 11.24 p.m. the number of pigeons in Piazza San Marco in Venice which were facing the bell tower was odd.  A realist will spontaneously believe that (P2) or its logical negation is true, though he will admit that neither of them is very probably knowable. Thus, he will maintain that:  ((P2)&¬K(P2)) (¬(P2)&¬K¬(P2)).  Yet, this disjunction is inconsistent with (6), for it is a consequence of (6) that neither of its disjuncts is true.  Fitch-Williamson’s objection, if it works, has devastating consequences when applied to internal realism. As we have seen, the internal realist wants to comply with the realist insight that empirical sentences in general have a definite truth-value – this is indeed a consequence of the alethic condition for realism (R2). On the other hand, Wright’s observation that there is no Peircean “end of inquiry”, in conjunction with the consideration that epistemic justification is in general a holistic matter, will lead the internal realist to believe that we human beings in the flesh will never know the truth-value of most empirical sentences. For we will never achieve any general system of sentences that could be considered ideally justified. Thus, the only way that the internal realist has to fulfil the realist requirement that empirical sentences in general have a definite truth-value is to claim that they have a definite truth-value though it will forever be unknown to the human beings. To put it formally, the internal realist must maintain that, in general, for a sentence p:  (UT) (p&¬Kp) (¬ p&¬K¬p).  
                                                1See Williamson (2000), p. 272. 
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The trouble is that Fitch-Williamson’s objection shows that the internal realist definition of truth (SCT*) and the above disjunction are logically incompatible. In fact, if one holds (SCT*), one appears to be committed to (WVER), which in turn entails (6), which is inconsistent with (UT). To avoid this logical contradiction, the internal realist must reject (UT). But this leaves him with apparently no way to comply with the realist insight that empirical sentences in general have a definite truth-value.  Fitch-Williamson’s argument has been the subject of a number of different criticisms. Williamson himself has vigorously answered many of them with apparent success.1 In the next pages, I shall focus upon one of these objections that Williamson – in my opinion – has inadequately answered. I believe that the objection is straightforward and that it can invalidate the argument at stake.  Fitch-Williamson’s proof can be challenged by contending that the formal language employed in it is not sophisticated enough to adequately represent the position of weak verificationism. The criticism is analogous to the one I have made against Wright’s objection. In particular, one can contend that the thesis (WVER) is imprecise, as it does not allow discrimination between the possible world in which a sentence p is true and the possible world – which can differ from the previous – in which p is known to be true. The internal realist can indeed argue that (SCT*) just involves that such a distinction must be drawn. For p, in (SCT*), is claimed to be true of the actual world, though p is known to be so in a possible world that can be – and, plausibly, is – different from the actual. The hope is, therefore, that employing a more precise formalism able to recognise this distinction, the argument becomes invalid.  The simplest re-formulation of (WVER) examined by Williamson is the one suggested by Edgington,2 which employs the operator A that means “in this actual world” or “actually”. We can then reformulate (WVER) as:  (WAVER) p (Ap ◊KAp).3  This principle states that for any actual truth p there is, in a possible world that is not necessarily the actual one, a corresponding knowable actual truth Ap. Williamson emphasises that:  
                                                1See Williamson (2000), pp. 275-301. 2See Edgington (1985).  3Williamson (2000), p. 291.  
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The phrase “In this actual world” as uttered in a counterfactual world with its current meaning refers to that counterfactual world, not to this actual one. Only as uttered in this actual world does the sentence “In this actual world p” express the proposition that in this actual world p. But when we actually say “Someone could have known that in this actual world p”, we are using “in this actual” in this actual world to refer to it.1   The latter use of “In this actual world p” explains how the use of the operator A is to be intended.  It holds a priori that “p is equivalent to Ap”.2 Thus, we could re-write (WAVER) as:  p (p ◊KAp).  Using this notation, we can replace ◊KAp by ◊Kp if and only if the possible world in which it is known that Ap is our actual one. In this case, (WAVER) is turned into (WVER) and Fitch-Williamson’s argument still applies. There is yet apparently no way to obtain consequences as paradoxical as (6) using (WAVER), (FACT) and (DIST). In the original proof, the crucial step hinges upon the fact that, by replacing p&¬Kp for p in (WVER), we obtain:  (5) p ((p&¬Kp) ◊K(p&¬Kp)).  As I have highlighted, the consequent of the conditional (5) asserts the negation of the intuitive principle:  (4) p ¬◊K(p&¬Kp),   which claims that it is impossible that someone, at some time, knows both that p and that nobody at any time knows that p. From (4) and (5), we obtain the negation of (5)’s antecedent; that is to say, the problematic:  (6) p ¬(p&¬Kp). 
                                                1Williamson (2000), p. 291. 2Ibid. 
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 Yet, when (WAVER) comes into play, by replacing p&¬Kp for p in it, we obtain the harmless:  (5*) p (A(p&¬Kp) ◊KA(p&¬Kp)).  In this case, the consequent of (5*) asserts nothing immediately problematic, namely, that it is possible that someone at some time knows that, in the actual world, both p is the case and nobody at any time knows that p. (5*) does not clash any more with the intuitive principle of (4). Thus, there is no hope to derive the negation of the consequent of (5*).  According to Williamson, the serious problem of (WAVER) is that, it relies upon the assumption that counterfactual beings could refer to the actual world, but there is no acceptable explanation of how such beings could do it.1 Indeed, the objection of trans-worlds reference has been already discussed in the analysis of Wright’s argument. I have shown that Williamson’s contention is actually wrong, as there is an acceptable explanation of how counterfactual beings could refer to our actual world. I have argued that that explanation is hardly disputable if counterfactual beings are conceived as ideal inquirers and truth is defined in terms of (SCT*). Thus, I think that, from this point of view, (WAVER) is scarcely questionable.  Before concluding this section, I wish to consider another possible criticism of (WAVER) that Williamson has not fully developed. Williamson has emphasised that:  
¬Ap    A¬p is a theorem of standard logic of the operator A; [consequently, for every p,] either p is actually true or is ¬p. […] Thus reference to a complete world is built into the technical conception of actuality to which Edgington appeals.2  Though Williamson has not made this point, one could argue that, if it is true that the operator A presupposes reference to a complete world, the internal realist can appeal to (WAVER) to formalise his conception of truth only with difficulty, as his conception of truth entails that the actual world is possibly – or even probably – an incomplete world. To be more exact, the objection would be that, while using the operator A entails a principle to the effect that: 
                                                1See Williamson (2000), pp. 293-296. Williamson also makes a number of minor objections against (WAVER) that appear to me very weak or scarcely relevant. See ibid., pp. 297-301. 2Ibid., p. 296. My italic. 
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(CW) p (Ap A¬p),  the internal realist cannot guarantee that all sentences are decidable in the actual world, and he will expect that some of them are in fact undecidable. Thus, the internal realist will plausibly endorse the following principle:  (IW) ¬ p (Ap A¬p).  The problem is that (IW) is the logical negation of (CW). The conclusion is that (WAVER), which is formulated by using the operator A, is not apt to express the conception of truth of the internal realist.  I think that this objection is incorrect, as Williamson is wrong in believing that the theorem of standard logic of the operator A, according to which ¬Ap    A¬p, necessarily entails (CW). Let us see why this is so.  Williamson is definitely correct in saying that the logic of A entails that ¬Ap    A¬p. In fact, it is a priori true that:  (1) p (Ap    p).  By Transposition, (1) entails:  (2) p (¬Ap    ¬p).  Replacing, in (1), p by ¬p, it holds that:  (3) p (¬p    A¬p).  Finally, by (2) and (3), it follows:  (4) p (¬Ap    A¬p).   Williamson also contends that (4) entails:  (CW) p (Ap A¬p). 
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This is surely true in classic logic. In fact, (4) entails:  (5) p (¬Ap A¬p),  which is equivalent to:  (6) p (¬¬Ap A¬p).  Finally, replacing, in (6), ¬¬Ap by Ap, it follows:  (CW) p (Ap A¬p).  Yet, what must be noticed here is that the last step rests upon the validity of the Double Negation Law, which will plausibly be dropped out by the internal realist together with the Middle Excluded Principle.1 Against Williamson’s opinion, it is therefore false that the operator A presupposes reference to a complete world. For this is not the case when classic logic in not accepted. In conclusion, the internal realist can accept (WAVER) without any trouble.  Let us recap the results achieved in this section. Fitch-Williamson’s argument aims to show that weak verificationism – namely, the thesis that every truth is knowable though it may rest forever unknown – entails that, for every sentence p, it cannot be the case that p is true and it is unknown that p is true. Fitch-Williamson’s objection appears to entail devastating consequences for internal realism. The internal realist, as a realist, intends to comply with the requirement that empirical sentences in general have a definite truth-value following from the alethic condition for realism (R2). Yet, the internal realist also believes that we will never know the truth-value of most sentences (though ideal inquirers would do). Thus, to fulfil the above realist requirement, the internal realist must claim that empirical sentences have a definite truth-value that will remain forever unknown. Fitch-Williamson’s objection shows that the internal realist definition of truth (SCT*) and this claim are incompatible. For, if one holds (SCT*), one is committed to weak verificationism that entails the very negation of the claim at 
                                                1Wright (1992), pp. 12-44, has shown that the internal realist must reject the general validity of the Middle Excluded Principle. The rejection of this Principle entails the rejection of the Double Negation Law. 
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stake. This prevents the internal realist from satisfying the alethic condition for realism (R2).  In this section, I have however shown that Fitch-Williamson’s objection hinges upon an inexact formulation of the concept of weak verificationism, as it does not distinguish between the actual world in which a sentence is true and the possible world in which the same sentence is known to be true. I have shown that, when the formulation of weak verificationism is made more accurate by employing the operator A, the argument becomes inconclusive.  Williamson has urged that the main problem for such a re-formulation of weak verificationism is that it entails that counterfactual knowers can refer to our actual world, though there is no acceptable explanation of trans-world reference. In the analysis of Wright’s argument, I have shown that Williamson’s contention is wrong, as trans-world reference can be fairly explained if counterfactual knowers are conceived as ideal inquirers. I have finally argued that, against Williamson’s opinion, the operator A involves no reference to a complete world. The internal realist, who plausibly believes that the world is incomplete, can consequently appeal to the use of the operator A without incoherence. In conclusion, Fitch-Williamson’s objection constitutes no real threat for Putnam’s internal realism.   4.5 Internal realist truth may not be convergent  In the earlier sections of this chapter, I have argued that typical objections against the possibility of reducing truth to epistemic notions, Wright’s objection and Fitch-Williamson’s argument yield no genuine problem for internal realism. For the internal realist can apparently answer all them. In this section and in the next one (Section 4.6), I will raise two further objections against Putnam’s position that I believe to be conclusive. Both of them aim to strike Putnam’s contention that internal realism is a form of realism.  In this section, I will argue that, since internal realist truth may turn out not to be convergent (i.e. both p and not-p may prove true for, respectively, different ideal inquirers or in alternative “maximally coherent” theories), internal realism may collapse into a sophisticated form of alethic relativism. I will then show that, since alethic relativism is not realism, internal realism may turn out not to be a form of realism either. Though this argument cannot prove that Putnam’s position is not a form of 
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realism, it is able to show that we have no sufficient grounds to conclude that internal realism is a form of realism. For we cannot exclude the possibility that internal realism is a form of alethic relativism, which is not realism.  Since my argument is complex and articulated in different branches, I have preferred to develop it in distinct sub-sections of this section. In particular, in Section 4.5.1, I will argue that there is no guarantee that the application of the reflective equilibrium method would yield univocal results so that it is not absurd to think that different groups of ideal inquirers may arrive at accepting alternative standards of coherence that certify incompatible theories as “maximally coherent”. In Section 4.5.2, I will show that, even if the reflective equilibrium process yielded univocal outcomes, there may still be more than one “maximally coherent” theory, as the global theory that ideal inquirers would construct, if they existed, may prove underdetermined by evidence. In Section 4.5.3, I will argue that, if there were more that one “maximally coherent” theory, to avoid clashing with the Law of Non-Contradiction, the internal realist should conclude that truth is a relative notion – he should namely embrace a form of alethic relativism. This claim will commit me to showing that Putnam’s most important arguments aiming to demonstrate that alethic relativism is a conceptually incoherent and thus unacceptable position are faulty or not relevant. I will do this in Section 4.5.4, where all these arguments will be analysed and evaluated. Finally, in Section 4.5.5, I will argue that alethic relativism is not a form of realism because, centrally, it does not comply with the realist requirement according to which the world not caused or constituted by our minds makes empirical statements true or false. I will conclude that, since internal realism may collapse into alethic relativism, Putnam is not justified in claiming that his position is a form of realism.   4.5.1 The reflective equilibrium method is not reliable  An objection frequently made against coherentism on truth is that it cannot guarantee that there is just one maximally coherent theory, so that, if we embrace this conception, we may arrive at the conclusion that incompatible statements, embodied in alternative “maximally coherent” theories, are true at the same time, which is absurd.1 The simplest way to argue that the coherentist faces this difficulty consists in emphasising that there 
                                                1See for instance Kirkham (1997), p. 108 and Johnston (1993), p. 90. 
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are alternative, logically coherent sets of sentences that are incompatible with one another.  The internal realist can easily reply to such a criticism. To begin with, he can emphasise that his concept of coherence is much richer than the mere notion of logical coherence (or consistency), as the latter is just one of the ingredients constituting the internal realist concept of coherence. A consequence of this is that many of the logically consistent sets of sentences will be rejected as not fulfilling all the requirements involved in internal realist coherence (for instance, not every set will be provided with explanatory force). The internal realist could in addition urge that his is a world-involving coherentism that admits experiential constraints and that resorting to them allows one to rule out many of the sets of statements that are simply logically consistent.  There are however more sophisticated ways to support the claim that there may be more than one “maximally coherent” theory. I wish now to develop an argument that depends upon Stich’s well-known contention – which I find sound – that there is no guarantee that the reflective equilibrium process would certify just univocal standards of rationality as correct.1 In the remainder of this section, I will first focus on Stich’s objection and then I will direct it specifically against Putnam’s thesis that the reflective equilibrium process determines the notion of ideal coherence. I will show that, if the reflective equilibrium process cannot certify univocal standards of coherence as correct, incompatible “maximally coherent” theories may turn up.  Stich has raised an interesting objection against the reliability of the method of reflective equilibrium in justifying our rational standards. The argument maintains, in brief, that the reflective equilibrium method may fail to cope with the phenomenon of cognitive diversity – that is, roughly speaking, the everyday observable diversity in human beings’ ways of thinking.2  Stich directly focuses upon Goodman’s account of the justification of the logical principles of deduction and induction based on the method of reflective equilibrium.3 As we have seen above, in Chapter 2,4 this process of justification is “the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences”.5 In particular, according to Goodman, we can justify a deduction by showing that it conforms to the                                                 1See Stich (1995). 2See ibid. 3See Goodman (1965), pp. 65-68. 4See above, Sect. 2.5. 5Goodman (1965), p. 67. 
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general rules of deductive inference. On the other hand, principles of deductive inference can be justified by showing their conformity with accepted deductive practices.1 All this applies equally well to induction: an inductive inference is justified by conformity to general rules, and a general rule is justified by conformity to accepted inductive inferences.2   According to Stich, Goodman’s account may however provide unacceptable results in many situations.3 Consider, for example, the well-known gambler’s fallacy: it is a fact that many people, when they deal with chance games, infer according to some version of that fallacy.4 In Stich’s opinion, it is plausible that, if these people were to reflect on the general principle underlying their inferences, they would endorse it. Consequently, their incorrect inferences and their principle would be in reflective equilibrium for them. Stich furthermore emphasises that, on the other hand, there are many sound inferential principles – for example in the theory of probability – which may be ignored in the accomplishment of the reflective equilibrium process by many individuals because they may appear at first counterintuitive.5  Stich considers that the advocate of reflective equilibrium might reply that any principle however strange and curious that is in reflective equilibrium for a given person or a group is justified for them. Yet, according to Stich, such a position would be too counterintuitive to be taken seriously.6 A more plausible defence could be to appeal to the idea of a wide reflective equilibrium; in other words, the advocate of reflective equilibrium could argue that by broadening the scope of the judgements and principles that are to be brought into mutual coherence it is possible to rule out the dubious inferences and rules for inferences.7 This thesis is explicitly held by Rawls8 in ethics and – as I have pointed out above – the internal realist Putnam probably accepts it in epistemology.9   Yet, in Stich’s view, the real results of such an approach are indeed dubious. For one could acceptably maintain that: 
                                                1See Goodman (1965), pp. 66-67. 2See ibid., p. 67. 3See Stich (1995), p. 370. 4For example: “[Many] people infer that the likelihood of throwing a seven in a game of craps increases each time a non-seven is thrown”(ibid.). 5See ibid. Stich mentions, for instance, the principle of regression to the mean. 6See ibid., p. 371. 7See ibid. 8See Rawls (1974). 9See above, p. 77. 
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[I]n the case of wide reflective equilibrium, counter-examples are hard to come by just because it is so hard to show that anything is in wide reflective equilibrium for anyone.1   Finally, in Stich’s opinion, it is surely possible to think that a person or a community can reach wide reflective equilibrium on a set of principles and convictions that includes very strange and unacceptable inferential rules. For  [O]ne suspects that by allowing people’s philosophical convictions to play a role in filtering their inferential principles, one is inviting such daffy principles, since many people are deeply attached to outlandish philosophical views.2   One cannot but notice that a difficulty affects Stich’s argument. Stich claims, in practice, that the method at issue provides no guarantee that incorrect inferences and principles cannot be justified. However, if this is true, a problem is why these inferences and principles should be considered incorrect. Stich sometimes appeals to “our intuitions” and, by this expression, he seems to mean the intuitions of most philosophers. But, again, it is not clear why these intuitions should be more reliable than the contrasting intuitions of other people belonging to other social or cultural groups. It seems that Stich, to reject Goodman’s account of justification, presupposes some other account of justification without stating its nature and certifying its legitimacy. For this reason, his argument against the reliability of the method of reflective equilibrium could be accused of being incomplete and, therefore, inconclusive.  A generous and more accommodating interpretation of Stich’s claims would be the following: he does not affirm that there is a superior standpoint from which particular inferences and principles can be judged correct or incorrect. Stich rather maintains that, on the one hand, it is probable that principles and inferences that most philosophers, epistemologists, logicians and experts in theory of probability de facto accept as correct would be brought into reflective equilibrium by them themselves. Yet, Stich also urges that, on the other hand, other people may bring incompatible principles and inferences into reflective equilibrium. Philosophers and epistemologists could not consider the latter as correct, because these inferences and rules are incompatible with those they consider valid. Thus, more generally, Stich’s thesis could be interpreted like this: if A                                                 1Stich (1995), p. 371. 2Ibid., p. 372. 
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and B are communities or groups of individuals sufficiently different, what would be brought into reflective equilibrium by A’s members may clash with what would be brought into reflective equilibrium by B’s members. For this reason, the process of reflective equilibrium may not be able to individuate a univocal class of correct inferences and principles and – in this sense – Goodman and Rawls’ method is not reliable. In the light of this generous interpretation, Stich’s argument appears plausible to me.  Stich’s objection can be generalised and used to support the thesis that internal realism cannot guarantee that there is just one maximally coherent theory. To do so, one should first emphasise that, probably in every field, there is no guarantee that the standards of rational acceptability brought into equilibrium would be univocal and shared by everybody. There is indeed no reason to circumscribe the phenomenon of cognitive diversity and its possible consequences to the principles of deductive and inductive inferences. In science, for instance, it is a frequent fact that different individuals and different communities disagree about what theories are the simplest and what theories are provided with effective explanatory power. Thus, the application of the reflective equilibrium method may well lead different communities to justify alternative and irreducible principles of rational acceptability.  Notice that sets of alternative and irreducible principles of justification may fulfil all the meta-requirements of acceptability that Putnam accepts and that I have listed above, in Chapter 2.1 In other words, (1) irreducible principles may have wide appeal, as the communities endorsing them might be wide. (2) These principles may be able to withstand rational criticism as they might be in (wide) reflective equilibrium. (3) The rationality recommended by them may be liveable as in harmony with the practical and intellectual capabilities of those communities’ members. Finally, (4) these principles may be theoretically fruitful, as there might be theories acceptable on the grounds of them.  The second step to be taken to show that the internal realist coherentist cannot guarantee that there is just one maximally coherent theory consists in emphasising that the fulfilment of the desideratum of (4) may eventually lead distinct communities of inquirers, which have brought divergent principles of rational acceptability into reflective equilibrium, to attain different global theories justifiable on the grounds of those principles. In other words, those communities may achieve theories that turn out to be maximally coherent on the grounds of the ideal coherence criteria respectively                                                 1See above, p. 78. 
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endorsed.1 Although this is admittedly a very abstract conjecture, nothing prevents us from thinking that it may actually happen.  Let us therefore consider two wide communities A and B of inquirers. Let us suppose that A and B have respectively brought into wide reflective equilibrium two different sets of principles of rational acceptability that they can actually employ in their rational choices and decisions. In this case, the members of A could rely upon standards of acceptability requiring, among other things, that any physical law provided with explanatory power is to be formulated in terms of a particular class A of mathematical functions. On the other hand, the members of the community B could endorse standards of acceptability that require, among other things, that any physical law provided with explanatory power is to be formulated in terms of a particular class B of mathematical functions. Let us also assume that no law formulated using A-functions can be re-formulated using B-functions, and vice versa. Suppose finally that A has worked up a theory Ta maximally coherent according to its own principles of coherence and that B has worked up a theory Tb maximally coherent according to its own principles of coherence.  In a possible situation like the above, there are two theories that are “ideally justifiable”. Such descriptions should however be considered as incompatible, for they describe the same world in ways that are irreducible to one another. It is worth emphasising that, in the situation at stake, Ta and Tb could not be considered as equivalent descriptions in Putnam’s sense. In fact, as we have seen, one requirement for the equivalence of two theories Ta and Tb is that they are mutually relatively interpretable.2 This happens when there are formal definitions of the terms of Ta in the language of Tb with the property that, if we “translate” the sentences of Ta into the language of Tb by means of those formal definitions, all theorems of Ta become theorems of Tb. Yet, in the case at stake, this cannot happen. For, by assumption, the theorems of Ta, which are formulated using A-functions, cannot be re-written using B-functions, by which the theorems of Ta are formulated.  A possible reply by the internal realist to the above argument is that, as abundantly argued in Chapter 3, the maximally coherent theory must be thought of as one that ideal inquirers would attain in an infinite time (namely, developing an infinite series of                                                 1One could argue for the same conclusion moving from the simpler conjecture that, even if any community of inquirers brought into reflective equilibrium the same notions of theoretical virtues (like simplicity, explanatory power, etc.), they might end up ordering them according to different hierarchies.  2See above pp. 85-86. 
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maximally coherent theories). In this case – the reply goes on – the individuals supposed to reach definite results by the reflective equilibrium method must be thought of as ideal inquirers too, and this involves the attainment of univocal coherence standards and, consequently, of just one ideally coherent theory.  Unfortunately, I believe that, even if the notion of ideal inquirers comes into play, it in fact provides no solution to the difficulty discussed here. For nothing in the concept of ideal inquirers, as it has been defined in this work (see above, Section 3.4), involves that such beings are not subjected to the phenomenon of cognitive diversity. To put the same point another way: it is not clear at all why, if we improved our rational and cognitive abilities to an ideal level, the phenomenon of cognitive diversity should disappear. We could – of course – define the ideal inquirers as those who, among other properties, would bring into reflective equilibrium just univocal epistemological principles. Yet, this would not be a solution of the difficulties, for no real explanation of why the standards of rational acceptability in reflective equilibrium should turn out to be univocal would be provided in this way.1  To sum up, in this section, I have focused on Putnam’s conviction that the reflective equilibrium process determines the standards of theory coherence. I have argued that, since the reflective equilibrium method may fail to cope with the phenomenon of cognitive diversity (that is, the observable diversity in the ways of thinking of human beings), divergent sets of coherence standards may ultimately be brought into reflective equilibrium. I have emphasised that these divergent standards may fulfil the other meta-requirements of acceptability endorsed by Putnam (that is, they may have wide appeal, the rationality recommended by them may be liveable, and they may be theoretically fruitful). This opens the door to the possibility that incompatible (i.e. non-mutually relatively interpretable) theories may be certified as “maximally coherent” at the same time on the basis of alternative conceptions of theory coherence, so that there would be more than one “maximally coherent” theory. I have finally pointed out that emphasising that the ideal inquirers, and not human beings in the flesh, are supposed to bring coherence standards into reflective equilibrium does not solve the difficulty, as there is 
                                                1Notice that, if Putnam insisted that the maximally coherent theory must be conceived as the one that a unique ideal inquirer would construct if he existed (that is, if Putnam insisted that his notion of an ideal inquirer refers to a unique ideal inquirer and not a community), this would provide no solution of problem. For, since Putnam could not exclude that the phenomenon of cognitive diversity would still exist even in case our cognitive abilities were ideally improved, Putnam would have to conclude that the properties of the unique ideal inquirer may be specified in alternative ways and that, in accordance with such alternatives, different and incompatible “maximally coherent” theories may be possible. 
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no reason to believe that the ideal inquirers would not be subjected to the phenomenon of cognitive diversity.   4.5.2 The “maximally coherent” theory may be underdetermined  The previous objection against Putnam’s coherentism crucially hinges upon the claim that the reflective equilibrium method may produce divergent results. Let us now suppose that this claim turns out to be false – that is, that the reflective equilibrium method is actually able to yield univocal results. I will now show that, if this happened, it would not solve the difficulty at stake. For, even in this case, there would be a way, shorter than the previous one, to conclude that that there may be more than one “maximally coherent” theory. The new argument moves from the thesis of the underdetermination of theories by evidence.  Two incompatible theories (i.e. non-“translatable” into one another by formal devices) T1 and T2 are underdetermined by evidence if and only all possible evidence equally confirms or, respectively, disconfirms both of them, so that the rational choice between them is impossible.1 A classical way to conclude that T1 and T2 are underdetermined by evidence is to argue that T1 and T2 are empirically equivalent – in the sense that they entail exactly the same observational consequences2 – and that T1 and T2 are on par regarding any non-empirical epistemic virtue – namely, they are also equally simple, elegant, unified etc. In this case, there seems to be no possible evidence that allows rationally choosing between T1 and T2.  The thesis of the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in its universal version, states the following:  All scientific theories are underdetermined by evidence. For, given any scientific theory T1, it is always possible to construct an incompatible rival T2 such that it is empirically equivalent to T1 and is indistinguishable from it in respect of any non-empirical epistemic virtue.  
                                                1See for instance Moretti (2002), p. 154.  2Since scientific theories in general entail observational consequences in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses, by T1 and T2, I precisely refer to two theoretical systems (i.e. theories plus suitable auxiliaries). 
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 Indeed, I find such a conjecture very implausible, as it is too general. Let us suppose that there is some logical procedure by which, given a scientific theory T1, one can always produce an incompatible and empirically equivalent rival T2. Even if this supposition turned out to be true, it is extremely implausible that, for whatever T1, the logical procedure can always produce an empirically equivalent rival T2 that proves – for instance – equally simple, unified and provided with the same explanatory power as T1. On the contrary, it is spontaneous to think that, at least in certain cases, one of the empirical equivalent alternatives would be preferable to the others on the grounds of its non-empirical virtues.   A weaker version of the theory underdetermination thesis – i.e., the existential version – states what follows:  Some scientific theories are underdetermined by evidence. For, if T1 is a scientific theory, it is in certain cases possible to construct an incompatible rival T2 such that it is empirically equivalent to T1 and is indistinguishable from it in respect of any non-empirical epistemic virtue.   I find this conjecture more reasonable than the above one. It is not impossible and to some extent plausible that some theories are underdetermined by evidence. And this may well be the case with the global theory that ideal inquirers would build up if they existed. Let us therefore consider the following particular version of the underdetermination thesis:  The “maximally coherent” theory T1 is underdetermined by evidence. For it is possible to construct an incompatible rival T2 that is empirically equivalent to T1 and is indistinguishable from it in respect of any non-empirical epistemic virtue.  I do not see why one should reject this conjecture as false or implausible; but accepting it as possibly true constitutes a reason to believe that there may be more than one “maximally coherent” theory.  As opposed to the argument considered in the previous paragraph, this objection against the thesis of the uniqueness of the maximally coherent theory does not require the reflective equilibrium process to produce divergent results. Two incompatible global theories may in fact be underdetermined by evidence – according to the above 
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characterisation – because they are empirically equivalent and they satisfy equally well the same univocal standards of coherence brought into reflective equilibrium.  In conclusion, even if the reflective equilibrium process proved able to produce univocal outcomes, Putnam could not exclude that there may be more than one “maximally coherent” theory, for the ideal inquirers may eventually face systems of the world underdetermined by evidence. Notice that, in this case too, emphasising that the ideal inquirers and not human beings in the flesh are supposed to construct the maximally coherent theory does not solve any difficulty. For the ideal inquirers would have no rational means to choose among underdetermined “maximally coherent” theories defined as above.   4.5.3 Internal realism may collapse into alethic relativism  In the above two sections, I have provided two independent reasons for thinking that there may be more than one “maximally coherent” theory. In brief, this would be the case if the reflective equilibrium process produced divergent results (and if alternative coherence standards in reflective equilibrium proved acceptable according to the other meta-criteria of justification), or – more simply – if the “maximally coherent” theory were underdetermined by evidence. Putnam has produced no specific argument to show that these two conjectures are false or very implausible. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Putnam has indeed argued that the criterial conceptions of rationality – which identify the criteria of rational acceptability with the standards available in a given culture – are faulty because the only way to obtain standards that do not themselves in turn ask for justification is to identify them with ideal standards.1 Yet, this argument does not suffice to show, or even make plausible, that ideal standards would be convergent. Moreover, even if Putnam’s argument were able to show it, this would not yet show that there would be just one maximally coherent theory. For the underdetermination objection would still stand undefeated.  I will now show that, if truth were not convergent (as more than one “maximally coherent” theory has been constructed), to avoid logical absurdity, the internal realist should very probably embrace some kind of relativism about truth.  If incompatible “maximally coherent” theories existed, the internal realist should admit that there are sentences such that they and their logical negations are true at the                                                 1See above, Sect. 2.5. 
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same time. Let us suppose that T1 and T2 are such theories, since they are incompatible, there must be a statement p such that p is deducible from – for instance – T1 and not-p is deducible from T2. In this case, both p and not-p should be considered true on the basis of the internal realist definition of truth (SCT*), for ideal inquirers would be justified in asserting both p and not-p. To be more exact, if T1 and T2 were underdetermined by evidence in the sense defined above, every ideal inquirer would be justified in asserting both p and not-p. On the other hand, if T1 and T2 were grounded upon alternative notions of coherence accepted by different groups of ideal inquirers, certain ideal inquirers would be justified in asserting p and others in asserting not-p.  The claim that p and not-p would be true together can be made more precise. If p and not-p concerned facts about our actual world – for example, if p is “It is the case that q in the actual world” and not-p is “It is the case that not-q in the actual world” – on the grounds of (SCT*), both q and not-q should be considered true in our actual world. If p and not-p concerned facts about the ideal inquirers’ possible world, both p and not-p should be considered true in that world.1 Notice that both these results are in a plain conflict with the Law of Non-Contradiction.   To cope with this difficulty, Johnston has suggested that the internal realist should consider true only the sentences deducible from a “maximally coherent” theory if their negations are not deducible from any other “maximally coherent” theory.2 On this view, the sentences that do not satisfy this requirement should not be given any definite truth-value.3 Notice that this proposal appears coherent with Putnam’s claim that:   [T]ruth is expected to be stable or “convergent”; if both a statement and its negation could be “justified” [for different subjects or cultures, or in different theories or conceptual schemes], even if conditions were as ideal as one could hope to make them, there is no sense in thinking of the statement as having a truth-value.4                                                  1I remind the reader that (SCT*) states that:  For every sentence p, p is true     if and only if if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert that it is the case that p in the actual world.  When (SCT*) is used to define truth in the ideal inquirers’ possible world, the expression “in the actual world” refers to that world. In such a case, the antecedent of the subjunctive-conditional of (SCT*) is trivially satisfied. 2See Johnston (1993), pp. 90-91. 3Johnston is not explicit about this second point, but this is very plausibly his idea. 4Putnam (1981), p. 56. My italic. See also Putnam (1983d), p. 85.  
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 Unfortunately, against Johnston’s opinion and Putnam’s claim, I believe that the internal realist cannot accept this simple solution, as it is at odds with the very coherentist conception of truth endorsed by Putnam. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the basic idea of this conception is that true sentences are so just because they justify each other to the highest possible degree within a maximally comprehensive system by explaining and confirming reciprocally.1 This means that the fact that a statement entailed by an ideally comprehensive system is true (i.e. ideally justified) depends, in various ways, upon the fact that other statements of the same system are true (i.e. ideally justified) too.  For instance, the theoretical hypotheses included in a maximally comprehensive system can be considered true (as a whole) when there are a very high number of prima facie justified observation sentences that confirm the former and that can be considered true as well because they are explained in the best possible way by those hypotheses. If the prima facie justified observation sentences could not be considered true, neither could the theoretical hypotheses, and vice versa. Only in this way can theoretical hypotheses and observational sentences in fact justify reciprocally to the highest possible degree. Another example is the following: single theoretical hypotheses included in a maximally comprehensive system are true not only because observational statements confirm them but also because these theoretical hypotheses explain each other in the best possible way. This means that, a hypothesis is true when, among other conditions, there are other hypotheses that explain the former and that become true because, among other things, they can provide such an explanation. More generally, my claim is that, in Putnam’s picture, truth is a holistic matter, so that one part of a system of sentences can be considered true if and only if also the other part can.  Unfortunately, the solution considered above for the problem arising from the possibility of incompatible “maximally coherent” theories has the consequence of dismissing the holistic “mechanisms” by which sentences justify reciprocally to the highest possible degree and can therefore be considered true. In particular, the devastating effect is that, if some sentences cannot be considered true (because incompatible with one another), in certain cases, no other sentence can be considered true. For instance, if central and general principles of two rival “maximally coherent” theories were incompatible, according to the proposed solution, they would not be true. Consequently, in accordance with the above characterisation of truth, neither could the observation statements confirming these principles be considered true, as the theoretical                                                 1See above, Sect. 2.4 
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hypotheses that explain the observation statements in the best possible way are not true.1 Besides, neither could lower level theoretical hypotheses shared by the rival “maximally coherent” theories be considered true, for central and general principles that are supposed to explain them in the best possible way are not true. Thus, in practice, no statement of the incompatible “maximally coherent” theories would turn out to be true.2 The same devastating consequence would follow if – more simply – a high number of theoretical hypotheses embodied in two rival “maximally coherent” theories were incompatible, so that they could not be considered true.  Although the considered way out to overcome the difficulties yielded by the possibility of incompatible “maximally coherent” theories proves impracticable, there is an alternative loophole apparently more viable for the internal realist. In brief, if incompatible “maximally coherent” theories turned up, the internal realist should claim that truth is a relative notion – in the sense that, when a statement is true, it so not absolutely but just relatively to a specific group of ideal inquirers or a specific “maximally coherent” theory. The point is that, when truth is relativised, if two “maximally coherent” theories T1 and T2 entail, respectively, p and not-p, the properties that make p and not-p true are distinct. For, now, that p is true means – roughly – that p is ideally rationally acceptable for those that endorse T1, and that not-p is true means that not-p is ideally rationally acceptable for those that endorse T2. In this case, there is no clash with the Law of Non-Contradiction, for this principle presupposes that the property called “truth”, which that p and not-p cannot share, is the same.  I find this loophole quite natural (after all the incompatible sentences, in the envisaged cases, would prove “true” on the grounds of their relative “maximally coherent” systems). In addition, this solution appears compatible with the holistic conception of truth of the internal realist: in contrast with Johnston’s solution, it does not involve denying that certain sentences entailed by a “maximally coherent” system are true. Finally, I do not see any other solution that would be immediately acceptable for the internal realist.  To recapitulate, in this section, I have argued that, if more than one “maximally coherent” theory turned up, the internal realist would face the absurdity that both a sentence and its negation are true at the same time. To escape this impasse, Johnston has suggested considering a sentence true if and only if it is deducible from an “ideally                                                 1Notice that the possible reply that these observational sentences are indeed explained and justified by the disjunction of incompatible general principles included in rival “maximally coherent” theories would not work. For, if the disjuncts of a disjunction are not true, the disjunction will not be true either. 2Apart from the most irrevocable analytic sentences and logical truths. 
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coherent” theory and its negation is not deducible from any other “ideally coherent” theory. I have however shown that Putnam cannot accept this proposal, as it is incompatible with the holistic conception of truth proper to internal realism. I have argued that the only alternative loophole at the internal realist’s disposal is, apparently, that of considering truth as a notion relative to groups of ideal inquirers or “maximally coherent” theories. This implies that, if incompatible “maximally coherent” theories existed, the internal realist should embrace a form of alethic relativism.   4.5.4 Putnam’s arguments against alethic relativism  A probable reply by Putnam against my claim that, if incompatible “maximally coherent” theories actually existed, the internal realist should accept a form of alethic relativism is that the internal realist could not do it because relativism is not rationally acceptable, as it is in different ways conceptually incoherent and self-refuting. Putnam has in fact developed a number of arguments to support the thesis that the most common forms of alethic relativism are conceptually incoherent and self-refuting.  In this section, I specifically aim to assess each of Putnam’s most important arguments against relativism in order to evaluate the cogency of this possible internal realist reply. In particular, I will first present the general notion of alethic relativism by focusing upon its most typical and central theses. Then, I will briefly introduce Putnam’s arguments against alethic relativism and I will analyse and appraise each of them. Finally, I will recap the attained results and I will evaluate whether they support Putnam’s possible contention that the internal realist could not endorse relativism because relativism is not rationally acceptable.  Putnam has characterised alethic relativism in general as the view, according to which, “[E]very [culture] has [its] own views, standards, presuppositions, and truth (and also justification) is relative to these”1 in such a way that “every conceptual system is [...] just as good as every other”.2 All this is quite confusing. My proposal is that, to have a better definition of relativism, we can resort to the following general schema:  The property P of every X-sentence is relative to Y.                                                  1Putnam (1981), p. 121.  2Ibid., p. 54. 
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A relativist is one who is committed to some instantiation of the above schema. Thus, we can obtain usual forms of relativism by singling out the appropriate parameters P, X and Y of the schema. For example, a moral relativist will claim that the truth (P) of every moral sentence (X) is relative to individuals, traditions or cultures (Y).  Putnam mainly refers to alethic relativism in its cultural variant, namely, to cultural relativism about truth. We can easily define it by the above schema in the following way:  Someone is a cultural relativist about truth if and only if he holds that:  the truth of every sentence is relative to cultures.     Putnam mostly considers cultural relativism about the truth of empirical sentences. As we will see, some of these cultural relativists claim that the facts that make an empirical sentence p true are relative to some framework too. Hence, they conclude that people who embrace different cultural frameworks inhabit different worlds.  Putnam has also argued against subjective relativism about truth. We can define the latter as follows:  Someone is a subjective relativist about truth if and only if he holds that: the truth of every sentence is relative to subjects or speakers.   Finally, a last distinction concerning possible forms of relativism has to be drawn: relativism about truth is at its most extreme when the class of X-sentences includes all declarative sentences and the relativist thesis itself; if this is the case, we have a version of total or global relativism about truth. If this is not the case, we have a version of partial relativism. As we will see, Putnam’s arguments are in general directed against forms of total relativism.  To fully understand some of the internal realist arguments against relativism we should pay attention to the following crucial point: as we have seen, Putnam holds – in my opinion, correctly – that thinking and speaking are essentially normative activities.1 For they presuppose what could be called the “rational agent perspective” or the “participant attitude”2 and they are guided by conventions and rules that determine what we are and are not justified to think and to say under given conditions. Yet, it is                                                 1See above pp. 54-55. 2See Putnam (1992), p. 351. 
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Putnam’s contention that the alethic relativist actually cannot ascribe a normative character to the truth of his beliefs and sentences, so that the alethic relativist is committed to a sort “mental suicide”, as he cannot really speak and think.1 (I will assess Putnam’s specific arguments for this conclusion below)  According to Putnam, the tendency to abolish the normative dimension of thought proper to relativism has a general explanation: the thesis, according to which, truth is whatever the “norms” of the local culture determine it to be is a naturalist view inspired by the social sciences. In other words, the “norms” for truth would be conceived by relativists as a sort of social “mechanism”; in this way, the “rational agent perspective” and the normative component of truth get lost.2 For this reason, cultural relativism could be considered as a form of naturalised epistemology even if, at first sight, it does not seem to be a “scientistic” position.3 The main difference between cultural relativism and physicalism is that, whereas the latter’s paradigm of science is a hard science, i.e. physics, the cultural relativist’s paradigm is a soft science, such as anthropology, psychology or history.4  Putnam’s major anti-relativist arguments are conceived as reductiones ad absurdum, that is, they aim to show that alethic relativism is in different ways conceptually incoherent and self-refuting,5 but not all these arguments appeal to normative issues.  It is possible to divide Putnam’s all arguments against relativism into three classes. The first just includes:  (a) The Argument against the Incommensurability Thesis,  namely, an argument against the thesis of the incommensurability of scientific theories belonging to different cultures or ages. I prefer to consider this argument apart from the others as it is not an objection against relativism but, rather, against a commonly held reason for alethic relativism. The second class includes classic and well-known objections that Putnam has reconsidered; that is:  (b) Garfinkel’s Argument;6 
                                                1See Putnam (1983f), p. 235. 2See ibid. 3See ibid. 4See ibid. 5See Putnam (1983i), p. 288. 6See Putnam (1981), pp. 119-120. 
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(c) Plato’s Argument.1  Both of them have been regarded as defective by Putnam himself and are therefore ineffective. The third class includes arguments that Putnam thinks to be effective and definitive, in particular:  (d) The Majority Opinion Argument;2 (e) The Argument from Wittgenstein,3 (f) The Counterfactuals Argument;4 (g) The Hermeneutic Argument.5   The above three classes include all the most important arguments made by Putnam after the rejection of metaphysical realism. Apart from the Majority Opinion Argument, all of them have been developed during the internal realist phase. Since the Majority Opinion Argument is quite general and it does not rely upon assumptions that are incompatible with the internal realist ones, I will examine it as well.  In the next pages, I will first present and assess the Argument against the Incommensurability Thesis and then each of the arguments (b)-(g). Though the Argument against the Incommensurability Thesis is not strictly relevant to establish whether alethic relativism is a coherent position, I prefer to examine it because its analysis will involve considerations relevant for the assessment of the other arguments against relativism. Putnam has mentioned some of the arguments (a)-(g) quite briefly and almost all of them have not been fully developed by him. Therefore, in presenting the arguments, some interpretation of them will be necessary. As we will see, the arguments are directed against cultural relativism or subjective relativism and, in certain cases, against both of them at the same time. All arguments aim to strike at forms of total relativism.                                                     1See Putnam (1981), pp. 120-21. 2See Putnam (1991a), pp. 109-110 and Putnam (1992a), p. 71. 3See Putnam (1981), pp. 121-122. 4See ibid. pp. 122-124. 5See Putnam (1983f), pp. 236-238. 
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(a) The Argument against the Incommensurability Thesis  The thesis of the incommensurability of scientific theories affirms that:  [T]erms used in another culture, say, the term “temperature” as used by a seventeenth-century scientist, cannot be equated in meaning or reference with any terms or expression we possess.1  If the incommensurability thesis were correct, we could no longer speak of one truth (and one reality) to which successive theories worked up in different ages approximate more and more in time. For theory change would involve a radical change of ontology. In the sense that the basic entities alleged to compose reality by a theory would be so different from those admitted by its rival, previous theories that among them there would be absolutely no continuity.2 To avoid the sceptical conclusion that truth is unknowable by scientific research, certain philosophers have preferred to conclude that truth should be relativised to ages and paradigms and that the scientists belonging to different historical periods or different paradigms “inhabit different worlds”.3  Putnam has however urged that the incommensurability thesis is an illicit conclusion from the correct claim that, in natural languages, the analytic/synthetic distinction – that he prefers to rename “concept/conception distinction” – is fuzzy. To distinguish between concept and conception is, in Putnam’s view, the specific job of interpreters and translators. This makes the distinction relative to the different purposes and interests of translators, but it does not make translation impossible as the advocates of incommensurability claim. According to Putnam, to affirm that translation from a given language into our own is impossible would involve believing that the terms of that language have meanings in principle unknowable by any translator speaking our own language. Yet, this would be untenable metaphysical realism. Thus, theories must be commensurable with one another.4 
                                                1Putnam (1981), p. 114. 2Notice that, if the incommensurability thesis were true, scientific theories could not be logically incompatible with one another because they could not ascribe incompatible properties to the same entities. Yet, rival theories could be thought of as ontologically incompatible because it appears intuitively true that, so to speak, they would fill up the same ontological “locations” by different and irreducible entities. 3See ibid. 4See ibid., pp. 116-117. 
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 Let us have a closer look at this argument. In brief, the incommensurability thesis would affirm that, since the conceptual (i.e. analytic) and the factual (i.e. synthetic) components of a language cannot be sharply distinguished, that which determines the meaning of a term used in a theory is the whole theoretical context in which the terms occur. Hence, the advocates of incommensurability conclude that, in different theories, there could be no terms having the same meaning and that translation among terms occurring in theories belonging to different ages and paradigms is impossible. This conclusion could be criticised as an overstatement. Yet, Putnam’s specific objection is different. From the internalist perspective, we could accept as true the claim that an organised set of signs L is a just in case we were able to ideally verify this claim. This would happen if interpreters and translators belonging to our linguistic community were in principle able to provide those signs with meanings on the grounds of rational procedures. In simpler terms, we could definitively consider L as a language only if we were in principle able to translate it into our language. A consequence of this is that we cannot admit the existence of languages that are supposed to be in principle non-translatable into ours; but this is just what the incommensurability thesis asks us to do. So, the incommensurability thesis is just an unacceptable absurdity.1  Putnam’s argument appears to be quite convincing; yet, notice that it can work only if the non-epistemic view of truth is untenable. Consequently, one could contend that, if this view were tenable, the incommensurability thesis could no longer be rejected and it may constitute a reason to endorse alethic relativism. I think however that at least two replies are possible here. First, in philosophy of science, many specific works have convincingly argued that the claim that rival scientific theories are incommensurable is faulty.2 Second, if the incommensurability thesis were acceptable provided that truth is a non-epistemic notion, incommensurability could hardly be considered as a reason to endorse forms of alethic relativism. For the claims that truth is relative and that truth is a non-epistemic notion appear to clash with one another.  The relativist assumes that different communities of researchers will provide (or at least can provide) incompatible descriptions of reality that are true, respectively, from the points of views of each community. This incompatibility implies that the                                                 1Putnam adds something more. It is his opinion that a translation can be considered rationally acceptable not just in case the translated beliefs turn out to be identical to ours, but, more simply, if they are intelligible for us (see Putnam 1981, p. 117). This allows theories of past ages and of other paradigms to be different from our theories, so that theories can in certain cases be considered as better or worse approximations to the same objective truth. 2For instance, Thomas Kuhn himself – one of the early advocates of this thesis – has successively retracted his claims arguing against the incommensurability of theories. See for instance Kuhn (1976). Kuhn grounds his new arguments in Sneed (1971) and Stegmüller (1973). 
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descriptions cannot be “converted” into one another by means of mere linguistic tricks – i.e. by changing the linguistic conventions used to describe reality. To be a relativist and to accept at the same time a non-epistemic notion of truth involves believing that, for every community, there is a particular non-epistemic correspondence between its language and the world self-organised into objects that makes sentences true. Since the descriptions provided by different communities have not to be “convertible” into one another, the languages of those communities must refer to and describe different worlds; namely, worlds which are equally real in a strong metaphysical sense, but which are different as including different objects. Yet, this claim appears unacceptable to me, as it is weird and strongly counterintuitive.1  In conclusion, Putnam’s Argument against the Incommensurability Thesis as a reason to embrace cultural relativism appears to be correct insofar as the internal realist perspective is accepted. In fact, if truth is idealised rational acceptability, the incommensurability thesis proves meaningless and it cannot serve as a reason for anything. I have furthermore argued that the incommensurability thesis can very probably not constitute a reason for embracing relativism even if the externalist perspective is accepted. For, if truth is conceived as a correspondence relationship between extra-linguistic reality and language, cultural relativism and alethic relativism in general turn out to be positions too odd to be sustained by anybody.   (b) Garfinkel’s Argument  An argument against alethic relativism in general is that called by Putnam “Garfinkel’s one-liner”.2 This argument provides a way to articulate the standard objections to relativism according to which “[It is] obviously contradictory to hold a point of view while at the same time holding that no point of view is more justified or right than any other”.3 More generally, the argument aims to show that relativism is self-refuting. That is, that even if relativism were, for the sake of the argument, true, then it would prove false. So, it must be false.                                                 1Notice that this conclusion is coherent with the thesis of certain relativists that people belonging to different communities live in different worlds. Yet, it seems to me that those relativists do not intend in reality to commit themselves to such a weird position. For, plausibly, their notion of a world is a non-metaphysical one. In the sense that the worlds that they claim to be inhabited by scientists that belong to different communities or paradigms are worlds described from within the languages of these scientists. 2See Putnam (1981), p. 120. 3Ibid., p. 119. 
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 Briefly, the argument is the simple reply by Alan Garfinkel to his relativist Californian students:  Since the truth of every claim is relative, then even the claim “the truth of every claim is relative” is just relatively true, and I know that it is not true for me.1  Putnam does not present Garfinkel’s argument as a conclusive objection to relativism. He correctly points out that it cannot actually show that relativism is self-refuting, for an intelligent relativist may in turn reply that he knows that relativism is true for him.2 In sum, the argument would show only that, if relativism were true, it could not be absolutely true but just relatively true.  Though the above conclusion is true, Garfinkel’s argument can be criticised as incomplete. This argument aims to show that relativism, if tenable, cannot be absolutely true because relativism is not true at least from Garfinkel’s point of view. Garfinkel has not however provided any reason to show that relativism is not true for him. This might be thought to be unnecessary. For one could argue that, whatever reason Garfinkel might provide, if it were contested by relativists, Garfinkel could well reply that it is true for them that his reason is not good to conclude that relativism is untenable. Yet, this cannot work. For Garfinkel must also have reasons that are good to show that relativism is not true for him. Otherwise, he could not accept his own argument as sound.  Notice however that, to overcome this difficulty, Garfinkel could simply appeal to the Law of Non-Contradiction. He could urge that, in accordance with this principle, the relativist cannot say that it is true that “all true sentences are relatively true” claiming, at the same time, that the previous sentence is not relatively true.  In conclusion, Garfinkel’s Argument, in the above revised version, just shows that, if relativism is true, it cannot be absolutely true but just relatively true. This weakens relativism but it does not refute this position.     
                                                1Garfinkel’s real sentence is: “You may not be coming from where I’m coming from, but I know relativism isn’t true for me” (Putnam 1981, p. 119). 2See ibid., pp. 119-120. 
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(c) Plato’s Argument  Putnam has also reconsidered the classic reductio ad absurdum that Plato made against the subjective relativist Protagoras. As Putnam has pointed out:  Protagoras [...] claimed that when I say p, I really should say “I think that p”. Thus when I say “Snow is white”, Protagoras would say that I really mean that Hilary Putnam thinks that snow is white, and that what Robert Nozick means by the same utterance is that Robert Nozick thinks that snow is white. A more sophisticated statement of the same idea would be that when I say “Snow is white”, I am using this utterance to claim that snow is white is true-for-me, whereas when Robert Nozick says the same word he would normally be claiming that snow is white is true-for-him.1   According to Putnam, Plato’s objection to Protagoras’ thesis would be that, if every statement p that Protagoras utters means, for him, “Protagoras thinks that p”, also the latter has to mean, “Protagoras thinks that Protagoras thinks that p”. But this process can always be iterated and it will continue indefinitely. Thus, what Protagoras really means by a statement p is “Protagoras thinks that Protagoras thinks that Protagoras thinks that Protagoras thinks... (with infinitely many ‘Protagoras thinks’) that p”.2 The same objection could be raised against the modern relativist R who holds that every statement p he utters really means “p is true for R” or “p is true for R’s social group”. In this case, the anti-relativist contention is that to understand any of his statements, the relativist is necessarily committed to an infinite regress. So, he cannot really understand what he says. This is obviously absurd and, therefore, relativism is untenable.  Nevertheless, according to Putnam, this reductio ad absurdum is not actually effective. For its conclusion does not follow from its premises. The fact is that from the possibility of applying the relativist analysis to itself “It does not follow that it must be self-applied an infinite number of times, but only that it can be self-applied any finite number of times”.3 Putnam’s counter-objection is analogous to my reply to the infinite 
                                                1Putnam (1981), p. 120. 2Putnam’s interpretation of both Protagoras’ position and Plato’s argument could however be questioned. Since to say “when I say p, I really should say ‘I think that p’” appears not to be a subjective relativist claim. The proper subjective relativist claim seems rather to be “when I say p, I really should say ‘It is true for me that p”. 3Ibid., p. 121. 
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regress argument against coherentism.1 If I am a relativist, I can contend that I can correctly grasp the meaning of my statement p simply understanding that by p’s utterance I mean “p is true for me”. I can emphasise that I can stay with this analysis for all ordinary linguistic usage and that, if necessary, I can deepen more and more my comprehension of the relativist sense of p by applying the analysis to itself every finite number of times I desire. I am not involved in any infinite regress in this case.  Putnam’s above observation is – in my opinion – straightforward. Thus, in conclusion, Plato’s Argument proves incorrect. Let us now examine the arguments that Putnam considers to work.   (d) The Majority Opinion Argument  This objection simply consists in objecting that, if cultural relativism were, for the sake of argument, true, it would be false for our culture. So, it must be false for our culture. The key premise of this argument is that cultural relativism is the position, according to which, a statement p is true when the majority of a culture’s members take p as true.2 A straightforward consequence of this is that cultural relativism is not true for our culture. For the majority of our culture’s members do not consider the statement “cultural relativism is true” as true.3  An evident weakness of this reductio is that, if it actually applies, it works just in case the sentence “cultural relativism is true” is asserted in our culture (or in other cultures where the majority does not believe in relativism). Yet, this leaves the door open to the possibility that relativism can be coherently held in other cultures where the majority believes in relativism. Another criticism is possible. As we will see in the next pages, the cultural relativist could resort to a more sophisticated characterisation of his position that make the truth of relativism independent of the majority opinion. In this case, the argument would not apply either.  To sum up, the Majority Opinion Argument is effective but its efficacy is limited to our culture or to cultures similar to ours; furthermore, this argument can just hit those forms of cultural relativism asserting that truth depends upon the majority opinion.  
                                                1See above, Sect. 3.2. 2See Putnam (1992a), p. 69. 3See ibid., p, 71. 
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(e) The Argument from Wittgenstein  This argument and the one in the next paragraph specifically focus upon normative issues. That is, they aim to show that alethic relativism falls into conceptual incoherence because it is not able to provide thought and language with the necessary normative character.  As is well known, Wittgenstein developed in Philosophical Investigation an argument against the possibility of an epistemologically private language, that is, a language whose words refer to what can only be known to the person speaking, i.e. his private sensations and mental states.1 The argument appears to rest upon the assumptions that (1) the meaning of the expressions of any language is given by the rules that govern their use and that (2) a rule must be such that there is some cognitive difference for the user between following it correctly and not following it correctly. Wittgenstein argues that defining the meaning of the words of a private language can be thought of only as a matter of associating linguistic expressions by quasi-ostensive definitions with the data of subjective experience.2 By these quasi-ostensive definitions the user is supposed to remember the connection right in the future. Wittgenstein however contends that, since the language is private, the mnemonic association can have no independent check at all. This would lead to the situation in which “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”.3 That is, to the situation in which there is no cognitive difference between following a private rule correctly and not following it correctly. In conclusion, since a private language cannot have semantic rules, it is impossible.  Putnam emphasises that “most commentators read Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument as simply an objection against ‘the copy’ theory of truth”4 of metaphysical realism. Yet, in his opinion, the argument can also be seen as an objection to relativism. In particular, “the form of relativism Wittgenstein was concerned to attack is known as ‘methodological solipsism’”.5  Putnam explains that:  
                                                1See Wittgenstein (1958), Sect. 243. 2For example, by writing a certain sign down and, at the same time, concentrating the attention on a certain sensation to connect the former to the latter. 3Ibid., Sect. 258. 4Putnam (1981), p. 121. 5Ibid. 
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A “methodological solipsist” is a non-realist or “verificationist” who agrees that truth is to be understood as in some way related to rational acceptability, but who holds that all justification is ultimately in terms of experiences that each of us has private knowledge of. Thus, I have my knowledge of what experiences of mine would verify that snow is white and Bob Nozick has his knowledge of what experiences of his would verify that snow is white: every statement has a different sense for every thinker.1   Methodological solipsism has to be considered as a form of subjective relativism because, according to this position, the truth (i.e. justification) of statements is thought of as relative to each speaking subject.  As we will see more clearly below, to characterise the notion of a methodological solipsist, Putnam follows Carnap. Accordingly, when Putnam says that, for the methodological solipsist, all justification is given in terms of private experiences, he intends that the justification conditions of sentences are conceived in terms of sense data occurrences. Thus, the words of the language of the methodological solipsist must refer to what can only be known to him. Given his conception of truth and justification, the methodological solipsist must speak a private language. As a consequence, according to Putnam:  The [methodological solipsist…] cannot, in the end, make any sense of the distinction between being right and thinking he is right.2  So that, for him:   [T]here is, in the end, no difference between asserting or thinking, on the one hand, and making noises (or producing mental images) on the other. But this means that (on this conception) I am not a thinker at all but a mere animal. To hold such a view is to commit a sort of mental suicide.3    Methodological solipsism is therefore an intrinsically incoherent and untenable position.  We can schematise Putnam’s reductio ad absurdum as follows: 
                                                1Putnam (1981), pp. 121-122. 2Ibid., p. 122. 3Ibid. 
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(1) The methodological solipsist can think. (2) Thinking involves using a language (or a “language of thought”).  [From (1) and (2)] (3) The methodological solipsist must use a language. (4) One can use a language if and only if one has correctness rules. (5) A rule must be such that there is a cognitive difference between following it correctly and not following it correctly. (6) For the methodological solipsist there is no cognitive difference between following a rule correctly or incorrectly.  [From (6) and  (5)] (7) The methodological solipsist cannot have rules for the correct use of his language.  [From (7) and (4)] (8) The methodological solipsist cannot use any language.  [From (8) and (2)] (9) The methodological solipsist cannot think.   The reductio appears to be logically correct. The question is, therefore, whether the methodological solipsist is committed to all its self-standing premises. Let us examine each of them.  The methodological solipsist is surely committed to the premise (1). For he could not even conceive his philosophical view if he were unable to think. Let us examine the premise (2). Many contemporary philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein’s anti-mentalist view, will accept the claim that to think involves speaking (or sub-vocalising) a language. Yet, it does not appears be absurd to believe that we could think even if we were not able to use any language conceived as the ability of using public signs – namely, signs that can be used to communicate. One could in fact hypothesise a sort of “language of thought” à la Fodor1 consisting of private items (e.g. concepts) that, as private objects, could not be used to communicate. In (2) and throughout the reductio the term “language” will be used in a broad sense to include the “language of thought” as well. It is very hard to understand how the methodological solipsist can avoid committing to (2). In fact, either he accepts the thesis that thinking involves speaking or sub-vocalising a language or he rejects it. Yet, in the second case, he has plausibly to admit the existence of something like a “language of thought” to account for thought’s nature. In both the cases, he will endorse (2).  The methodological solipsist appears to be committed to the premise (4) as well. For he will recognise that speaking a language is – as I have emphasised above – an activity                                                 1See Fodor (1975). 
 173 
based on conventions1 and this surely involves having correctness rules. On the other hand, if the solipsist accepted the thesis of a “language of thought”, he would have to admit the necessity of rules for the correct application of its concept (for instance, the correct application of the concept of red to all its empirical instantiations).2  Let us consider now the premise (5). A non-methodological solipsist could challenge the claim that a rule involves a cognitive difference between following it correctly and not following it correctly. He could for instance argue as follows: the existence of a rule R implies that there is a difference between following R correctly and not following R correctly. However, to admit such a difference involves admitting the possibility that one may follow R incorrectly, namely, that one may make a mistake about R’s application. But one can make mistakes of this sort just when one does not know whether one is following R correctly or incorrectly (even if one intends to follow R correctly)! So, what a rule appears really to require is that there are cases in which it is true that one follows it correctly and other cases in which it is true that one does not follow it correctly, though one cannot distinguish between the two cases.3   Yet, no methodological solipsist could ever raise an objection like the above one. Since, according to the definition of methodological solipsist, there can be no other point of view from which the solipsist could actually be right or wrong in applying his rules apart from the one of the solipsist himself. We must not forget that the methodological solipsist defines truth in terms of subjective verification. Thus, whether the solipsist is in fact correct or incorrect in following a linguistic rule is something that must be known by the solipsist. As a conclusion, the methodological solipsist is committed to (5).  Let us consider the premise (6). Given Putnam’s characterisation of a methodological solipsist, the latter will be committed to (6) too. For, if I am supposed to have my knowledge of what sense data of mine would verify “snow is white” and you are supposed to have your knowledge of what sense data of yours would verify “snow is white”, everybody has just a private knowledge of the meaning of the words he uses. This is the situation in which giving a word meaning is thought of as a matter of associating the word by a quasi-ostensive definition with data of private experience. By 
                                                1See above, p. 55. 2Notice furthermore that an extreme reductionist view according to which using a language – even a language of thought – is not a normative activity but just a causal one (e.g., a matter of producing certain effects – public or private – once a certain stimulation is presents on our sensorial receptors) can hardly be accepted in the light of the current philosophical debate.  3See, for instance, Robinson (1994), Ch. IV. Note however that Robinson addresses his objection directly against Wittgenstein’s argument and not against Putnam’s. 
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such a definition, we are supposed to remember the connection correctly in the future. Yet, in these conditions, the mnemonic association can have no independent check at all; so we are left in the situation in which, as Wittgenstein has said, “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”. Namely, the very situation in which there is no cognitive difference between following a semantic rule correctly and not following it correctly. If the solipsist endorsed the thesis of a “language of thought”, he should tie the concepts of his “language of thought” to their referents (i.e. his private sense data) by quasi-ostensive definitions. So, in this case too, he would fall afoul of the difficulties considered above.  I wish to consider a reply to the above conclusion that might seem not to be completely implausible in the first instance. One could argue that an indirect way to establish whether or not a private speaker, PS, is using his words correctly is the following: let I be an interpretation of PS’s words used by him up to a given time. If, given I, all sentences that PS has asserted until that time fit together into a logically coherent network of statements, I’s correctness is justified. This reply involves however a serious difficulty. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that PS intends and is in fact able to make statements that are always logically compatible with one another, then, at any time, there will surely be more than one interpretation of PS’s words able to turn his asserted sentences into a logically coherent network.1 Yet, just one of them can be the correct one and the test at issue is not able to discriminate it. So, this reply has to be refused.  No further self-standing premise has to be examined. In conclusion, Putnam’s reductio appears to work: the particular form of subjective relativism called methodological solipsism appears to be nothing but a conceptually incoherent and therefore unacceptable philosophical position.  An important question is whether there are other forms of subjective relativism that are not affected by Putnam’s argument. Notice that this cannot be the case if to be a subjective relativist entails being a methodological solipsist. Putnam has characterised methodological solipsism by two constitutive theses, that is: (a) truth is some sort of verification; (b) all justification is ultimately given in terms of sense data. Possible forms of subjective relativism that are able to elude Putnam’s reductio must reject either of these claims. 
                                                1Consider, for instance, Quine’s problem of the indeterminacy of translation. 
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 Could a subjective relativist reject (a)? Speaking about the incommensurability thesis, we have seen that the cultural relativist has serious difficulties to accept a non-verificationist (i.e. non-epistemic) conception of truth.1 Analogous considerations can be made for any other kind of alethic relativism. A subjective relativist endorsing a non-epistemic notion of truth should explain the incompatibility of the world descriptions of each of us claiming that they concern metaphysically distinct worlds; but this is hardly acceptable. So, very probably, any sensible subjective relativist will endorse (a).  Let us turn to the examination of the claim (b). It involves the thesis of the existence of (private) sense data. Not all forms of subjective relativism are committed to the sense data thesis; one could in fact contend that subjective relativists could reject it – and thus (b) – by embracing direct realism. This possibility appears to be open to subjective relativists, at least in the first instance. Therefore, the conclusion we should draw is that not all the forms of subjective relativism are affected by Putnam’s reductio.  However, it is my opinion that Putnam’s argument, if appropriately modified, could lead to a more general conclusion. The claim (b) appears to be indispensable for Putnam’s reductio as it involves the premise (6) – that is, that for the methodological solipsist there is no cognitive difference between following a rule correctly or incorrectly. Yet, one could contend that the subjective conception of justification of the methodological solipsist – i.e. the view that relativises justification to each subject – is in itself sufficient to involve (6), independently of any recourse to the sense data thesis. Let us dwell on this point. When a subjectivist about justification, SJ, wants to know whether or not he is following a rule R correctly, he wants to know whether or not one (or some) of R’s applications is justified for him. Yet, under these conditions, he cannot resort to the help of any other subject to establish this. For everybody else’s opinion about the justification of that application of R would concern the justification for that subject, which is irrelevant for SJ’s problem. Thus, SJ will only be able to resort to his present and private memory of R or his private impressions of correctness. But this leads to the very situation in which, for SJ, it is impossible to “make any sense of the distinction between being right and thinking he is right”, so that there is no cognitive difference between following a rule correctly or incorrectly. Notice that in these reflections the sense data thesis has never been mentioned.  We can therefore consider the thesis (b*) – simpler than (b) – according to which the justification of every sentence is relative to the speaker. We will say that (a) and (b*) jointly define a methodological solipsist in a non-Carnapian sense. It is possible to                                                 1See above, pp. 164-165. 
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work out a reductio ad absurdum against the non-Carnapian methodological solipsism strictly analogous to Putnam’s by simply replacing, in Putnam’s argument, all the occurrences of “methodological solipsist” by occurrences of “non-Carnapian methodological solipsist”. It is easy to see that this reductio will be working as well as Putnam’s. Since all subjective relativists very plausibly accept (a), they are subjectivists on justification, thus, they all will endorse (b*) too. Consequently, every subjective relativist will be a non-Carnapian methodological solipsist so that every form of subjective relativism will fall afoul of the reductio just sketched.  To conclude, in the above pages, I have shown that the Argument from Wittgenstein – according to which, the kind of subjective relativism called “methodological solipsism” is conceptually incoherent – is actually sound. For the methodological solipsist has no way to distinguish between following a rule correctly and not following it correctly and he is therefore unable to account for the essential normative properties of speaking and thinking. I have furthermore argued that Putnam’s objection can be re-formulated in a stronger version able to show that subjective relativism in general cannot account for the same normative properties, so that subjective relativism in general proves conceptually incoherent and untenable.   (f) The Counterfactuals Argument  Putnam formulated this argument quite confusedly during his internal realist phase, but he has re-discussed it more recently, trying to make it more understandable. Thus, for the sake of clearness, my interpretation of the argument will mostly rely upon Putnam’s more recent discussion. Putnam has emphasised that Plato, arguing against Protagoras, noticed something very deep. That is, that “[since the] total relativist would have to say that whether or not p is true relative to S is itself relative [, ...] our grasp on what the position even means begins to wobble”.1 Since the total relativist is not involved in any infinite regress – as Putnam himself admits – what is the cause of this difficulty? The answer comes again from Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument. In Putnam’s view, it is possible to somehow extend that argument to show that relativism in general is unable to account for the normative character of thought and language.2 
                                                1Putnam (1981), p. 121. 2See ibid., p. 122. 
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 As we have seen, Wittgenstein’s thesis is that the meaning of the expressions of a language is given by the rules that govern their use and the rules must be something such that there is a cognitive difference between following them correctly and not following them correctly. As a consequence, if the relativist wants to use his language meaningfully and to be able to think, he has to be able to make sense of the distinction between knowing that one is actually right in asserting statements and merely thinking one is right in doing so.1 However, according to Putnam, the relativist can be argued not to be able to make any sense of this distinction. For if one can be known to be right in asserting statements, one must be actually or objectively right in asserting those statements. But the relativist cannot contemplate the case in which one is objectively right in doing anything, as “The whole purpose of relativism, its very defining characteristic, is […] to deny the existence of any intelligible notion of objective ‘fit’ [i.e. rightness]”.2 This is the reason why Putnam thinks that our grasp of the notion of relativism “begins to wobble”.  Putnam considers, however, a loophole that the relativist would probably resort to if he were pressed on this objection. The relativist might attempt to draw the cognitive distinction between being right and believing to be right by “borrow[ing] the idea that truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability”3 from the internal realist, but conceiving of idealisation as relative to an individual or a culture. In other words, the relativist might maintain that someone is actually correct in asserting a statement p if and only if p is ideally justifiable for that individual (subjective relativism) or for his culture (cultural relativism).   For instance, a subjective relativist might hold that:  p is true-for-me if [and only if] “p is justified-for-me” would be true provided I observed carefully enough, reasoned long enough, or whatever.4   Here Putnam has probably in mind a sort of “coherence test of one’s beliefs system under a given interpretation” like the one briefly considered in the examination of the previous argument.5 
                                                1See Putnam (1981), p. 122. 2Ibid., p. 123. 3Ibid., p 122. 4Ibid. 5See above, p. 173. 
 178 
  Analogously, the cultural relativist might identify correctness or truth with the majority opinion when certain conditions are met. It means that when a speaker S of a culture C says that “p is true for the culture C”, S is actually correct in his affirmation if and only if most of his cultural peers would agree that p is justified for C, provided that they were sufficiently informed of the relevant circumstances.1  Putnam believes that, although the relativist might think of the truth conditions of a sentence p in many different ways, these ways have plausibly to rely upon counterfactuals like the following:  If a subject (most of a culture’s members) did such and such or were in such and such circumstances, he (they) would assert p.2   Accordingly, the view of correctness of both the subjective and the cultural relativist will in general mean that a sentence is true when specific counterfactual conditions like this are true too.  In Putnam’s opinion, this picture of truth and of the difference between being correct and merely thinking that one is correct is however unacceptable. Putnam believes that in fact the notion of a counterfactual is not clear as it stands and that it would become clear if a counterfactual’s truth could be adequately explained in terms that do not involve using other counterfactuals. And it is Putnam’s contention that this kind of explanation will not be available to the (total) relativist.3 
                                                1See Putnam (1992a), pp. 68-69. 2See Putnam (1981), p. 122. 3This is the interpretation of Putnam’s argument I propose here. To support my interpretation, I will mostly rely upon Putnam’s recent discussion of the problem of counterfactuals developed in Putnam (1992a). In an earlier paper, Putnam claimed that the difficulty of the (total) relativist simply arises from the fact that he “seems to be taking a non-relativist attitude towards the counterfactual condition itself” (Putnam 1991, p. 409). If this were Putnam’s argument, it would be weak. For, as Putnam himself recognises, it would be open to the objection that the relativist could coherently take a relativist attitude towards the truth of counterfactuals (see ibid.). Yet, in the same paper, Putnam seems also to allude to the possibility that further problems for the relativist may turn up if he were asked to provide an account of the truth of counterfactual statements (see ibid., pp. 408-409). These problems appear to be at least in part investigated in Putnam (1992a). Actually, Putnam has never been completely clear about what specific difficulties a relative notion of truth raises for counterfactuals and this has yielded misunderstandings. For instance, according to Johnson’s interpretation, Putnam would maintain that the relativists are in difficulty since Putnam believes that an objective notion of the truth of counterfactuals is genetically pre-established in us (see Johnson 1991, p. 343). Putnam has rejected this interpretation replying that the thesis attributed to him relies upon a reductionist perspective that disallows the normative dimension of thought and language (see Putnam 1991, p. 413). On the other hand, according to Throop, Putnam would mistakenly contend that the analysis of the notion of a relativised counterfactual generates an infinite regress quite similar to that considered in the analysis of Plato's Argument (see Throop 1989, pp. 676-679). Putnam has however rejected this interpretation too (see Putnam 1991, p. 409). 
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 Putnam has recently provided an example of the relativist failure in accounting of the truth of counterfactuals. He specifically focuses upon cultural relativism (but his considerations are easily extendible to subjective relativism). He considers the case in which a cultural relativist, CR, thinks of the sentence “This kitchen needs painting” (in the sense that:  “The paint in this kitchen is dingy and peeling”) as true. In the light of the previous considerations, to make sense of his belief about the state of his kitchen, the relativist may be committed to thinking that it is true that:  (CT) If most members of CR’s culture looked at this kitchen (under specified epistemic conditions), they would assert, “This kitchen needs painting”.1  Putnam’s question is whether the relativist could in turn make sense of the claim that (CT) is true when he thinks – as a coherent (total) relativist – that all truth is relative. To answer this question, we have to ascertain whether, from the relativist point of view, there is anything that could actually be claimed to determine (CT)’s truth-value, taking into account that the relativist thinks of any truth as relative to his own culture.  Putnam firstly considers the explanation of (CT)’s truth that would very probably be provided by a metaphysical realist physicalist. According to this explanation:  [I]f the possible situations are completely described in the language of physics […], what will happen in that situation […i.e., that described by the antecedent of (CT)] is determined by the laws of fundamental physics.2  A full-blooded physicalist would in fact claim that the explanation of the human behaviour is ultimately given in terms of the laws of fundamental physics. Putnam also emphasises that:  [T]his account makes the truth-value of a counterfactual depend on the notion of something being a law of physics […] – not a law of the accepted physics […] but a law of the true physics […], whatever that may ever be.3  Here “true” means “corresponding to reality”, as the physicalist whom Putnam is speaking about is a metaphysical realist.                                                 1See Putnam (1992a), pp. 69. 2Ibid., p. 70. 3Ibid. My italic. 
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 Putnam then considers what an analogous account of the truth of (CT) provided by a relativist with physicalist tendencies would look like. Putnam’s conclusion is that, in such a picture,  [T]he truth-value of the statement that [… the relativist’s] kitchen needs painting depends (for the relativist) on the truth-value of the statement that people (in various hypothetical situations) would say that the paint in [… the relativist’s]  kitchen is dingy and peeling, and that in turn depends on what the relevant laws are [… i.e. the true laws of fundamental physics], and that in turn depends on what people would say the relevant laws are.1  Putnam affirms that this account of (CT)’s truth is problematic without explaining why. But the reason of his conviction is not difficult to see. Let CR be the cultural relativist with physicalist tendencies that thinks that the sentence “This kitchen needs painting” is true. CR will claim:   (I) (CT) is true for CR’s culture because certain laws LL of fundamental physics are true for CR’s culture.  But CR will also claim that:  (II) The laws LL of fundamental physics are true for CR’s culture because most of its members would assert them if they were in such and such circumstances.  Thus, CR must conclude that:  (III) (CT) is true for CR’s culture because most members of CR’s culture would assert the laws LL of fundamental physics if they were in such and such circumstances.  The trouble with this clarification of (CT)’s truth is that it is not given only in terms of categorical statements, but – as (III) shows – it involves another counterfactual. And, obviously, the attempt to explain the truth of the latter in terms of categorical statements would again lead to the same unsatisfactory result; and so on.                                                 1Putnam (1992a), pp. 70. 
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 The conclusion of Putnam’s argument is that the relativist has no acceptable way to show that there is a cognitive difference between being correct and merely thinking that one is correct, with the absurd consequence that he cannot speak any language or think.  We can schematise Putnam’s reductio into the following steps:  (1) The relativist can think. (2) The relativist can think if and only if, for him, there is a cognitive difference between his being correct in using a language and his mere thinking that he is correct in doing it. (3) For the relativist, there is a cognitive difference between his being correct in using a language and his mere thinking that he is correct in doing it if and only if he can conceive truth as a sort of idealised justification. (4) The relativist can conceive truth as a sort of idealised justification if and only if he can think of the truth conditions of sentences in terms of counterfactuals. (5) The relativist can think of the truth conditions of sentences in terms of counterfactuals if and only if he can provide an account of the truth of such counterfactuals. (6) The relativist cannot provide any satisfactory account of the truth of these counterfactuals. [From (6) and (5)]  (7) The relativist cannot think of the truth conditions of sentences in terms of counterfactuals. [From (7) and (4)] (8) The relativist cannot conceive truth as a sort of idealised justification. [From (8) and (3)] (9) For the relativist, there is no cognitive difference between his being correct in using a language and his mere thinking that he is correct in doing that.  [From (9) and (2)]  (10) The relativist cannot think.   The reductio is logically correct. Let us therefore examine whether the relativist is actually committed to all its self-standing premises. The relativist appears to be committed to the claims (1) and (2). The latter have already been discussed in the 
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analysis of Putnam’s previous argument and they will not be considered again.1 Let us focus upon the premise (3). As I have pointed out above, to make sense of an objective notion of correctness, the relativist appears to have no choice but to identify truth with some sort of idealised justification. Thus, he appears to be committed to this premise too.  What about the premise (4)? A possible objection to it is that, even if idealised justification conditions of sentences will probably be expressed by subjunctive-conditionals, the latter are not necessarily counterfactual conditionals. For it is not absurd to think that idealised justification conditions for sentences are or will be de facto attained in certain cases. Yet, it is quite certain that, both in the case of the cultural relativist and in the case of the subjective relativist, these subjunctive-conditionals will in general be conceived as counterfactual conditionals. For, the relativist is or will be able to effectively justify in a complete and definitive way only a very little part of all the sentences that he takes for true in every instant. If the relativist insisted that only the sentences really verified in a complete and definitive way should be considered true, his position could legitimately be accused of being strongly counterintuitive and actually implausible. Thus, the relativist appears to be committed to the claim (4) too.  Let us now consider the premise (5). This premise claims that the relativist is legitimated to think of the truth conditions of sentences in terms of counterfactuals only if he is able to account for the truth of the latter (which does not involve, in turn, appealing to any counterfactual statement). An objection to this premise is that counterfactuals are indeed clear as they stand, so that they need in turn no analysis of their truth conditions. Putnam takes into consideration that relativists may reply just this against (5). He however urges that, in that case, coherent relativists should take as primitive the notion of a relativised counterfactual and that it could be found to be unintelligible.2 Unfortunately, Putnam does not explain why relativised counterfactuals should raise such huge difficulties. In fact, it is not immediately clear why taking the notion of a relativised counterfactual as primitive should be more problematic than taking the notion of an objective counterfactual as primitive.  Putnam also emphasises that, if relativists insisted on contending that counterfactuals in general are clear as they stand, their claim would probably be insincere. The point is that:                                                  1See above, pp. 171-172. In this case too, I will consider the term “language” in a wide sense to include the Fodorian “language of thought”. 2See Putnam (1991), p. 409. 
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[M]etaphysical innocence, like other things, once lost is hard to regain. Once one has seen how difficult it is to give an account of the truth of a counterfactual, it is hard to see why someone who regards the truth of ordinary non-counterfactuals statements as problematic […] would regard counterfactual truth as unproblematic.1  But relativists could simply reply to Putnam’s observation by insisting that they sincerely find the notion counterfactual perfectly intelligible and that, in their view, counterfactuals actually do not need any analysis of their truth.   Putnam contends that the relativist can think of sentences’ truth conditions in terms of counterfactuals so long as the relativist is able to provide an account of the truth of these counterfactuals that does not involve in turn using other counterfactuals – this is the point of the premise (5). Notice that this contention would be correct if the relativist were committed to explaining the truth of these counterfactuals by appealing to facts of the world not caused or constituted by our minds. (That is, for instance, if the relativist had to defend the thesis that p is true for his culture because most of his cultural peers would agree that p is justified and that it is true that they would do so because it is a fact not caused or constituted by our minds that p). Yet, I will argue in Section 4.5.5 that the relativist cannot explain the truth of sentences in general by appealing to facts of a reality conceived as not caused or constituted by our minds.  Notice that some contemporary relativists appear to accept it without problems. For instance, the sociologists of science B. Latour and S. Woolgar have urged that “Scientific activity is not ‘about nature’, it is a fierce fight to construct reality”.2 Their idea is that not only is the truth of statements relative to scientific communities but also the very facts which these statements are about are relative the same communities. The consequence is that different scientific communities relying on different theoretical backgrounds will end up “constructing” different facts and living in different worlds. On this view, the reality of which scientific statements are true or false is describable as one that is constituted by the scientists’ minds. (I will go deeper into the notion of a relativised fact in Section 4.5.5).  It is worth stressing that Putnam’s argument is a reductio ad absurdum; therefore, the fact that he and, possibly, many other philosophers find the general notion of a counterfactual and of relativised counterfactual problematic is not immediately relevant                                                 1Putnam (1992a), p. 70. 2Latour and Woolgar (1979), p. 243. 
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for the soundness of his argument. To make his reductio effective, Putnam should be able to show that the relativist himself finds this notion problematic; but Putnam is not able to do it.  Though the above considerations are sufficient to show that Putnam’s reductio is unsound, for the sake of completeness, I will examine the premise (6) too. The only argument by Putnam to support the claim that the relativist cannot provide any satisfactory account of the truth of the counterfactuals would seem to be the objection against the cultural relativist with physicalist tendencies discussed before. A number of points should be noticed here. First, that objection is general, for it applies not only to the counterfactual (CT) but, probably, to any counterfactual. This involves that the cultural relativist with physicalist inclinations cannot explain in terms of mere categorical sentences the truth conditions of any counterfactual describing, in turn, the truth conditions of a statement.  Second, the target of this objection could probably be extended. If Putnam’s characterisation of the relativist point of view is correct, something similar to a physicalist approach to the truth of counterfactuals might be welcome among cultural relativists in general. As we have seen, according to Putnam, because of the tendency to abolish the normative dimension of thought, cultural relativism can be considered as a form of naturalised epistemology. In the sense that relativists would tend to conceive the norms of cultures as sorts of “social mechanisms” that determine the behaviour of their members.1 If Putnam is correct, many relativists without physicalist inclinations would simply replace the expression “certain laws LL of fundamental physics are true for CR’s culture”, in (I), by the expression “the social laws of CR’s culture are true for CR’s culture” and they would endorse (I) so modified. In that case, Putnam could easily develop a working objection parallel to his original.  Finally, note that, though Putnam does not say it explicitly, an objection quite analogous to his own could easily be made against a subjective relativist, SR, with physicalist tendencies, who replaced (CT) by the following counterfactual:  If SR observed carefully enough, reasoned long enough etc., SR would assert, “This kitchen needs painting”.   Relativists might however try to escape from Putnam’s objection, formulated in any of the variants considered above, simply by refusing to endorse reductionist views that                                                 1See above, p. 161. 
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explain people’s behaviour by the mere recourse to physical or social laws. Sophisticated relativists could contend that people’s behaviour is genuinely explained by normative rules, though the latter are valid only relatively to specifiable contexts or cultures.1 Also in this case, relativists might attempt to draw the conceptual distinction between being right and thinking of being right by borrowing the idea that truth is an idealisation of justification, but conceiving idealised justification as determined by the rules of each culture. The claim could be, therefore, that a member of a culture is ideally justified in asserting a statement just in case the conditions of assertibility for that statement specified by the rules of that culture are perfectly met.  Let us therefore suppose that NR is a normative relativist and that he thinks of the sentence “This kitchen needs painting” as true. For reasons already indicated, NR would plausibly committed to thinking of the truth (i.e. ideal acceptability) conditions of this sentence in terms of a counterfactual statement. The latter would probably be the following:  (CT*) If NR were in optimal epistemic circumstances as defined by the norms of NR’s culture, NR would assert: “this kitchen needs painting”.  We can plausibly assume that the optimal epistemic circumstances which (CT*) appeals to are hard to meet in ordinary situations, so that (CT*) can be considered as a genuine counterfactual statement. But, in this case, NR can become the target of the objection that he cannot explain (CT*)’s truth without appealing to other counterfactual statements.  How would NR explain the truth of (CT*) by appealing to his culture’s norms? He could for instance affirm that:  (CT*) is true for NR’s culture because certain assertibility rules RR are valid in NR’s culture.  Notice however that such an explanation would hardly be the whole explanation. For rules alone cannot make a sentence assertible. To achieve a complete explanation, certain facts have to come into play. An assertibility rule for the sentence “this kitchen needs painting” could for instance state that, in such and such epistemic conditions, if                                                 1Such a position could however not be endorsed by the subjective relativist, as the Argument from Wittgenstein shows in a convincing way that no subjective relativist could ever embrace a genuine normative perspective. 
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the speaker perceived that the paint in this kitchen is dingy and peeling, he should assert: “This kitchen needs painting”. A more exhaustive explanation of (CT*)’s truth will therefore be:  (CT*) is true for NR’s culture because certain assertibility rules RR are valid in NR’s culture and it is true that, if a speaker were in optimal epistemic circumstances, as defined by RR, he would have such and such perceptions.  Notice that now the explanation crucially relies upon the truth of another counterfactual. To provide an acceptable explanation of (CT*)’s truth (“acceptable” according to Putnam’s standards), NR should produce an acceptable explanation of the truth of the new counterfactual. Yet, it is hard to understand how he could do it. NR might perhaps contend that the counterfactual at issue is true because it is in turn assertible on the grounds of the rules of his own culture, but this would call into question a new counterfactual whose truth conditions should be explained. Alternatively, NR might perhaps appeal to certain physical or physiological laws that are true for NR’s culture. But the analysis of the truth conditions of the statements expressing such laws would raise the same difficulties affecting (CT*). These considerations show that the relativist is very probably committed to the premise (6).  To conclude, the Counterfactual Argument – according to which alethic relativism in general (i.e. subjective and cultural relativism) is conceptually incoherent – proves unsound. In brief, the argument claims that the only apparent way by which the relativist could distinguish between following a rule correctly and not following it correctly, in order to account for essential normative properties of speaking and thinking, would be identifying correctness and truth with some sort of (relativised) idealised justification. Yet, Putnam urges that this identification would commit the relativist to providing an explanation of the truth of counterfactuals expressing the conditions of idealised justification for sentences and that the relativist can hardly do it. Against Putnam, I have argued that the relativist is not committed to providing such an explanation, as he can insist that such counterfactuals are clear as they stand. Thus, the relativist appears to be able to distinguish – in this respect – between following a rule correctly and not following it correctly, and he can rebut the charge of being committed to conceptual incoherence.   
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(g) The Hermeneutic Argument  Putnam has explicitly directed this argument against cultural relativism (yet, it could easily be re-formulated in a way to strike subjective relativism as well). Putnam has “develop[ed] [… his] argument in analogy with a well-known argument against ‘methodological solipsism’”.1 Let us examine first the latter argument. As Putnam has explained,  [The methodological solipsist] holds that everything he can conceive of is identical (in the ultimate logical analyses of his language) with one or another complex of his own experiences. What makes him a methodological solipsist as opposed to a real solipsist is that he is kindly adds that you, dear reader, are the ‘I’ of this construction when you perform it: he says everybody is a (methodological) solipsist.2   Yet, Putnam has emphasised that:  The trouble [...] is that his two stances are ludicrously incompatible. His solipsist stance implies an enormous asymmetry between persons: my body is a construction out of my experiences [...], but your body isn’t a construction out of your experiences. It’s a construction out of my experiences. And your experiences [...] are a construction out of bodily behavior, which [...] is a construction out of my experience. But [the methodological solipsist’s] transcendental stance is that it’s all symmetrical: the “you” he addresses his higher-order remark to cannot be the empirical “you” of [... his experience]. But if it’s really true that “you” of the [.... experience] is the only “you” he can understand, then the transcendental remark is unintelligible. Moral: don’t be a methodological solipsist unless you are a real solipsist!3    To summarise, Putnam’s argument against methodological solipsism appears to be the following, the methodological solipsist substantially claims that:  
                                                1Putnam (1983f), p. 236. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., pp. 236-237. 
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(MST) Every object that every subject can experience is a logical construction out of that subject’s sense data.  This thesis aims to assert what Putnam contends is impossible to assert. That is, that every subject that the methodological solipsist can conceive is, so to speak, in a symmetric position in respect to the methodological solipsist’s. Namely, in the sense that every subject would be able to reduce the world to his own sense data as well as the methodological solipsist can do. The problem of this thesis is that it is self-refuting, for it implies its logical negations.  A methodological solipsist, MS, can in fact refer (MST) to himself. In that case, he will obtain:  Every object that MS can experience is a logical construction out of MS’s sense data.  Notice however that the term “object” of (MST) also refers to any subject that the methodological solipsist can experience. Consequently, the methodological solipsist must also assert that:  Any subject that MS can experience is a logical construction out of MS’s sense data.  But now, if the other subjects are nothing but constructions out of the methodological solipsist’s sense data, also their perceptions and beliefs have to be conceived as constructions out of the methodological solipsist’s sense data. Consequently, MS must conclude that:  (RST) Every object that every subject can experience is a logical construction out of MS’s sense data and of nobody else.  (RST) follows from (MST) but it is incompatible with the latter; as (RST) denies the symmetry claim made by (MST). In this way, methodological solipsism turns out to be self-refuting. Finally, taking into account that (RST) constitutes one of the possible formulations of what Putnam calls “real solipsism”, it is clear why Putnam urges that the methodological solipsist is destined to become a real solipsist. This argument 
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appears to me to be hardly criticisable. Let us consider now the argument that Putnam has specifically directed against the cultural relativist.  Putnam contends that an objection analogous to the above one can strike cultural relativism. Here is Putnam’s point:  Consider […] the position of the cultural relativist who says, “When I say something is true, I mean that it is correct according to the norms of my culture”. If he adds, “When a member of a different culture says that something is true, what he means […] is that it is in conformity with the norms of his culture”, then he is in exactly the same plight as the methodological solipsist.1 […Since] he lands in the predicament the methodological solipsist found himself in: the […] claim of a symmetrical situation cannot be understood if the relativist doctrine is right. [For the relativist is committed to conclude by saying:] “truth – the only notion of truth I understand – is defined by the norms of my culture”.2   The objection sketched above constitutes what I have called “the Hermeneutic Argument”. Putnam is admittedly unclear in formulating it – he characterises his argument as “somewhat messy, somewhat ‘intuitive’”3 – so, recourse to reconstruction and interpretation will be necessary. In the next pages, I will present what I think is the most coherent reconstruction of Putnam’s argument; then, I will show that the argument is incorrect.  The above quotation suggests that Putnam believes that a substantive claim of the cultural relativist is the following:  (CRT) For every subject S and every sentence p, when S asserts p, S’s assertion means that p is true (i.e. assertible) as determined by the norms of S’s culture.  (CRT) is analogous to the central thesis of the methodological solipsist (MS) considered above. For both the theses take the world to be a construction out of the cognitive practices of the speakers – namely, in one case, of single speakers and, in the other case, of different groups of speakers identifying different cultures. 
                                                1Putnam (1983f), p. 237. 2Ibid., p. 238. 3Ibid., p. 236. 
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 A second similarity that Putnam finds between the two theses is – in my opinion – the following: both (CRT) and (MS) are meant to assert something that ultimately proves impossible to assert. This similarity is the one that ultimately grounds the analogy between Putnam’s argument against methodological solipsism and Putnam’s argument against cultural relativism.   In the case of the (MS), the impossible assertion was that every subject that the methodological solipsist can think of is, so to speak, in a symmetric position with respect to the methodological solipsist’s one, in the sense that every subject would be able to reduce the world to his own sense data as well as the methodological solipsist does. In the case of (CRT), the impossible statement is that every other culture that the relativist can conceive is in a symmetric position in respect to the relativist’s one. In the sense that, for any other culture, the truth of every sentence asserted by its members is determined by the norms of that culture, exactly as it happens in the relativist’s culture. Putnam’s argument is meant to make this internal incoherence of cultural relativism explicit.  The trouble with the methodological solipsist is that the very application of (MS) shows that the experiential world of every subject the methodological solipsist can think of is in fact a construction out of the methodological solipsist’s sense data. Thus, the symmetry thesis cannot be true. Analogously, the trouble with the cultural relativist is that the very application of (CRT) shows that, for every other culture that the relativist can conceive, the truth of every sentence is in fact determined by the norms of the relativist’s culture. (According to Putnam the coherent relativist must in fact conclude: “truth – the only notion of truth I understand – is defined by the norms of my culture”1). So, again, the symmetry thesis is untenable. In conclusion, (CRT) turns out to be self-refuting as (MS) does.  To show that this conclusion is correct, Putnam has envisaged a scenario with an American cultural relativist, R.R.2, talking about a German, Karl, who affirms: “Schnee ist weiss”. Putnam claims that R.R., as a cultural relativist interpreter of Karl, will think that:  (A) When Karl asserts “Schnee ist weiss”, Karl’s assertion means that “snow is white” is true as determined by the norms of Karl’s culture.3 
                                                1Putnam (1983f), p. 238. 2Probably Richard Rorty. 3Ibid., p. 237. Putnam’s italic. I have modified Putnam’s original sentence, which is: 
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(A) in fact follows from the relativist thesis (CRT).  Putnam emphasises that the phrase “‘snow is white’ is true as determined by the norms of Karl’s culture” contained in (A) “is itself one which R.R. has to use, not just mention, to say what Karl says”.1 Thus, on the grounds of (CRT), when a cultural relativist asserts a sentence, his assertion means that the sentence is true as determined by the norms of his own culture. In conclusion, what R.R.’s assertion actually means is that:  “‘Snow is white’ is true as determined by the norms of Karl’s culture” is true as determined by the norms of American culture.2  Substituting it back into (A), it yields:  (B) When Karl says “Schnee ist weiss”, Karl’s assertion means that “‘snow is white’ is true as determined by the norms of Karl’s culture” is true as determined by the norms of American culture.3  Putnam contends that sentences like (B) show that, for the cultural relativist, all other cultures are nothing but “logical constructions” out of the hermeneutic practices of his own culture. For, in the above example, “Other cultures become, so to speak, logical constructions out of the procedures and practices of American culture”.4 In my opinion, this claim is straightforward. The fact is that sentences like (B) just show that the truth conditions of any statement (or its meaning) used in any culture which the relativist can think of are ultimately determined by the norms the relativist’s culture.  According to Putnam, (B) also shows that, if you are a relativist, you will “think that the only notion of truth there is for you to understand is ‘truth-as-determined-by-the norms-of-this-[i.e. your]-culture’”.5 This entails that: 
                                                                                                                                          When Karl says “Schnee ist weiss”, what Karl means (whether he knows it or not) is that snow is white as determined by the norms of Karl’s culture  The expression “what Karl means (whether he knows it or not) is” is very confusing. For the sake of clarity, I have replaced it by “Karl’s assertion means”, which has, in my opinion, the same meaning but it is much clearer. 1Putnam (1983f), p. 237. 2See ibid. 3See ibid.  4See ibid., pp. 237-238. 5Ibid., p. 238. 
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If now [… the relativist] attempts to add that “the situation is reversed from the point of view of the other culture” he lands in the predicament the methodological solipsist found himself in: the […] claim of a symmetrical situation cannot be understood if the relativist doctrine is right.1  For this reason, the central claim of the cultural relativists (CRT) cannot be true too, and cultural relativism proves self-refuting. This conclusion is, in my opinion, disputable.  To make Putnam’s ideas clearer, I will generalise (B) into the following claim:  (II) For every subject S who does not belong to the relativist’s culture and every sentence p, when S asserts p, S’s assertion means that “p is true as determined by the norms of S’s culture” is true as determined by the norms the relativist’s culture.    It is easy to see that Putnam could have shown that the cultural relativist is committed to (II) by using only (CRT) as a premise and leaving aside the whole story of R.R. and Karl. His argument could have run as follows: by definition, the cultural relativist is committed to (CRT). Since the cultural relativist endorses (CRT), he must also accept that:  (I) For every subject S who does not belong to the relativist’s culture and every sentence p, when S asserts p, S’s assertion means that p is true as determined by the norms of S’s culture.   “p is true as determined by the norms of S’s culture” is a sentence that the cultural relativist has to use, not just mention, when he asserts (I). So, (CRT) applies to this sentence as well. In conclusion, for the relativist, “p is true as determined by the norms of S’s culture” is equivalent to:  “p is true as determined by the norms of S’s culture” is true as determined by the norms of the relativist’s culture.  Substituting it back into (I), it yields:                                                  1Putnam (1983f), pp. 237-238. 
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(II) For every subject S who does not belong to the relativist’s culture and every sentence p, when S asserts p, S’s assertion means that “p is true as determined by the norms of S’s culture” is true as determined by the norms the relativist’s culture.  The argument appears to be logically correct so far and there is no doubt that the cultural relativist that considers truth as relative to the norms of each culture is committed to its unique self-standing premise; that is, (CRT).1 The trouble is that Putnam also maintains that (B) – or its generalisation (II) – entails the negation of the symmetry claim and (CRT).  As we have seen, Putnam contends that the cultural relativist, by endorsing (B) – or its generalisation (II) – ends up conceiving all truths as determined by the norms of his own culture. This means that the relativist is committed to thinking that, even for those who are not members of the relativist’s culture, the truth of any sentence that they assert is determined by the norms of the relativist’s culture and not by the norms of their culture. If this were actually a consequence of (II), the incompatibility between (II) and (CRT) would be evident. For (CRT) trivially entails:  (T) For every subject S who does not belong to the relativist’s culture and every sentence p, when S asserts p, S’s assertion means that p is true as determined by the norms of S’s culture,   If this is Putnam’s contention, there is a straightforward objection. There are at least two possible meanings of the expression “the truth of p is determined by the norms of the relativist’s culture”. In one way, this means that p is true because, according to the norms of the relativist’s culture that directly apply to p, p is true. In another way, this means that p is true because, according to the norms of the relativist culture that do not apply directly to p, p is true. In this second case, the norms of the relativist’s culture                                                 1In the previous pages, I have characterised cultural relativism simply as the position, according to which, truth is relativised to cultures (see above p. 160). This characterisation does not necessarily involve (MS), though it is compatible with it. For instance, a claim alternative to (MS) that cultural relativists could make and that is compatible with my general characterisation of cultural relativism is:  For every subject S and every sentence p, when S asserts p, S’s assertion means (or he should mean) that p is true (i.e. assertible) according to the majority opinion of S’s culture.  Yet, it is worth emphasising that Putnam could have worked up an argument exactly analogous to the one at stake by replacing (MS) with the above principle. It is my opinion that the defects affecting Putnam’s original argument (see below) would affect also this alternative formulation of it. 
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directly apply to sentences stating that p is true as determined by the norms of other cultures; thus, the norms of the relativist’s culture directly determine the truth of these sentences but not the truth of p. I will say that, in this case, the norms of the relativist’s culture ultimately determine the truth of p.  One cannot but notice that (II) involves that the norms of the relativist’s culture ultimately, but not directly, determine p’s truth. On the other hand, (T) just says that the norms of S’s culture directly determine the truth of p. Since (T) does not specify anything at all about whether or not p’s truth can be ultimately determined by the norms of the relativist’s culture, there is no immediate conflict between (II) and (T). (II) could well be seen as a statement that goes deeper in the meaning of (T) and clarifies it. This shows that the Hermeneutic Argument is incorrect.  This result also shows that the analogy drawn by Putnam between methodological solipsism and cultural relativism is not as deep and complete as Putnam thinks. As we have seen, Putnam emphasises that, from the cultural relativist perspective, the other cultures turn out to be constructions out of the hermeneutic practices of the relativist as well as the other subjects turn out to be logical constructions out of the sense data of the methodological solipsist. Putnam is probably right about this. Yet, an important difference between the two philosophical positions is that, whilst methodological solipsism is a self-refuting position because the other subjects turn out to be constructions out of the sense data of the methodological solipsist, cultural relativism is not a self-refuting position even though the other cultures turn up to be constructions out of the hermeneutic practices of the relativist.  Putnam might perhaps counter-object urging that the cultural relativist holds a thesis stronger than (CRT). That is, one stating that:  (CRT*) For every subject S and every sentence p, when S asserts p, S’s assertion means that (1) p is true as directly determined by the norms of S’s culture and (2) p’s truth is not ultimately determined by the norms of any other culture.  As it is easy to see, (CRT*) is incoherent. The simple reason is that, as soon as the relativist tries to refer (CRT*) to a subject S that is not a member of his culture and he asserts (CRT*), he will intend (1) as:   
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“p is true as directly determined by the norms of S’s culture” is true as determined by the norms of the relativist’s culture.  Which is incompatible with (2).  Yet, a problem with this possible counter-argument is that it is not clear why the cultural relativist should endorse a thesis as strong as (CRT*). Putnam contends that the advocate of (CRT), by admitting that all other cultures are nothing but “logical constructions” out of the hermeneutic practices of his own culture, ends up upholding a position that is not relativist at all. For “it postulates an objective notion of truth, although one that is said to be a product, and to be defined by [… a certain] culture’s criteria”.1 If this claim were correct, the cultural relativist might have a reason to drop out (CRT) and to accept (CRT*), which does not imply that the other cultures are “logical constructions” out of the practices of his own. However, rigorously speaking, what Putnam affirms in the quotation is not correct. For, as a consequence of (CRT), truth is directly relativised to each culture and ultimately relativised to just one culture, namely that of the relativist – thus, truth is a relative notion.2   In conclusion, the Hermeneutic Argument is incorrect because the cultural relativist thesis that, when a subject asserts a sentence, his assertion means that the sentence is true as determined by the norms of that subject’s culture is not intrinsically incoherent as Putnam believes, and replacing this thesis with a stronger (and self-refuting) one appears to be unjustified from the cultural relativist perspective.                                                       1Putnam (1983f), p. 238. 2According to Putnam, just as the methodological solipsist can become a real solipsist, the cultural relativist can become a cultural imperialist, who is no longer a relativist (see ibid.). In other words, the cultural relativist should eventually acknowledge that, because of the above argument, all other cultures are nothing but “logical constructions” out of the hermeneutic practices of his own culture. Consequently, he should admit that his position just claims that:  For every sentence p, p is true if and only if p is assertible according to the norms of the relativist’s (i.e. imperialist’s) culture.  I have argued that this claim is incorrect because, in the relativist picture, the truth of every sentence is determined by the norms of the relativist’s culture in a weaker sense. I will therefore not examine Putnam’s argument that aims to show that cultural imperialism is incoherent too.  
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Conclusion: Putnam’s arguments do not work or are irrelevant  I have completed my scrutiny of Putnam’s arguments against relativism. I can recapitulate the attained results as follows: Putnam has directed his arguments against the most common forms of alethic relativism, namely, subjective and cultural relativism. Cultural relativism about truth holds that the truth of sentences is relative to cultures. Subjective relativism about truth holds that the truth of sentences is relative to subjects or speakers. These arguments are in general directed against forms of total relativism, which states that the truth of all sentences – including the relativist theses – is relative.  To begin with, Putnam’s Argument against the Incommensurability Thesis – which is meant to show that this thesis provides no reason to embrace forms of cultural relativism – has proved conclusive, as the incommensurability thesis appears untenable because meaningless.  Putnam’s other arguments are conceived as reductiones ad absurdum of cultural or subjective relativism; some of them are meant to show that the alethic relativist cannot ascribe a normative character to the truth of his beliefs, so that he cannot really speak and think. Most of Putnam’s reductiones ad absurdum have been proved to not work, some have proved to work only with strong restrictions and, finally, just one has proved to definitely work.  Let us start with the first group – namely, the one of the non-working arguments. The group includes: Plato’s Argument, the Counterfactuals Argument and the Hermeneutic Argument. Plato’s Argument, which aims to strike both subjective and cultural relativism, has proved to be incorrect. For understanding the claims of the relativist does not involve any infinite regress. The Counterfactuals Argument, which is meant to hit both subjective and cultural relativism, has proved to be unsound. For the relativist is not committed to providing any explanation of the truth of counterfactuals. Finally, the Hermeneutic Argument, which is directed against cultural relativism, is incorrect. For stating that the other cultures are constructions out of the hermeneutic practices of the relativist does not involve the negation of any relativist thesis.  The arguments working only with restrictions are Garfinkel’s Argument and the Majority Opinion Argument. Garfinkel’s Argument is meant to strike both subjective and cultural relativism. In an improved version, the argument works but it can just show that, if relativism were true, it would be just relatively true. This could be said to weaken the relativist position but it does not refute it. The Majority Opinion Argument 
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is directed against cultural relativism; it indeed shows that relativism is self-refuting but just in case relativism is conceived as the position according to which truth is determined by our culture’s majority opinion.  Finally, the only argument that appears to definitely work is the Argument from Wittgenstein. This objection targets methodological solipsism but it can be extended to strike subjective relativism in general. The argument persuasively shows that subjective relativism in general is an incoherent position, as no subjective relativist could be said, in a proper sense, to be able to think or to use a language.  Let us now assess whether these results can invalidate the objection against internal realism that I have been developing from Section 4.5. As the reader may remember, in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, I have given reasons to believe that alternative “maximally coherent” theories may exist. Then, in Section 4.5.3, I have argued that, if it were actually the case, to avoid absurd consequences, Putnam should very probably endorse a form of alethic relativism, according to which, truth is relative to groups of ideal inquirers or “maximally coherent” theories. I have emphasised that a possible reply by Putnam is that the internal realist could not embrace alethic relativism because relativism is conceptually incoherent and self-refuting. The analysis of Putnam’s argument was meant to evaluate the soundness of this reply, and the results I have attained clearly show that it would be ungrounded.  To begin with, Putnam’s only argument that works without restriction – that is, the Argument from Wittgenstein – just shows that subjective relativism is conceptually incoherent. Therefore, it cannot affect the specific forms of alethic relativism which internal realism may collapse into. For, if more than one “maximally coherent” theory turned up, the internal realist should relativise truth to “maximally coherent” theories or groups of ideal inquirers, and not to single subjects.1 Besides, Putnam’s arguments that work with restrictions – that is, Garfinkel’s Argument and the Majority Opinion Argument – cannot affect these specific forms of alethic relativism either. For Garfinkel’s Argument shows that, if total relativism were true, it would be just relatively true. This seems to apply to the types of relativism which the internal realist may be committed to, as they are probably forms of total relativism,2 but it does not refute them. Finally, the Majority Opinion Argument shows that cultural relativism is 
                                                1Notice that above, p. 100, I have chosen to speak of ideal inquirers and not of one ideal inquirer to define truth from the internal realist perspective, just to avoid difficulties of this sort. 2The fact that truth is a holistic matter, in the sense that one part of a system of statements is true if only if the other part is so, makes it intuitive to think that, if one part of the system is just relatively true, the other part will be just relatively true too. 
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self-refuting only if relativism is conceived as the position, according to which, truth is determined by our culture’s majority opinion. Yet, the types of relativism which Putnam may be committed to do not affirm this; they rather claim that truth is determined by the theories that ideal inquirers would accept if they existed, and such theories are not dependent upon our culture’s majority opinion.  In conclusion, it appears clear to me that, if incompatible “maximally coherent” theory existed, the internal realist should embrace a form of alethic relativism.   4.5.5 Alethic relativism is not realism  In the above sections, I have argued that internal realism may collapse into a form of alethic relativism. In this section, I aim to show that, if this were the case, internal realism could not be considered a form of realism. For alethic relativism cannot comply with the alethic condition for realism, according to which:  (R2) The world not caused or constituted by our minds makes empirical statements in general determinately either true or false, and truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.  As I have pointed out in Chapter 1,1 one reason why alethic relativism in general cannot be considered a form of realism is the following: since alethic relativists claim that truth is relative to subjects, social groups or cultures, from the relativist perspective, truth depends on the beliefs of subjects, social groups or cultures in general. But this is just incompatible with what (R2) requires.  I think that this reason alone is in fact insufficient to show that the specific kinds of relativism which the internal realist may be committed to are not forms of realism. For, if truth were relativised to “maximally coherent” theories or groups of ideal inquirers, this would not entail that truth depends on the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general. Quite the opposite, truth would in this case be independent of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general, as it would depend on the beliefs of just certain beings – namely, the ideal inquirers. (In particular, if truth were relativised to groups of ideal inquirers, truth would depend on the beliefs of just those groups, and, if truth were                                                 1See above, Sect 1.4. 
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relativised to “maximally coherent” theories, truth would depend on the beliefs of the ideal inquirers that accept those “maximally coherent” theories).   In Chapter 1,1 I have indicated there is yet a deeper reason for the claim that alethic relativism is not realism. I think that this second reason is sufficient to show that the specific kinds of relativism which the internal realist may be committed to are not forms of realism.  In brief, alethic relativism admits that incompatible sentences may turn out to be true relative to different subjects or cultures at the same time: for instance if p is true for a culture X, not-p may turn out to by true for a culture Y. On the other hand, the condition for realism (R2) requires empirical statements to be true or false of the world not caused or constituted by our minds. The problem is that those two claims clash with one another, as it hardly intelligible how two incompatible sentences could be both true of the world not caused or constituted by our minds.2  As I have suggested in Section 1.4, to try to comply with the above alethic desideratum for realism, the relativist might first urge that his position does not state that an empirical statement p, when it is asserted by a sincere speaker, is just invented by him but, rather, that p is asserted on the grounds of the speaker’s actual sensory experience. The relativist might then add that, from his perspective, the existence of that sensory experience is adequately explained only by hypothesising that the facts described by p – which bring about the sensory experience – are not caused or constituted by the speaker’s mind. Since the relativist is very probably committed to an epistemic notion of truth,3 he might finally contend that these mind-independent facts can be described from within language by appealing to a relativised version of the platitude (F), to the effect that:  (FR) “p” is true relative to a subject or culture X if and only if it is a fact that p.   It is worth emphasising that the internal realist relativist would certainly resort to an explanation of this kind if he were asked to show that his position is a form of realism. 
                                                1See above, Sect. 1.4. 2It is worth emphasising that the incompatibility of p and not-p that I have in mind here must not be conceived in a mere notational sense but in a more pregnant one. We can flesh out this intuitively strong sense of incompatibility by appealing, for instance, to Putnam’s notion of mutual interpretability discussed above, in Sect. 2.7. In this case, we will say that p and not-p are incompatible if and only if they can respectively be embodied in two descriptions that intuitively deal with the same phenomena but, just because they contain p and not-p, are not mutually interpretable. 3See above, pp. 164-165. 
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For, as we have seen in Chapter 2,1 this is just the way in which Putnam defends the realist character of his position.  The trouble with this explanation is that the relativist admits that, when a sentence p is true relative to some subject or culture X, not-p may turn out to be true relative to some other subject or culture Y. If this is the case, by appealing to the above platitude, we obtain:  Since “p” is true relative to the subject or culture X, then it is a fact that p,  and  Since “not-p” is true relative to the subject or culture Y, then it is a fact that not-p.2  The palpable problem is that the world not caused or constituted by our minds, which is thought of as a coherent world, cannot contain both the fact that p and the fact that not-p at the same time. On the other hand, the notion of an incoherent world not caused or constituted by our minds is scarcely intelligible and, at any rate, it does not fit the idea of the world that most realists have in mind.  A way to avoid these difficulties is that of taking the relativisation of the platitude (F) further. In other words, the relativist could urge that facts too exist just relatively to subjects or cultures. This means turning (FR) into:  (FRR) “p” is true relative to a subject or culture X if and only if it is a fact relative to a subject or culture X that p.  Accordingly, if it is the case that p is true relative to the subject or culture X and not-p is true relative to the subject or culture Y, by appealing to (FRR), we obtain:  Since “p” is true relative to the subject or culture X, then it is a fact relative to the subject or culture X that p,  and                                                 1See above, Sects. 2.2 and 2.4. 2As I have already emphasised, “not-p” does not necessarily refer to a negative fact, as it can be conceived as referring to a positive fact q whose existence makes the sentence p false (or, equivalently, the sentence not-p true). 
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Since “not-p” is true relative to the subject or culture Y, then it is a fact relative to the subject or culture Y that not-p.   This manoeuvre has the immediate effect of removing the absurd conclusion – which the relativist with realist tendencies appeared to be committed to – that the world is incoherent. In fact, now, the relativist can claim that the (intra-linguistic) world of which p is true and the (intra-linguistic) world of which not-p is true should be thought of as distinct. In particular, p will be conceived as true of the world consisting of all empirical facts existing relatively to the subject or culture X and not-p will be thought of as true of the world consisting of all empirical facts existing relatively to the subject or culture Y. Thus, now, we do not have just one incoherent world but two coherent worlds whose existence is relative to subjects or cultures.   Unfortunately, it seems to me that, if the relativist opted for this apparent way out, he would run afoul of difficulties even bigger than before. The relativist is asked to show that, from his perspective, empirical sentences are true or false of a reality that is not caused or constituted by our minds. Thus, if he accepted (FRR), the relativist would be committed to asserting the thesis that the world existing relatively to the subject or culture X and the world existing relatively to the subject or culture Y are not created or constituted by, respectively, these subjects’ minds or the minds of these cultures’ members. The problem is that such a thesis would prove paradoxical and unacceptable to most realists and most philosophers in general. For the notion of a world that is not constituted by our minds and that is, at the same time, just existing relatively to a culture or subject is intuitively incoherent. I indeed believe that most of us will spontaneously think of such a relatively existent world as one that is constituted by our minds.  A second problem for the relativist who relied on (FRR) is that he would be committed to claiming that there are many different worlds that make sentences true or false (for instance, the world existing relatively to X and the world existing relatively to Y), while the realist usually just claim that the world – i.e. one world – makes sentences true or false. In sum, the claim of the relativist would be at odds with the intuitive assumption shared by most realists that the (actual) world is just one.  The above considerations shows the alethic relativist cannot make any sense of the claim that, from his own perspective, empirical sentences are true or false of the world not caused or constituted by our minds. This difficulty would affect every possible form of alethic relativism that aimed at being a form of realism. For it hinges upon the simple 
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possibility – admitted by all kinds of alethic relativism – that incompatible sentences turn out to be true relative to different “cognitive perspectives” (i.e., those depending on subjects, social groups, conceptual schemes, theories, etc.). This means that alethic relativism structurally cannot comply with the essential condition for realism (R2), so that it cannot be considered a form of realism. Notice also that this difficulty would in any case affect internal realism, if it collapsed into forms of alethic relativism. For, as we have seen in Section 4.5.3, these forms of relativism would stem from the very necessity of recognising that incompatible sentences are true relative to different “cognitive perspectives” – in particular, those depending on groups of ideal inquirers or “maximally coherent” theories.  In conclusion, since internal realism may collapse into a form of alethic relativism, and since alethic relativism is not realism, Putnam’s position may turn out not to be a form of realism. In view of the fact that this possibility is left open, the claim that internal realism is a form of realism proves groundless.  Before concluding this section, I wish to sum up this very long argument, which I have been developing from Section 4.5. As we have seen in Section 2.5, Putnam has claimed that the reflective equilibrium process determines the standards of theory coherence. In Section 4.5.1, I have argued that, since the reflective equilibrium method may fail to cope with the phenomenon of cognitive diversity, which can possibly affect the ideal inquirers, divergent sets of coherence standards may ultimately be brought into reflective equilibrium. I have also emphasised that divergent standards may fulfil all the other meta-requirements of acceptability endorsed by Putnam. This opens the door to the possibility that incompatible theories may be certified as “maximally coherent” at the same time on the basis of alternative conceptions of theory coherence, so that there would be more than one “maximally coherent” theory.   In Section 4.5.2, I have urged in addition that, even if the reflective equilibrium process proved able to produce univocal outcomes, one could not exclude that there may be more than one “maximally coherent” theory, for the ideal inquirers may end up constructing “ideally rationally acceptable” global theories underdetermined by evidence.  In Section 4.5.3, I have then argued that, if more than one “maximally coherent” theory turned up, the internal realist would face the logical absurdity that both a sentence and its negation are true. To overcome this difficulty, the internal realist could not just consider a sentence true if and only if it is deducible from an “ideally coherent” theory and its negation is not deducible from other “ideally coherent” theories. For this 
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would be incompatible with the holistic conception of truth proper to internal realism. I have argued that the only alternative way out at the internal realist’s disposal would be that of considering truth as a notion relative to groups of ideal inquirers or “maximally coherent” theories. This means that, if incompatible “maximally coherent” theories existed, the internal realist should embrace a form of alethic relativism.  In Section 4.5.4, I have focused on Putnam’s possible reply that the internal realist could not embrace alethic relativism because relativism is conceptually incoherent and self-refuting. Yet, my analysis of Putnam’s arguments against alethic relativism has clearly shown that this reply would be ungrounded, as most of these arguments are inconclusive and the working ones prove ineffective against the specific forms of alethic relativism which internal realism may collapse into. In particular, either they do not apply to these forms of alethic relativism, or they cannot show that these forms of alethic relativism are just incoherent or self-refuting. Thus, Putnam could hardly defeat the claim that the internal realist may be committed to a form of alethic relativism.   Finally, in present section I have shown that alethic relativism is not a form of realism, as it does not comply with the minimal condition for realism (R2). A first reason is that, while (R2) requires truth to be independent of the beliefs of subjects or social groups in general, the alethic relativist claims that truth just depends on the beliefs of subjects or social groups in general. This reason can yet not show that the specific kinds of relativism which the internal realist may be committed to are not forms of realism. For, these positions make truth depend on the beliefs of the ideal inquirers and not on the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.  I have however indicated a deeper reason why alethic relativism is not realism. (R2) requires that empirical sentences are true or false of the world not caused or constituted by our minds. Since the relativist admits that incompatible sentences may turn out to be true relative to different subjects or cultures, to fulfil (R2), the relativist must explain how the world makes such sentences true at the same time. The relativist has apparently only two alternative explanations: either he will assert that there is just one world not caused or constituted by our minds that is able to make incompatible sentences true at the same time because it is incoherent – but this is absurd. Or he will assert that there are many incompatible worlds not caused or constituted by our minds that exist relatively to subjects or cultures and that make incompatible sentences, respectively, true at the same time. But the idea of a world not constituted by our minds that exists just relatively to subjects or cultures is intuitively incoherent and, moreover, such an explanation does not comply with the realist intuition that the world is just one. Since 
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both these alternative explanations prove unworkable, alethic relativism fails to comply with the necessary condition for realism (R2) and it turns out not to be a form of realism. This reason for the failure of the claim that relativism is a form of realism is general and it applies to the kinds of relativism which the internal realist may be committed to.  In conclusion, since internal realism may collapse into a form of alethic relativism, and since alethic relativism is not realism, Putnam’s position may turn out not to be a form of realism. In this situation, there are no sufficient grounds to believe that internal realism is a form of realism.   4.6 Internal realist truth is not world-dependent   I wish now to raise a final objection against internal realism; this objection is much simpler and, at the same time, stronger than the one developed throughout Section 4.5. In brief, to comply with the alethic condition for realism (R2), the internal realist must claim that empirical sentences are true or false of the world not caused or constituted by our minds, though the world can be described only from within language. Since the internal realist must plausibly accept (SCT*) as a definition of truth, he is committed to explaining how (SCT*) allows the world not caused or constituted by our minds to play a role in fixing the truth-value of sentences. This means providing a world-involving explanation of the truth of the subjunctive-conditional in the right-hand side of (SCT*). I will however show that the internal realist can hardly provide such an explanation, so that Putnam’s position cannot fulfil the essential requirement for realism (R2) and it cannot be considered a realist position.  This objection is stronger than the previous one because, while the former can just show that we have no sufficient grounds to claim that internal realism is a form of realism, the argument that I will develop here concludes that we have sufficient grounds to claim that internal realism is not a form of realism.  A further point should be noticed: the present objection is similar to the one directed by Putnam against alethic relativism in his Counterfactual Argument, which has been examined above in Section 4.5.4.1 As the reader may remember, Putnam argued that a crucial difficulty for the relativist is that he is unable to explain the truth of counterfactuals constituting the truth conditions of empirical sentences in general. The                                                 1See above, pp. 175-185. 
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objection I am going to develop here affirms – similarly – that a crucial difficulty for the internal realist is that he is unable to provide a world-involving explanation of the truth of counterfactuals constituting the truth conditions of empirical sentences in general. An important difference is that, while Putnam’s argument proves inconclusive, as the relativist is not committed to providing that explanation,1 my argument is more successful, as the internal realist is – as a realist – actually committed to provide this explanation.  To fully appreciate the new objection, let us go back to the “Peircean” notion of a maximally coherent theory and let us see how this notion – if the internal realist could embrace it – would let the world play a role in the determination of the truth of a statement p. Let us imagine that we have come to the end of rational research and we have attained the maximally coherent theory T (I will naturally ignore any of the objections that I have moved against “the Peircean view”). In Putnam’s picture, the world “intervenes” in establishing the truth of our sentences through the speaker’s perceptive experience. Thus, the “Peircean” internal realist will claim that an empirical sentence p, deducible from T, is true of the world not caused or constituted by our minds because T has been built up on the grounds of perception data – describable only from within language and accepted, at first, only conditionally – that sincere and competent speakers have actually had. The “Peircean” internal realist will emphasise that these perceptions are at best explained by means of the theory T that entails p and that states that the world not caused or constituted by our minds is such that observers committed to describe it must have just those perceptions that they have in fact had.  Notice that, from the “Peircean” internal realist perspective, the classic coherentist explanation of p’s truth that asserts that:  (1) p is true because p is deducible from the maximally coherent theory T,  entails:  (2) p is true of the world not caused or constituted by our minds.   This is a consequence of the world-involving notion of coherence at stake here, according to which, there are perceptual constraints for the assertion of basic sentences – though the constraints can only be described from within T and they are accepted, at                                                 1See above, pp. 181-182. 
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the start, as defeasible. In conclusion, because of his notion of maximal coherence, if the “Peircean” internal realist were asked to provide a world-involving explanation of p’s truth, he could simply assert (1).  It is worth noticing that, if the world-involving concept of coherence were replaced by one that does not admit of perceptual constraints for basic sentences, (1) would no longer entail (2). For, in that case, the maximally coherent theory could be entirely invented – in the literal sense – without any worry about the compatibility of the theory with defeasible data de facto arrived at. Obviously, on this view too, the maximally coherent theory could entail the description of certain perception data supporting, for instance, an empirical sentence p. But, now, the description would simply be invented as everything else.  So far, so good. But the problem is that Putnam cannot accept a notion of truth characterised in terms of a “Peircean” maximally coherent theory. Let us focus, therefore, on truth defined in accordance with (SCT*), that is, in terms of the epistemically ideal theory that ideal inquirers would make up if they existed. Now, the crucial question is how the world intervenes in the determination of sentences’ truth-value when truth is defined in this way. The hope is that an explanation analogous to that sketched above based on the world-involving notion of coherence could again be provided. Unfortunately for Putnam, I will now show that this hope is doomed to failure.  What needs to be elucidated is why an empirical statement p, if true, is true of the world not caused or constituted by our minds. (SCT*) states that:  For every sentence p, p is true     if and only if if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert that it is the case that p in the actual world.  On the grounds of (SCT*), the internal realist could think of giving such an elucidation by simply claiming that:  p is true because, if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert p to describe the actual world.  This in other words means that: 
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 p is true because that p correctly describes our actual world would be deducible from the maximally coherent theory T.  The internal realist providing this explanation would of course specify that the employed notion of coherence is a world-involving one and he would urge that – analogously to the case sketched above – world-involving coherence allows reality not caused or constituted by our minds to play an effective role in determining p’s truth. Now, the desired explanation could run as follows: the sentence p is true of the world not caused or constituted by our minds because this would be entailed by the maximally coherent theory T built up on the grounds of perception data that ideal inquirers would actually have if they existed. These perceptions would in fact be at the best explained by means of the theory T stating that the world not caused or constituted by the ideal inquirers’ minds is such that they must have just the perceptions that they have in fact had. And T entails that, if the world not caused or constituted by the ideal inquirers’ minds were different for the fact such beings did not exist (namely, if it were our actual world), the world would include the fact not caused or constituted by our minds that p.  There is however a serious difficulty in this explanation (and in all similar explanations). To say that it would be deducible from a maximally world-involving coherent theory T that p correctly describes our actual world means to say that:  If there were ideal inquirers, they would have certain defeasible, intra-linguistic perception data and they would explain them by working up a maximally coherent theory T entailing that p correctly describes our actual world.  But this requires the internal realist to elucidate what it is that makes the following counterfactual true:  (CF) If there were ideal inquirers, they would have defeasible, intra-linguistic perception data supporting the claim that p correctly describes our actual world.  If the internal realist contended that (CF) is true simply because (CF) would in turn be deducible from T – without adding any further clarification – his concept of world-involving coherence would collapse into a concept of world-independent coherence. 
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For, in this case, that the ideal inquirers would have defeasible, intra-linguistic perception data supporting the claim that p correctly describes our actual world could well be said to be invented by the ideal inquirers themselves. The internal realist must therefore add something more substantial to the explanation of (CF)’s truth.1  The internal realist must add that (CF) is true also because the ideal inquirers would actually have certain defeasible, intra-linguistic perception data caused by the world not created or constituted by their minds. The internal realist must maintain that those perceptions would be caused by the world, as, if he denied it, he could no longer state that the ideal inquirers would explain them by appealing to the features of the independent world. Yet, the problem of this world-involving explanation of (CF)’s truth is that it is not clear at all why the world should cause just the perception data supporting the claim that just p – and not p’s negation or neither – correctly describes our actual world. The internal realist obviously cannot claim that the ideal inquirers would have just those perceptions because of the features of reality as T would describe them. For, again, this would turn the internal realist concept of world-involving coherence into a world-independent one.  The only explanation left is, apparently, that the ideal inquirers would have those perceptions because of language-independent features of the world. In other words, such an account would assume that reality is structured into objects independently of our descriptions of them and that such objects would cause just certain perceptions and not others. Yet, this claim is unacceptable for the internal realist, as it immediately clashes with the internalist tenet:  (I1) Only within a theory or description, does it make sense to say what objects and classes of objects the world consists of,  which is entailed by Putnam’s central thesis:2  (I3) Truth is not a correspondence relationship between words and the world’s extra-linguistic things but some sort of idealised rational acceptability.  
                                                1Notice that all these complications depending on counterfactuals do not arise when T is thought of as the “Peircean” ideal theory that human beings in the flesh have already attained. For, in that case, that human beings have perceptions supporting p would literally be an attained given – though intra-linguistic and originally defeasible.  2See above, p. 47. 
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Thus, Putnam appears to have no possible way to show that his anti-metaphysical position complies with the realist insight that empirical sentences in general are made true or false by the world not caused or constituted by our minds.  It is worth emphasising that this conclusion does not depend on the fact that the internal realist accepts just (SCT*) as a definition of truth. For the same result would have been obtained on the grounds of any other definition of truth similar to (SCT*) – for instance (SCT) – that appeals to perceptions of counterfactual beings to determine the truth-values of sentences that are actually used by us. Since “the Peircean theory of truth” is untenable, as I have argued in Chapter 3, it is hardly disputable that the internal realist is committed to a definition of truth of just this kind.  To conclude, in this section, I have emphasised that, to fulfil the alethic condition for realism (R2), the internal realist must claim that empirical sentences are true or false of the causally mind-independent world. This commits the internal realist to show that his notion of truth (SCT*) actually allows the world to play a role in fixing sentences’ truth-values. The internal realist aims at providing such an explanation by appealing to the world-involving notion of coherence that is presupposed by (SCT*). I have however argued that such an explanation is doomed to face insurmountable difficulties when truth is defined by appealing to statements that counterfactual knowers would make on the grounds of their perceptions; and this is just the case of (SCT*). Since Putnam’s position is unable to fulfil the essential requirement for realism (R2), internal realism is not a form of realism.    4.7 Conclusion of the chapter   In this long chapter, I have examined and raised a number of different objections to internal realism. I have initially examined typical and general objections to the possibility of identifying truth with epistemic notions. If these arguments worked, they would show that the internal realist is committed to conceptual incoherence and vicious circularity. None of objections in this class has yet proved conclusive or fully convincing, thus, they appear to constitute no serious threat for Putnam’s position. I have suggested that the general reason for this failure is that objections of this kind ultimately rely upon subjective “intuitions” about truth, justification and related concepts. These objections will therefore prove unconvincing to philosophers who have 
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(or claim to have) “intuitions” compatible with epistemic conceptions of truth, and the internal realist can well insist that he has intuitions of just this kind.  I have then focused upon two criticisms that apply more directly to the specific conception of truth of the internal realist. To begin with, I have examined Wright’s argument to the effect that the internal realist definition of truth (SCT) – according to which, a sentence is true if and only if the ideal inquirers would assert it – entails an absurd consequence. That is, it turns an intuitively contingent truth into a necessary falsity. Against Wright, I have shown that the absurd consequence is avoided when (SCT) is made more precise by replacing it with the definition (SCT*), to the effect that a sentence p is true if and only if the ideal inquirers would assert that p is the case in the actual world. I have argued that the ideal inquirers could refer p to our actual world without evident difficulties by means of counterfactuals saying that, if there were no ideal inquirer, it would be the case that p. In conclusion, the internal realist appears able to answer Wright’s objection too.  The second objection I have examined that applies to the internal realist conception of truth is based upon Fitch-Williamson’s proof. This proof aims to show that weak verificationism – namely, the thesis that every truth is knowable though it may rest forever unknown – ends up entailing that there cannot be unknown truths. Fitch-Williamson’s proof can be used against internal realism to show that it fails to fulfil the essential realist requirement that empirical sentences have a definite truth-value, which follows from (R2). In brief, if truth is idealised rational acceptability, it is reasonable to believe that human beings will never know the truth-value of most empirical sentences (though the ideal inquirers would do). Thus, to fulfil the above realist requirement, the internal realist must claim that most empirical sentences have a definite but forever unknown truth-value. Fitch-Williamson’s proof shows however that the internal realist definition of truth (SCT*) and the above claim are incompatible. For (SCT*) entails weak verificationism that in turn entails the negation of the claim at stake. I have replied that Fitch-Williamson’s proof in fact hinges upon an inexact formalisation of the weak verificationist thesis that does not distinguish between the actual world in which a sentence is true and the possible world in which the sentence is known to be true. I have also shown that there is a more accurate formalisation of the weak verificationist thesis, which the internal realist can accept without difficulty, that turns Fitch-Williamson’s proof into an incorrect one. In conclusion, the objection based on Fitch-Williamson’s proof constitutes no real threat for internal realism. 
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 After that, I have raised two objections against Putnam’s position that I believe are conclusive. Both objections specifically target the claim that internal realism is a form of realism.  My first and weaker objection starts by urging that alternative, incompatible “maximally coherent” theories are possible because the reflective equilibrium method – by which coherence standards for theories are justified – may yield divergent results and, furthermore, because the “maximally coherent” theory attained by the ideal inquirers may be underdetermined by evidence. If incompatible “maximally coherent” theories existed, to avoid clashing with the Law of Non-Contradiction, Putnam could not just decide to not consider true the incompatible sentences of these theories, as this would be at odds with the holistic conception of truth endorsed by the internal realist. Putnam should rather embrace a form of alethic relativism, according to which, truth is relative to groups of ideal inquirers or “maximally coherent” theories. Putnam is allowed to do it, as most of his arguments against the acceptability of alethic relativism are faulty, and the working ones do not show that the specific forms of relativism which the internal realist may be committed to are untenable. The trouble is that alethic relativism is not realism, for it is unintelligible how two incompatible empirical sentences that are true relative to two different subjects or cultures can be both true of the world not caused or constituted by our minds. Hence, relativism cannot fulfil an essential realist desideratum that follows from the alethic condition for realism (R2). In conclusion, since internal realism may turn out to be a form of relativism, which is not realism, there are no sufficient grounds to assert that internal realism is a form of realism.   Finally, my second and stronger objection against internal realism runs as follows: the internal realist relies on the subjunctive-conditional definition of truth (SCT*). Since Putnam claims that his position is a form of realism, he must explain how this definition of truth allows reality not caused or constituted by our minds to fix sentences’ truth-values. Otherwise, the realist desideratum that statements are true or false of such a reality proves unfulfilled. The internal realist will try to provide such an explanation by claiming that (SCT*) hinges on a world-involving notion of coherence. In brief, according to (SCT*), a sentence p is true of our actual world because the ideal inquirers would actually have certain intra-linguistic perceptions and they would explain them by a maximally coherent theory hypothesising the existence of the causally mind-independent facts described by the sentence p. This will however require the internal realist to elucidate why the ideal inquirers would have just those intra-linguistic 
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perceptions and not others. The only satisfactory explanation compatible with a world-involving notion of coherence is that the ideal inquirers would have those specific perceptions because of the features of the world in itself. Yet, this explanation assumes that reality self-structured into objects and facts, and this metaphysical claim is incompatible with the central theses of internal realism. Since the internal realist cannot explain how the world not caused or constituted by our minds makes sentences true or false, Putnam’s position does not fulfil an essential condition for realism. Consequently, there are sufficient grounds to assert that internal realism is not a form of realism.  
 213 5 Conclusion: realism is incompatible with truth as an epistemic notion      Before drawing the general conclusions of my investigation, I wish to briefly recapitulate the main points I have made in the above chapters, I will repeat claims already discussed that will hopefully turn out to be clearer now.  In my work, I have mainly aimed to provide an appraisal of Putnam’s claim that internal realism is a form of realism. Internal realism stems in fact from the attempt to re-propose a general form of realism in philosophy once the externalist perspective and metaphysical realism has proved, according to Putnam, conceptually incoherent. The externalist perspective can be defined by the following theses:1   (E1) The world consists of some totality of objects and classes of objects that do not depend on our language.  (E2) There can at most be one true and complete bare description of the world.  (E3) Truth is a radically non-epistemic notion that involves a univocal, causal or sui generis correspondence relationship between the words and the world’s extra-linguistic objects.  Metaphysical realism consists of the conjunction of the above three externalist theses and the ontological realist thesis:  (OR) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds.   Putnam has argued that (E1), (E2) and (E3) are conceptually incoherent. He has however urged replacing them by parallel but incompatible internalist theses, which state that:2                                                 1See above, Sect. 1.2. 2See above, Sect. 2.2. 
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(I1) Only within a theory or description, does it make sense to say what objects and classes of objects the world consists of.  (I2) There is more than one true description of the world and there is no bare description of the world.  (I3)  Truth is not a correspondence relationship between words and the world’s extra-linguistic things but some sort of idealised rational acceptability.  Where (I3) is the central thesis, as it entails both (I1) and (I2).1  Putnam calls “internal realism” the position obtained from metaphysical realism by simply replacing (E1), (E2), (E3) with (I1), (I2), (I3), and keeping (OR) unchanged. He thinks that this position is still a form of realism.2   As we have seen, Putnam’s position originates from the attempt to develop Dummett’s anti-realist notion of truth in a realist direction. Both philosophers identify truth with an epistemic notion and not with a correspondence relationship between language and extra-linguistic world,3 but, while Dummett identifies truth with current justification, Putnam thinks of it as idealised rational acceptability.4 Putnam believes in fact that his notion of truth, despite being an epistemic one, retains the essential realist characteristics of the externalist notion of truth without sharing its faults. In this sense, internal realism could be seen as an attempted synthesis of metaphysical realism and Dummett’s anti-realism.  A crucial point in my analysis of Putnam’s doctrine has been the clarification of the internal realist conception of idealised rational acceptability: in brief, the internal realist thinks of ideally rationally acceptable sentences as those derivable from the most coherent theory that one could in principle attain.5 The internal realist cannot however conceive such a theory as the omnicomprehensive “Peircean theory” that we will attain “at the end of inquiry”. For, mainly, it is unclear what it means to say that “the end of inquiry” has been reached.6 I have argued that Putnam must conceive the maximally coherent theory as the one that the ideal inquirers would construct in an infinite time if 
                                                1See above, p. 47. 2See above, pp. 48-49. 3See above, Sect. 2.3. 4See above, Sects. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.  5See above, Sect. 2.4. 6See above, Sect. 3.5. 
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they existed.1 This ultimately commits the internal realist to a definition of truth that proves irremediably faulty; that is, the following:  (SCT*) For every sentence p, p is true          if and only if if there were ideal inquirers, they would assert that it is the case that p in the actual world (i.e. they would develop, on the grounds of their experiences and intelligence, a maximally coherent theory entailing that it is the case that p in the actual world).2   What are, at last, the difficulties that such a definition of truth involves? An important result of my thesis is that (SCT*) does not appear to be immediately incoherent or problematic. To begin with, I have suggested that general objections stating that, since (SCT*) identifies truth with an epistemic notion, (SCT*) commits the internal realist to conceptual incoherence or vicious circularity will not prove universally convincing. For such objections will persuade, probably, only philosophers who are already convinced that truth is not an epistemic notion.3 I have in addition shown that (SCT*) is sophisticated enough to elude conditional fallacies like those recently emphasised by Wright.4  There is however a crucial respect in which (SCT*) has proved flawed. In brief, the serious problem with this definition of truth – which the internal realist is committed to – is that it is incompatible with Putnam’s contention that internal realism is a form of realism – that this, with the very raison d’être of internal realism.  Let us consider for the last time the way in which this decisive result has been attained. The intuitive necessary and sufficient conditions that every general realist position must satisfy are the following:  (R1) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds. (R2) The world not caused or constituted by our minds makes empirical statements in general determinately either true or false, and truth is 
                                                1See above, Sect. 3.6. 2See above, Sect. 4.3. 3See above, Sect. 4.2. 4See above, Sect. 4.3. 
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independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.1   Superficially, internal realism would seem to fully satisfy both these requirements. First, its ontological realist thesis (OR), just affirms that the world is not caused or constituted by our minds. Thus, internal realism certainly fulfils the condition (R1).2 Moreover, the internalist tenet (I3) identifies truth with idealised rational acceptability; and this entails that truth transcends current justification and is independent of subjects and cultures in general,3 and that most empirical sentences are determinately either true or false.4 Besides, the internal realist world-involving concept of theory coherence would seem to entails that, from the internal realist perspective, one has epistemic access to the world not caused or constituted by our minds, so that empirical sentences can be thought of as true or false of that world.5 These features of internal realist truth appear to make Putnam’s position fulfil also the condition for realism (R2).   The above result shows the superficiality of the judgments made by some philosophers that internal realism is obviously not a form of realism.6 Yet, in spite of this apparent success, as soon as the analysis of Putnam’s position is taken deeper, internal realism proves indeed unable to be a form of realism. The difficulties do not depend upon Fitch-Williamson’s proof. As we have seen, if Fitch-Williamson’s proof were correct, (SCT*) would fail to fulfil the realist requirement that empirical sentences have a definite truth-value. Yet, Fitch-Williamson’s proof proves incorrect when the formal language used in it is made more accurate.7 The actual difficulties hinge upon the two central objections to internal realism that I have made. They specifically target the claim that (SCT*) fulfils the requirement, which follows from (R2), that empirical statements are true or false of the world not caused or constituted by our minds.  My weaker objection8 holds that internal realist truth, defined in accordance with (SCT*), may collapse into a form of relativism. If this were the case, Putnam could not explain how empirical statements are true or false of the world not caused or constituted by our minds, as no relativist could ever do it. Since internal realism may not fulfil the 
                                                1See above, Sect. 1.3. 2See above, pp. 43-44 and 48. 3See above, p. 61. 4See above, Sect. 2.6. 5See above, pp. 49-50 and Sect. 2.4, pp. 68-71. 6See, for instance, Devitt (1984), pp. 191-192. 7See above, Sect. 4.4. 8See above, Sects. 4.5-4.5.5.  
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necessary condition (R2) for realism, Putnam’s claim that internal realism is a form of realism appears groundless.  My stronger objection to internal realism1 goes further, as it arrives at showing that Putnam’s claim is just false. The objection holds that, independently of the above difficulty, the definition of truth (SCT*) makes it impossible to explain how empirical statements are true or false of the world not caused or constituted by our minds. Thus, the necessary condition (R2) for realism cannot just be met by Putnam’s position. In brief, according to (SCT*), if an empirical sentence p is true, it is so not because the ideal inquirers would just invent it but because they would actually have the appropriate perceptions that support p. To claim that p is true of the world not caused or constituted by our minds commits the internal realist to maintaining that those perceptions would actually brought about by that world. And the only way at the internal realist’s disposal to maintain it would be admitting that the world has language-independent features that cause just those perceptions. But this is incompatible with the internalist tenet (I1) that the world is not structured independently of language, which follows by the main internalist tenet (I3), according to which, truth is an epistemic notion.  In conclusion, since internal realism is unable to fulfil all intuitive requirements for realism, Putnam’s position is not a form of realism. In the light of this outcome, it is fair to say that internal realism has failed in its central purpose.  Though this conclusion is certainly interesting in itself, the main reason for its relevance is that – I think – it has decisive consequences for the debate on realism and anti-realism in contemporary philosophy. As we have seen, Putnam’s belief is that, though the collapse of the externalist perspective entails the rejection of metaphysical realism, it does not entail the impossibility of realism tout court, as it is possible to attain a sound realist position by developing Dummett’s anti-realist paradigm in a realist direction. This means, in substance, just rejecting Dummett’s identification of truth with current justification and identifying truth with ideal rational acceptability. The result of this change is, roughly, internal realism.  Putnam’s claim might appear plausible in the first instance: Dummett’s anti-realist position includes (or, in any case, does not reject) the thesis (OR) that satisfies the intuitive ontological realist condition (R1).2 We have also seen that the fulfilment of the other realist condition (R2) crucially depends on the central internalist thesis (I3), which just states that truth is idealised rational acceptability. Putnam’s metaphor “the mind                                                 1See above, Sect. 4.6. 2See above, p. 8. 
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and the world jointly make up the mind and the world” expresses the idea that, by admitting, on the one hand, a world not caused or constituted by our minds, and by identifying, on the other, truth with idealised rational acceptability, we can attain a fully realist position.1 For, under these conditions, one is allowed to claim that, on the one hand, (R1) the world is not caused or constituted by our minds and, on the other, that (R2) that world makes empirical statements determinately either true or false, and truth is independent of what we can currently justify and of the beliefs of subjects and cultures in general.  I have however shown that, in spite of appearances, Putnam’s idea does not work. The trouble with the internal realist programme is, in a nutshell, that the very identification of truth with an epistemic notion is incompatible with realism, even when realism is thought of in terms as basic as those specified by (R1) and (R2). The main difficulty is that, if truth is identified with idealised rational acceptability, there is no way to explain how our statements are made true or false by the world not caused or constituted by our minds.  I will now show that this outcome undermines not only Putnam’s position but also any other philosophical position with realist tendencies that aims to reduce truth to an epistemic notion in Dummett’s and Putnam’s sense.2 For my major objection – or a strictly analogous one – successfully applies to any such position too.  To begin with, notice that the only candidate for an epistemic conception of truth prima facie able to fulfil the minimal realist desiderata is certainly some kind of idealised justification or idealised rational acceptability. Current justification immediately fails to fit the consequence of the condition for realism (R2), according to which, truth is independent of current justification. Moreover, the failure of “the Peircean theory of truth” to fulfil the realist requirement entailed by (R2), according to which most empirical sentences are determinately either true or false,3 shows that sentences’ conditions of idealised justification must be conceived in terms of counterfactual statements (i.e. as statements that refer to certain counterfactual situations or counterfactual speakers). Finally, the necessity of having an epistemic access to the world – to allow it to make empirical statements true or false, as required by (R2) – involves that sentences’ conditions of justification have ultimately to depend upon the perceptions of the speakers. 
                                                1See above, pp. 43-45. 2See above, p. 36. 3See above, Sect. 3.3. 
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 These three desiderata must be satisfied by any philosophical position that identifies truth with an epistemic notion and, at the same time, aims to be a realist position. In other words, any such position has to state that: truth is some kind of idealised justification or idealised rational acceptability, that sentences’ conditions of idealised justification rational acceptability come in terms of counterfactual statements and, finally, that such conditions ultimately appeal to the perceptions of the speakers. It is easy to see that the fulfilment of these three desiderata suffices to make my major objection (or a strictly analogous one) applicable and conclusive.  Someone might perhaps reply that my major objection also assumes that idealised rational acceptability is coherence among statements. I indeed think that this is a necessary assumption. For it can hardly be denied that justification is, in general, a holistic matter, and this makes it natural to think of idealised justification or idealised rational acceptability in coherentist terms. Moreover, it is easy to see that an objection analogous to mine could be directed against any (implausible) view identifying truth with a non-coherentist notion of idealised justification (that is, specifying ideal conditions of justification for single sentences that are independent of one another). For, on such a view, the ideal justification conditions of sentences must, in most cases, be specified in terms of counterfactual statements relative to the perceptions of the speakers.  At this point, it is clear that no realist position can be attained if truth is conceived as some kind of justification or rational acceptability – that is, as an epistemic notion in Putnam and Dummett’s sense of “epistemic”. For there is no way to show that sentences are true or false of a reality not caused or constituted by our minds when truth is conceived so. If one wants to use Putnam’s metaphorical language, the metaphor could be this: there is no way to join the mind and the world if truth is an epistemic notion.   The failure of Putnam’s internal realist project teaches that Dummett’s anti-realist paradigm is anti-realist in a very strong sense of the term. Not only is it so because it is incompatible with metaphysical realism, but also because it is incompatible with and it is not extendable to non-metaphysical realism. If one wants to comply with the insight of the realists, one must get rid of the Dummettian perspective towards truth, for realism proves structurally incompatible with any epistemic conception of truth in a Dummettian sense.  In the light of the present achievement, what realists could do is to go back to Putnam’s controversial arguments against externalism (which I briefly examine in the 
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Appendix) and to try to show that they are not actually conclusive, in order to restore the externalist framework.  To conclude, this work was meant to look at the success or failure of Putnam’s very sophisticated attempt to ground realism in an epistemic notion of truth by developing in an interesting way Dummett’s idea that truth is nothing but justification. I have shown that Putnam’s identification of truth with idealised rational acceptability can indeed capture many of the intuitive realist properties of truth and that internal realism – due to this identification – actually retains many of the characteristics proper to any sound realist position. I have however argued that Putnam’s internal realism is in danger of collapsing into a form of alethic relativism, which is not realism. Most importantly, I have shown – I think, in a definite way – that internal realism eventually succumbs to the same fatal flaw of every form of anti-realism that is aimed at being a realist position. For any such view is structurally unable to show that truth is a world-dependent property, which is without any doubt a necessary desideratum for realism. 
 221 Appendix: Putnam’s arguments against metaphysical realism      In this appendix, I wish to present the best-known arguments against metaphysical realism that Putnam has developed in his internalist period and to sketch the outline of a possible line of defence against them. What I aim to do is to suggest that Putnam’s arguments are indeed questionable because promising replies appear on hand, so that it is far from being definite that the non-epistemic conceptions of truth and metaphysical realism have been defeated.  The arguments that I am going to discuss are the following:  (a) The Brains-in-a-Vat Argument.1 (b) The Model-Theoretic Argument.2 (c) The Conceptual Relativity Argument.3   They all aim specifically to question the three theses that define the externalist perspective; namely:  (E1) The world consists of some totality of objects and classes of objects that do not depend on our language.  (E2) There can at most be one true and complete bare description of the world.  (E3) Truth is a radically non-epistemic notion that involves a univocal, causal or sui generis correspondence relationship between the words and the world’s extra-linguistic objects.  
                                                1See mostly Putnam (1981), Ch. 1. 2See mostly Putnam (1983b). 3See mostly Putnam (1987). 
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Yet, Putnam’s arguments against metaphysical realism do not question its ontological realist thesis:  (OR) The world is not caused or constituted by our minds.  Consequently, Putnam’s arguments should more appropriately be called arguments against the externalist perspective.  In particular, the arguments (a) and (b) rest on alethic and referential issues: they are primarily meant to show that any non-epistemic conception of truth defined like in (E3) is conceptually incoherent. More recently, Putnam has focused upon the problems of conceptual relativity and he has elaborated a new argument – the third of the above list – aiming specifically to show that the externalist theses (E1) and (E2) are nothing but meaningless conjectures.  Familiarity with some of Putnam’s ideas about reference is necessary to understand the arguments (a) and (b); let us therefore consider the most relevant ones. To begin with, it is Putnam’s conviction that the reference of the terms of our language is fixed by means of causal chains and not by means of mental images or concepts (conceived as mental “presentations”). To support this claim, Putnam argues that any kind of image, even mental image, cannot intrinsically refer to specific objects. An apparently plausible thesis might be that images refer to certain objects in virtue of the fact that they are similar to those objects. Yet, as Putnam emphasises, the main difficulty of this thesis is that no image would actually have one specific referent or some specific referents. For:  [E]verything is similar to everything else in infinitely many respects. For example, my sensation of a typewriter at this instant and the quarter in my pocket are both similar in respect that some of their properties (the sensation’s occurring right now and the quarter’s being in my pocket right now) are effects of my past action; if I had not sat down to type, I would not be having the sensation; and the quarter would not be in my pocket if I had not put it there. Both the sensation and the quarter exist in the twentieth century. Both the sensation and the quarter have been described in English. And so on.1  
                                                1Putnam (1981), pp. 64-65. 
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 The thesis that images cannot intrinsically refer to specific objects can be generalised to words and signs. It is in fact a common place that a same word or sign (conceived as a physical thing or a thought-sign) can be used in different contexts and languages to refer to very different things and that no word or sign has any intrinsic reference.  Although mental images and words appear not to be able to intrinsically refer to anything in particular, some philosophers – for instance, Brentano1 – have argued that concepts, or images and signs accompanied by concepts, can do that. Putnam however urges that even if concepts conceived à la Brentano – i.e., as sort of mental “presentations”, or introspectible entities or events – really existed, they could not account for reference. For it is not clear at all how such a kind of entities could “stick” signs to external things in general and to specific external things. Such entities would provide our minds with – literally – magical powers.2 In Putnam’s view, all this is unacceptable.  What actually determines the referent of a sign is – according to Putnam – a causal chain.3 Putnam’s contention is that what links up a real object O, constituting the referent of a term T, with T itself is a causal relation existing between a speaker’s uses of T and that O. In particular, a speaker S may have been in direct causal “contact” (for instance, by perception) with O and on that occasion he may have learned to use T. Otherwise, S may have acquired the capability to refer to O by T as the effect of verbal interactions (which are supposed to be, at least in part, causal as well) with another speaker able to causally refer to O and who may have taught S the use of T by means of a description. In the same way, S can indefinitely extend the causal chain of reference to O by T by his verbal interactions with new speakers.4 Putnam has worked up this explanation to account for the reference of both singular and general terms. In the second case, the causal chain connects the use of a general term with some objects of the class of referents of that term.  It is worth noticing that, in this picture, any referential causal chain has to be appropriate. This means that not any causal connections between, for instance, an object and a name’s utterance can set up a referential relationship between that object and that name. Some relevant rules and standards have to be taken into consideration. For instance, the simple electric stimulation of someone’s brain could have the effect of 
                                                1See Putnam (1981), p. 17. 2See, for instance, ibid., p. 51. 3The clearest presentation of Putnam’s theory of reference is in Putnam (1975a). 4See Putnam (1983d), pp. 70-74.  
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pushing that person to pronounce a name. Yet, this causal chain could hardly be thought of as fixing up any referential relationship.1   (a) The Brains-in-a-Vat Argument  Putnam’s Brains-in-a-Vat Argument is directed against what Putnam has called “internal scepticism”, i.e. a kind of scepticism claming that “all or a large part of our claims about the empirical world cannot amount to knowledge”.2 Internal scepticism is well represented by the Cartesian hypothesis that I may be a disembodied mind deceived by a malicious demon, so that my perceptions and empirical sentences may not be veridical. A more modern version of the same hypothesis, not contemplating the existence of demons, is that all human beings (or all sentient beings)3 might be nothing but brains in a vat of nutrients and all their nervous inputs might come from a very powerful computer able to give them the collective illusion of the real world.4 Putnam emphasises that, in this nightmare, there is not necessarily any mad scientist that made up the vat and the computer, for one could think that “(though this is absurd) the universe just happens to consist of automatic machinery tending a vat full of brains and nervous systems”.5 Putnam’s Brains-in-a-Vat Argument aims to show that this fantastic hypothesis “cannot possibly be true, because it is, in a certain way, self-refuting”.6  A self-refuting statement is one whose truth implies its own falsity. For example, consider the statement p affirming that:  All general statements are false.  p is either true or false. Let us suppose that p is true. In this case, all general statements are false. But p is a general statement. So, if it is true, then it must be false. Hence, p is 
                                                1See for example Putnam (1981), p. 51. 2Putnam (1994), p. 284. 3Notice that the Cartesian sceptical hypothesis is solipsistic, i.e. it questions the existence of even the other thinking subjects, while Putnam’s hypothesis assumes the existence of other subjects (we all are brains in a vat). This could be because a solipsistic sceptic has to use a private language. As we have seen, Putnam explicitly accepts Wittgenstein’s argument against private language, so he cannot admit solipsism. 4See Putnam (1981), pp. 5-7. 5Ibid., p. 6. 6Ibid., p. 7. 
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false.1 In the case at stake, Putnam’s thesis is that, if the supposition that we are brains in a vat were true, our claim “We are brains in a vat” would be false. So, this claim is false and we cannot be brains in a vat.  Putnam’s Brains-in-a-Vat Argument is based upon the thesis that:  [A]lthough the people in that possible world [where everybody is a brain in a vat] can think and “say” any words we can think and say, they cannot […] refer to what we can refer to. In particular, they cannot think or say that they are brains in a vat (even by thinking “we are brain in a vat”).2  More specifically, Putnam’s claim is that, if we were brains in a vat, the non-logical terms of our sentences would not be able to refer to the external objects that appear to be the referents of our terms, for we would have no causal relation with them. The non-logical terms of our sentences would refer, in that case, to certain electronic impulses causing the illusory experience of the external objects or to the features of the computer program that are responsible for those electronic impulses. Thus, for instance:  [W]hen the brain in a vat […] thinks “There is a tree in front of me”, his thought does not refer to actual trees. [… It] might refer to the electronic impulses that cause tree experiences, or to the features of the program that are responsible for those electronic impulses.3   Accordingly, if we were brains in a vat, also the terms “brain” and “vat” of our sentence “We are brains in a vat” would refer to certain electronic impulses that cause the illusory experience of perceiving brains and vats and not to real brains and vats. In this case, we could say that “brain” and “vat” respectively refer to brains in the image and vats in the image. Furthermore, in case those impulses occurred in such a way to give us the coherent illusion (or the hallucination) that we are brains in a vat, we will say that we are brains in a vat in the image.  Putnam’s argument runs as follows:   
                                                1See Putnam (1981), pp. 7-8. 2Ibid., p. 8. 3Ibid., p. 14. 
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[If] we are really brains in a vat, then what we now mean by “we are brains in a vat” is that we are brains in a vat in the image or something of that kind (if we mean anything at all). But part of the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is that we aren’t brains in a vat in the image (i.e. what we are “hallucinating” isn’t that we are brains in a vat). So, if we are brains in a vat, then the sentence “We are brains in a vat” says something false (if it says anything). In short, if we are brains in a vat, then “We are brains in a vat” is false. So, it is (necessarily) false.1   We can schematise Putnam’s condensed reasoning by the following steps:  (1) We are brains in a vat. (2) If we are brains in a vat, then we are not brains in a vat in the image. (3) If we are brains in a vat, then “We are brains in a vat” means that we are brains in a vat in the image. (4) If we are brains in a vat, then we are brains in a vat in the image. (5) We are brains in a vat in the image. (6) We are not brains in a vat.2  (1) is the hypothesis that Putnam wants to show to be absurd. The validity of (2) depends upon the fact that the sceptic assumes, as his central hypothesis, that the computer gives us the perfect illusion of the everyday life and not the illusion of being brains in a vat. (If we had even occasionally the illusion that we are brains in a vat, the illusion of everyday life would not be perfect). The validity of (3) rests upon that which has been explained above; if we were brains in a vat, the terms of our sentences would refer to certain electronic impulses. In this case, the truth conditions of the sentence “We are brains in a vat” should be thought of in terms of the occurrences of the computer’s impulses constituting the fact that we are brains in a vat in the image. Accordingly, since the truth conditions of a sentence provide the sentence’s meaning, the meaning of “We are brains in a vat” would be that we are brains in a vat in the image. (4) follows from (3). (5) follows from (1) and (4). (6) follows from (5) and (2) by modus tollens.  What is supposed to be the anti-metaphysical import of Putnam’s argument? The sceptical hypothesis of brains in a vat aims to show that our epistemically best theory                                                 1Putnam (1981), p. 15. 2For a more sophisticated reconstruction, see Wright (1994). 
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about the world might be false independently of any evidence we may obtain for its truth. This hypothesis, therefore, sets up a logically possible scenario well harmonising with our modern image of reality where the truth of our sentences is shown to be totally disjointed from any evidence available for them – i.e. a scenario where, in accordance with the externalist thesis (E3), truth is a radically non-epistemic notion. Putnam’s argument is against the intelligibility of this scenario and, consequently, against this conception of truth.  The Brains-in-a-Vat Argument has been subject to a number of “technical” criticisms that cannot be considered in this appendix.1 The only point I want to emphasise here is that, if this argument actually works, its efficacy is in any case limited. For, though metaphysical realists can appeal to the brains in a vat possibility to support the thesis that our epistemically best theory might be false, they can also appeal to reasons that are independent of it. For instance, they could argue that there is no evident connection between our conception of the “inner beauty, […] elegance, ‘plausibility’, simplicity”2 of theories and the facts constituting the world that are supposed to be independent of our minds. So that it is not absurd that “the theory that is ‘ideal’ from the point of view of operational utility, inner beauty, and elegance, ‘plausibility’, simplicity, ‘conservatism’, etc., might be false”.3 This simple argument is in no way affected by the (alleged) collapse of the scenario according to which we are brains in a vat.   In conclusion, I agree with Alston in thinking that:  The possibility that we are brains in a vat is sufficient to undergird the possibility of an ideal theory’s being false, but it is not the only possible undergirding; and hence it is not necessary as a support for the [metaphysical] realist position. The [… metaphysical] realist can cheerfully toss brain-in-a-vat scepticism in the wastebasket and still take truth to be “radically non-epistemic”.4                                                        1See Wright (1994). 2Putnam (1979), p. 125. 3Ibid. 4Alston (1996), p. 161. 
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(b) The Model-Theoretic Argument  The Model-Theoretic Argument is grounded in results of modern logic and set theory.1 The argument assumes that a formal version of our (scientific and everyday) language can be given.2 This allows us to define the reference relation between the language and the world as an interpretation I, that is, a function that assigns extensions, i.e. individuals or subsets of individuals of a “universe” set, to the individual constants, the predicates and the function symbols of the language. If I is given, it is possible to single out the set of the true sentences of the language in the standard Tarskian way. I is called the “model” of the true sentences.  A second assumption of the argument is that there could be just one epistemically ideal theory; namely – roughly – a theory T containing all and only sentences that we would accept at the ideal limit of the rational inquiry. T is supposed to be perfectly confirmed by observations and to meet ideally well all theoretical constraints – such as logical consistency, completeness, coherence, explanatory power, simplicity, etc.3 It is Putnam’s contention that the metaphysical realist actually believes that one epistemically ideal theory is possible.4 Notice that this belief is not in contradiction with the thesis of the sophisticated metaphysical realist that there are many equivalent descriptions of everything. In fact, according to the sophisticated realist, equivalent descriptions differ from one another only from a formal point of view, consequently, following Quine, equivalent descriptions can be considered different formulations of the same theory.5  The concept of empirical confirmation used to define an epistemically ideal theory involves referring to an observational language; the definition of the latter involves, in turn, the possibility of distinguishing between non-observational and observational terms. Putnam’s arguments would however appear to work no matter how the line between the observational and the non-observational might be drawn.  
                                                1For an updated discussion of this argument, see, for instance, Alston (1996), Ch. 5 and van Fraassen (1997). 2See Putnam (1994c), p. 352. 3See Putnam (1981), pp. 29-32. 4See Putnam (1994c), pp. 352-353. 5See Quine (1975). See also Putnam (1983h), p. 211. Even if Putnam does not specify this, it is clear that, from the sophisticated metaphysical realist perspective, the content of a theory is fixed by its bare formulation. 
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 The Model-Theoretic Argument presupposes a well-known result of modern mathematical logic: the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, which affirms that:  If a first-order formal theory T (expressed in a denumerable language) has a model, then T has a denumerable model (i.e. a model whose universe’s individuals are denumerable).1  In reality, Putnam mainly appeals to another theorem “whose proof is […] intimately related to one of Skolem’s proofs of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem”,2 that is, the Gödel completeness theorem. The latter affirms that:   If a first-order formal theory T is consistent, T has a model of every infinite cardinality.3   The Model-Theoretic Argument mainly aims to hit the thesis that our epistemically best theory of the world might be false – that is, the central claim of any radically non-epistemic conception of truth.4 In particular, as Alston has explained:   [Putnam’s] argument is designed to show that where a theory is epistemically ideal it is not the case that it might be false, that is, that it is impossible that it should not be true.5   A further purpose of the Model-Theoretic Argument is that of striking the metaphysical realist’s thesis, according to which truth is a univocal correspondence relationship between the language and the extra-linguistic world, by showing that no univocal correspondence of this sort is indeed conceivable.6 Notice that both the claim that truth is radically non-epistemic and the claim that truth is a univocal correspondence relationship are entailed by the externalist thesis (E3). Thus, the argument is, in general, against this thesis.  Putnam’s argument runs as follows: an epistemically ideal theory T is logically consistent, therefore, for the Gödel completeness theorem, T has a model of every                                                 1See Putnam (1983b), p. 2. 2Ibid., p. 13. 3See Putnam (1979), pp. 125-126. 4See above pp. 27-28. 5Alston (1996), pp. 134-135. 6See, for instance, Putnam (1994c), p. 353. 
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infinite cardinality.1 If we assume that the world is constituted of infinite objects – this is not at all implausible – we could think of picking out a model M of the same cardinality as the world and mapping the individuals of the model one-to-one onto the things in the world. In doing that, we have to pay attention to keep the referential relationships existing between the observational predicates of language and the observable individuals of the world.2 This means that we will make an effort to map the individuals of M associated to observational terms into the appropriate observational objects. In this way, all ordinary observational sentences will express the appropriate observational facts (e.g. “cats mew” will express the fact that cats mew). Since T is supposed to entail all true observational sentences, this is to be done with all these sentences. On the other hand, we will be much more free regarding theoretical terms: we will be allowed to map whatever individual of M onto whatever theoretical object, provided that all theoretical sentences turn out to be true eventually. In this way, it is possible to define an interpretation I of T’s language that turns T into a theory true of the world. Actually, since we are free to map the individuals of M into theoretical objects in alternative ways, this procedure allows us to define a whole class of interpretations I1, I2, I3, ... of T’s language that turns T into a theory true of the world.  As Putnam notices, any of the interpretations In defined as above would satisfy the best operational constraints of reference that we might ever conceive.3 Operational constraints of reference were originally conceived by Neopositivists as conventional stipulations connecting the truth of certain sentences to the observation of certain empirical test results. For instance:  The statement “Electricity is flowing through this wire” is true if and only if the needle of a voltmeter applied to the wire is deflecting.4   On Putnam’s view, the conventionalist conception cannot be accepted because, firstly, today it is generally recognised that inferential links between theory and experience are probabilistic: this is mainly due to the existence of disturbing factors that influence observations and measurements. Often, such factors cannot be made explicit because they are too many or are describable with difficulty or are unknown. Because                                                 1See Putnam (1983b), p. 13. 2See ibid., pp. 11-13. 3See Putnam (1981), p. 29. 4See ibid. 
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of these implicit disturbing factors, referential links cannot be formulated as perfect logical correlations. A second reason why the conventionalist conception of constraints of reference cannot be accepted is simply that statements expressing referential links are subject to revisions in the long run as well as any other scientific statement; so they are not definitely conventional stipulations.  To overcome these difficulties, the operational constraints of reference of our theories should be formulated in terms of sentences expressing probabilistic correlations. For example:  Mostly, the statement “Electricity is flowing through this wire” is true when the needle of a voltmeter applied to the wire is deflecting.1  Moreover, sentences of this sort should be considered as revisable as the related theories develop.2 These considerations show that, if our ordinary theories were expressed in formal language, there would be difficulties in accounting for the reference relationships of their terms. For, in the first place, no function interpretation in formal logic is conceived as a probabilistic one.  Notice however that an epistemically ideal theory would plausibly provide us with totally explicit (i.e. mentioning all disturbing factors) and definitive (i.e. non-revisable) operational constraints of reference. These constraints would be, in a sense, the best ones we could ever hope to attain. If the ideal theory were formalised, its terms’ extensions could be fixed by an interpretation In, defined as above, of the theory’s formal language. This is the reason why Putnam claims that any In would fit our best operational constraints of reference.  Putnam also emphasises that any of the interpretations In would fit our best theoretical constraints of reference.3 Let us see what this means. Reference is usually conceived as depending, in part, on the formal properties of the theories;4 for example, an admissible interpretation of theoretical terms is such that it turns out to be true that the theoretical entities that have been “hooked up” are simple, coherent, really indispensable in explanations, and so on. Putnam points out that reference constraints of this sort are, at the same time, constraints for theory acceptance, as the properties of the                                                 1See Putnam (1981), p. 30. 2See ibid. 3See ibid., p. 29. 4See ibid., p. 31. 
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referents of a theory’s terms are described by the theory itself. It is plausible to believe that an epistemically ideal theory must fit the best theoretical constraint of acceptance we might ever imagine and so also the best theoretical constraints of reference we might ever imagine. This is the reason why Putnam believes that any In – which interprets the language of the epistemically ideal theory – would satisfy our best theoretical constraints of reference.   The proof that there is an interpretation In that makes the epistemically ideal theory T true of the world is meant to defeat the metaphysical realist’s thesis that T might be false of the world. Putnam recognises that the metaphysical realist will probably reply, at this point, that his own claim is that T might be false according to its intended interpretation and that, since any In, constructed as above, is nothing but an arbitrary interpretation of T’s language, his specific claim still stands undefeated.1 Yet, according to Putnam, this reply is mistaken. The reason is that:  [S]uch a model [In] satisfies all operational constraints […]. And it satisfies those theoretical constraints we would impose in the ideal limit of inquiry. So, […] it looks as if any such model [In] is “intended” – for what else could single out a model as “intended” than this?2  Putnam also emphasises that:  If the intended model is singled out by theoretical and operational constraints, then […] “the” intended model is plural not singular (so the “the” is inappropriate; our theoretical and operational constraints fit many models, not just one […]).3  Putnam’s conclusion is that:  [I]f this is what it is to be an “intended model”, T must be true: true in all intended models [In]! The metaphysical realist’s claim that even the ideal theory T might be false “in reality” seems to collapse into unintelligibility.4                                                 1Putnam (1979), p. 126. 2Putnam (1983b), p. 13. 3Ibid., p. 10. 4Ibid., p. 13. 
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A further conclusion by Putnam is that there is no univocal correspondence relationship between the language and the extra-linguistic world that makes true our statements. For T (which is meant to include all true statements) is made true by an indefinite number of intended models that identify an indefinite number of correspondence relationships between T’s language and the extra-linguistic world.1 If the Model-Theoretic Argument works, the metaphysical realist’s conception of truth proves conceptually incoherent in different ways and it must be rejected.  Putnam has tried to answer in advance a possible objection against the Model-Theoretic Argument. The metaphysical realist could object that causal chains connecting the terms of T with external objects do fix T’s intended interpretation and that this is not the case with any of the models In, defined as above, so that none of them is an intended interpretation. Putnam has replied to this objection as follows: an epistemically ideal theory is supposed to explain everything existing in the world; thus, it must also account for reference relationships.2 If the latter are explained by means of the causal theory of reference, this explanation has to be part of T. But, in this case,  The problem [for the metaphysical realist] is that adding to our hypothetical formalized language of science a body of theory entitled “Causal theory of reference” is just adding more theory. But [… the Model Theoretic Argument is] not affected by enlarging the theory.3  The enlarged theory should now be conceived as including sentences of both T’ language and its metalanguage.4 For instance, if “a” is a proper name in T’s language, T will now include a metalinguistic sentence like (very roughly):  “a” refers to a if and only if a causes the utterance of “a”.  In this case,  If  “refers” can be defined in terms of some causal predicate or predicates in the metalanguage of our theory, then, since each model of the object language extends in an obvious way to a corresponding model of the metalanguage, it will turn out                                                 1See, for instance, Putnam (1994c), p. 354. 2This consideration is indeed implicit in Putnam’s reply. 3Putnam (1983b), p. 18. 4See ibid. 
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that in each model [… of T], “reference” is definable in terms of “causes”; but, unless the word “causes” (or whatever causal predicate or predicates may be) is already glued to one definite relation with metaphysical glue, this does not fix a determinate extension for “refers” at all.1  Putnam has made the same point by affirming that:  [A] “causal” theory of reference is not (would not be) of any help here: for how “causes” can uniquely refer is as much of a puzzle as how “cat” can, on the metaphysical realist picture.2  In brief, Putnam contends that, since the term “causes” is not “intrinsically” “glued to one definite relation”, as well as any other terms, we have at our disposal an indefinite number of possible interpretations of it. In these conditions, the intended interpretations of “causes” should again be conceived in terms of the functions In defined as above. For they satisfy our best constraints of reference. Yet – as we know – these interpretations make T true of the world. Thus, even if the metaphysical realist appealed to the causal theory of reference, it would still prove unintelligible to say that T might be false of the world.  In my opinion, Putnam’s above claims are straightforwardly criticisable. The fact is that the metaphysical realist who appeals to the causal theory of reference need not resort to the functions In to single out the intended interpretation of the term “causes”. For, he can coherently contend that even the word “causes” is already referentially connected to its referents by means of real causal chains, as well as any other terms. More generally, the metaphysical realist will claim that causal chains are able fix the interpretation of both the language and the metalanguage of T – thus, even the interpretation of the term “causes”. So a characterised (intended) interpretation appears to be prima facie compatible with the possibility that T might prove false of the world.3  Recently, Putnam has raised a more insidious objection to the appeal to the causal theory of reference. Putnam has first emphasised that the causal reference theorists do not hold that reference can be fixed by means of mere causal chains, but they hold,                                                 1Putnam (1983b), p. 18. For the sake of clarity, I have slightly modified Putnam’s words. 2Putnam (1979), p. 126. 3Notice that, though the metaphysical realist who appeals to the causal theory of reference must admit that T’s sub-theory called “causal theory of reference” is true, he appears to not be committed to holding that T’s all consequences are true.  
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rather, that reference is fixed by means of causal chains of the appropriate type. (Focusing on causal chains of the appropriate type allows us to discard “incidental” causal connections that might mistakenly elicit the use of a word without establish any contact with its intended reference). Putnam has then argued that the notion of an appropriate causal chain and even the very notion of a cause are “both context-bound and interest-dependent”.1 This makes the referents of our terms – in case they are fixed by causal chains – in the same way, both context-bound and interest-dependent. Yet, this is incoherent with the metaphysical realist’s view of reference, according to which, reference is fixed once and for all (and it is so context-free and interest-independent).2   I cannot go deeper into Putnam’s new argument in this appendix. I believe, though, that even if it were able to show in a conclusive way that the metaphysical realist cannot appeal to the causal theory of reference without falling into incoherence, the metaphysical realist could still successfully oppose to the Model-Theoretic Argument. For he could contend that the ability to refer to (specific) mind-independent objects and classes of objects is an irreducible property of our concepts (or signs used by us in certain ways).3 This would allow the metaphysical realist to maintain that there is just one intended interpretation I of our language; this also appears compatible with the thesis that the epistemically ideal theory T might turn out to be false on the grounds of the intended interpretation I.  As I have indicated above, Putnam has tried to dismiss solutions of this sort by simply emphasising that they ultimately rely on the belief that our minds are provided with magical powers.4 Indeed, Putnam has never made any argument more substantial than this to defeat those conceptions of reference. There is however nothing logically absurd or a priori incorrect in admitting entities or powers that cannot be explained by today’s science or that are incoherent with the ontology which our present image of reality is grounded in. For our present view of the world, probably, is not the true one, and it can be modified to embody theses and positions formerly refused if, for instance, this turned out to be helpful to solve theoretical and philosophical difficulties. This might just happen with the case at stake. On the one hand, our present theoretical background excludes the existence of sui generis referential powers. But, on the other hand, realism appears to be a position strongly intuitive and natural – perhaps the most 
                                                1Putnam (1992a), p. 47.  2This objection is mostly developed in ibid., Ch. 3 and throughout Putnam (1991a). 3See, for instance, Plantinga (1982) and Lewis (1984).  4See above, p. 223. 
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intuitive and natural in philosophy. If admitting the existence of irreducible referential powers could allow us to defeat the Model-Theoretic Argument and to save central parts of the realist doctrine, I believe that the step would be worth taking. In that case, our present theoretical background should be in part changed in order to contemplate the possibility of irreducible referential properties.1   (c) The Conceptual Relativity Argument  Finally, Putnam has presented an objection against metaphysical realism not based on referential issues and that, during the recent development of his philosophical view, has risen more and more in importance. Let us focus on it.  Putnam has emphasised that there is another point at which the externalist picture proves untenable. That picture affirms that the world consists of a totality of objects and classes of objects that are conceptually independent of our minds. Yet, conceptual relativity – that is, the fact that each of our descriptions presupposes some conceptual choice – involves that we have an indefinite number of conflicting descriptions of such objects and classes of objects, and not just one coherent picture of them.2 As Putnam has emphasised:  [E]lements of what we call “language” or “mind” penetrate so deeply into what we call “reality” that the very project of representing ourselves as being “mappers” of something “language-independent” is fatally compromised from the very start.3   Putnam’s favourite example of conceptual relativity is the mereological one presented in Chapter 1.4 Let us consider it again. Suppose that in the world there are just three objects: A, B and C. The Polish logician Lesniewski’s mereology claims that, given a number of objects in the ordinary sense, there are necessarily other objects that are the “mereological sums” of the first ones. Consequently, Lesniewski would have said that in the world there are not just three objects, but eight. Exactly: A, B, C, A+B, 
                                                1This would seem to reflect also D. Lewis’ opinion. See Levis (1884). 2See Putnam (1987), pp. 18-21 and pp. 32-40. 3Putnam (1990b), p. 28. Putnam’s italic. 4See above, p. 29. 
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B+C, A+C, A+B+C and the null object that is part of all objects.1 This example is meant to show that the even the answer to the simple question: “How many objects are there?” is relative to the conceptual schemes one uses to fix the meaning of the term “object”.  Another example of conceptual relativity concerns an apparently irresolvable conflict between Quine and Kripke. They disagree about the relationship between a material object and the region of space-time it fills. Quine affirms that the material object and the space-time’s region are identical and Kripke claims that they are two different entities.2 Also in this case, according to Putnam, Quine’s and Kripke’s contrasting descriptions depend on the different conceptual schemes they use to fix the meaning of “material object”.  Finally, in Putnam’s opinion, the problem “whether points […] are individuals or properties, particulars or mere limits, etc.”3 is another case of conceptual relativity. This question is traceable to the ancient dispute about the ontological status of the geometrical entities. For instance, Kant conceived points as mere limits of a plane, whereas Leibniz thought of them as parts of the plane.4  To expose the anti-metaphysical consequences of conceptual relativity, Putnam examines the sophisticated metaphysical realist’s account of this phenomenon. On that view, alternative descriptions yielded by conceptual relativity are nothing but different pictures of the same language-independent objects achieved employing different linguistic conventions. According to this perspective, the language-independent items of reality can be identified by looking at the “factual component” of our descriptions (i.e. the bare descriptions of reality). Putnam however contends that this explanation cannot work, as we cannot sharply distinguish the “factual component” from the “conventional component” in any of our descriptions. For every part of any of our descriptions is affected by our conceptual choices.5  The sophisticated realists often use the so-called “cookie-cutter metaphor” to elucidate their point of view. In this metaphor, reality or the language-independent objects would be like dough. The latter would be shaped in different ways by our cookie cutters. The cookie cutters represent our conceptual choices. Yet, in Putnam’s view, the problem is that:                                                 1See Putnam (1987), pp. 18-19. 2See Putnam (1990b), pp. 26-27. 3Putnam (1987), p. 19. 4See ibid. 5See Putnam (1990a), p. x.  
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[T]his metaphor is of no real assistance in understanding the phenomenon of conceptual relativity. [Since, if you] take it seriously, [...] you are at once forced to answer the question “What are the various parts of the dough?”1  The point is that, to answer this question, we have to be working within some conceptual scheme. Since also our most elementary terms, such as those of “object”, “substance” and “existence”, by which we are supposed to specify the language-independent nature of the “invariant elements” of the world, “have a multitude of different uses rather than one absolute ‘meaning’”.2  Before, we have seen a case of different uses of the term “object”. Concerning that example, Putnam stresses that one could simply not dismiss Lesniewski’s concept of object arguing that only the most parsimonious or “natural” conceptual schemes can represent reality correctly. The reason is that we de facto do not respect such a principle. Here is Putnam’s argument:  Aren’t almost all the “objects” we talk about – chairs and tables, our bodies, countries, not mention such scientific objects as solar systems and galaxies – “strange discontinuous object”? It hardly follows that they don’t really exist. Yet, if my body exists, if this chair exists, if the solar system exists, then why should we not say that the discontinuous object consisting of my nose and the Eiffel Tower also exists? This is an unnatural object to talk about, to be sure, but what has the “naturalness” of an object to do with its existence?3  As Alston has indicated, Putnam’s conclusion is that:  Since there is no possibility of any objective rational settlement of the conflict [among different ways of dividing the world into objects and classes of objects], the best diagnosis is that the differences [… among] the positions simply amount to differences in the conceptual frameworks used for representing reality rather than disagreements as to what the one reality is like.4  Consequently, Putnam comes to maintain that:                                                 1Putnam (1991a), pp. 113-114. 2Putnam (1987), p. 19. 3Ibid., p. 35. Putnam’s italic. 4Alston (1996), p. 165. 
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“Objects” do not exist independently of conceptual schemes.1   This statement is the negation of the externalist thesis (E1), according to which, the world consists of some totality of objects and classes of objects that do not depend upon our conceptual schemes. This statement also involves that the externalist tenet (E2), according to which there can at most be one true and complete bare description of the world, is meaningless thesis. For, if objects and classes of objects do not exist independently of conceptual schemes, the very notion of a bare description makes no sense.  The Conceptual Relativity Argument has been the subject of a number of different criticisms;2 on my view, the most straightforward is that Putnam’s argument is grounded in an illicit inference from an epistemological thesis to an ontological one. Conceptual relativity involves that there are alternative descriptions of the objects and the classes of objects that, according to the metaphysical realist, exist independently of our language. Putnam emphasises that there is apparently no objective way to decide among these descriptions. Let us call this epistemological thesis (M). Putnam then concludes, from (M), that objects and classes of objects do not exist independently of our conceptual schemes. Let us call this ontological thesis (O).  To begin with, it is worth noticing that (O) is not a logical consequence of (M). For, one can hold that (O) is false and (M) is true without incurring in any contradiction. Namely, one can maintain, without any logical incoherence, both that objects and classes of objects do exist independently of our conceptual schemes and that we have no way to decide among the incompatible descriptions of them yielded by conceptual relativity. Furthermore, one can legitimately question Putnam’s contention that (O) is to be inferred from (M) as its best explanation. In Putnam’s opinion, the best explanation (or “the best diagnosis”) of our inability to decide among the incompatible descriptions of the objects and classes of objects that, according to the metaphysical realism, constitute the world is that the differences among these descriptions “simply amount to differences in the conceptual frameworks used for representing reality”. Yet, an alternative and prima facie equally plausible explanation not involving (O) is – simply – that our limited cognitive faculties provide us with no epistemic access to the objects and classes of objects that constitute the world. This appears to show that the inference 
                                                1Putnam (1981), p. 52. 2See for instance Alston (1996), Ch. 6. 
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from (M) to (O) is ultimately illicit and that the Conceptual Relativity Argument is incorrect.   Summary of the results achieved   To sum up, in this appendix, I have focused upon Putnam’s most discussed arguments against metaphysical realism, that is: the Brains-in-a-Vat Argument, the Model-Theoretic Argument, and the Conceptual Relativity Argument. The arguments aim to challenge specifically the theses (E1)-(E3) that define the externalist perspective (which is an essential part of metaphysical realism). I have indicated possible counter-objections to these arguments.  In particular, the Brains-in-a-Vat Argument – which aims to hit the thesis (E3) that truth is radically non-epistemic – can be challenged by pointing out that, if it works, its efficacy is at any rate limited. For, it can at most defeat just one of the possible reasons supporting radically non-epistemic conceptions of truth – that is, the conjecture that all sentient beings might be nothing but brains in a vat. But other reasons are available to the metaphysical realist – for example, he could argue that there might be no connection between our non-empirical criteria for the acceptability of theories and the facts independent of our minds, so that our best theories might be false in reality.  The Model-Theoretic Argument again aims to strike the thesis (E3), by showing that the claim according to which truth is radically non-epistemic is conceptually incoherent, as we cannot actually conceive the possibility that the intended interpretation of the epistemically ideal theory T makes T false. Indeed, the Argument just shows that any interpretation able to fit our best operational and theoretical constraints of reference will make T true and not false. I have objected that the intended interpretation of T should be thought of not as one that fits our best operational and theoretical constraints of reference but as one based on suitable causal chains. I have argued that the metaphysical realist can coherently contend that even the word “causes” is already referentially connected to its referents by means of real causal chains. I have emphasised that such an interpretation of T can make T false. Finally, I have pointed out that, if the causal theory of reference did not work, the metaphysical realist could contend that the ability to refer to specific mind-independent objects is an irreducible property of our concepts (or signs used in certain ways). There is in fact nothing logically absurd or a priori incorrect in assuming the existence of entities or powers that 
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cannot be explained by today’s science. This would again provide the metaphysical realist with the notion of an intended interpretation of the epistemically best theory T that can make T false.   Finally, the Conceptual Relativity Argument aims to challenge the thesis (E1) that the world consists of some totality of objects and classes of objects that do not depend on our language and the thesis (E2) that there can at most be one true and complete bare description of the world. I have indicated that this argument rests upon the inference from the epistemological thesis that there is no objective way to decide among conflicting descriptions of the objects and classes of objects constituting the world to the ontological thesis that objects and classes of objects do not exist independently of our conceptual schemes. The ontological thesis is argued by Putnam to be the best explanation of the epistemological thesis. I have suggested that this inference is in reality illicit, for another equally plausible explanation that does not entail the rejection of (E1) and (E2) is available, that is: our limited cognitive faculties provide us with no epistemic access to the objects and classes of objects that do constitute the world.  In conclusion, it seems to me the metaphysical realist has at his disposal promising lines of reply to Putnam’s contention that metaphysical realism has been defeated. 
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